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SURVEY

a journal of East & West studies

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Robert A. Scalapino

Soviet Union

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Communist Parties

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The Cold War

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China and The Road Ahead

Robert A. Scalapino

EACH New Year, with a deep bow toward Chinese tradition, Chairman Mao issues an imperial rescript, embodying in the most succinct manner the priorities for the coming twelve months. At the beginning of 1973, the exhortation was threefold: "dig tunnels deep, store grain everywhere, and never seek hegemony."

In a direct if somewhat cryptic fashion, this message addressed itself to two of the four critical issues confronting the People's Republic of China as the communists move further into their third decade of national control. Perhaps these issues can be posed in the form of questions: Is political stability a prospect for this massive, complex society during the remaining years of this decade? Can China achieve a relatively constant and viable rate of economic growth? What role will the People's Republic play in international affairs? Finally, is the Maoist dream of a New Socialist Man in China being realized?

The 1973 New Year's Message was aimed at questions two and three, but the student of the Chinese scene comes quickly to appreciate the importance and the interrelation of all four issues. Appreciation of their importance, however, and the capacity to provide definitive answers are quite separate matters. No one, including the top Chinese leaders, can currently spell out the future of this major society in conclusive, unambiguous fashion. Moreover, a new danger now looms on the horizon. Over-positive interpretations and analyses can be sealed with the ringing finale—"I was there!" Increasing numbers of foreigners, including Americans, are once again going to China, usually for brief but intensive trips.

As one who has recently returned from a 27-day trip of this type,* let me enter an initial caveat. Such a trip cannot possibly provide firm answers to any of the major questions posed above, nor to a number of subordinate ones as well. Indeed, there is serious risk that one may be badly misled by what one sees, hears, and instinctively feels. This is partly due to the tendency within all of us to superimpose our own values and cultural perspectives upon another environment. Such a tendency surely exists, and for some, it represents an ever-present bias in the direction of ethnocentrism and a proclivity toward being overly critical. Others come to China filled with alienation, even rage,

* As a member of a 14-person group who were guests of the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs, and visited Canton, Peking, Shenyang, Anshan, Nanking, Shanghai and Hangchou and their surrounding environs between 11 December 1972 and 6 January 1973. This article, incidentally, represents my personal views only, and should in no way be interpreted as representing the opinion of other members of the group or the National Committee on US-China Relations of which we were all members.

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against their own society. Their writings consequently reveal far more about their views of their own social order than about China. Each individual, in any case, carries his prejudices with him in some measure, and he may well reinforce them as he goes along.

Even when one attempts to wrestle seriously with the problem of "objectivity," there remains the enormous difficulty of penetrating deeply into a largely closed, self-contained culture. In the most basic sense, all trips to China for the foreigner today are managed trips. Supposing this not to be the case, however, many of the same obstacles would continue to exist. How could one be confident of crucial macro data concerning economics and demography (gratifying as it would be to possess such data), when the evidence clearly indicates that the top-most Chinese leaders are themselves not fully confident of their statistics? Speaking more broadly, does Chou En-lai really know what is going on in Nanking, or conversely, is the key figure of that area, Hsü Shih-yu, fully abreast of current developments in Peking? Moreover how can one accurately tap public opinion in a society where the quotients of xenophobia and inwardness are now powerfully buttressed by the most pervasive authoritarian system that this society has known in its long history?

Even foreigners of Chinese ancestry, equipped with language skills and cultural links unavailable to most others, will continue to have complex problems. Relations with relatives in China apparently range from intimate to somewhat strained. In any case the issue is: Will utter frankness in public evaluations complicate the lives of those remaining in China? Will it also make return trips more difficult? Unfortunately, the element of apprehension appears to be very high at present, and it has influenced the public words and writings of some individuals to a surprising degree. The issue of going or returning to China is of consequence to all foreign journalists and scholars and once again, it has created some substantial restraints. How to be fair is therefore counter-balanced by the thorny problem of how to avoid being intimidated or used.

It is appropriate to dwell upon these matters because China is led today by a political elite which is acutely conscious of the importance of propaganda and dedicated to the cultivation of international opinion. Moreover, it is easy to like the Chinese and to feel comfortable with them, irrespective of political or cultural differences. In every sense, they are magnificent hosts—solicitous of the guest's needs, however troublesome, offering an unexcelled cuisine, and in their personal exchanges, relaxed, friendly and urbane. Criticism is not easy after such hospitality—and particularly when one has been assured that criticism is welcome!

The task of the student, however, is to sort out fact from myth and to seek broad trends, hopeful that, at some point, these may lead to general insights. We are a long way from being able to

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posit with assurance any "laws" or basic theories about Chinese politics under communism. What follows are some highly tentative hypotheses at a lower level, pertaining to the questions posed above. Let us commence with the issue of political stability, with our conclusions set forth at the outset. The likelihood is strong that China will face recurrent political instability during the 1970s. The central issue, however, is whether that instability can be contained at elitist levels, or whether it will permeate the masses, affecting production and the social order itself.

IN a trip to China today, one is quickly made aware of a series of paradoxes. On the political level, one of these is the contrast between the order and discipline that are to be perceived at mass levels, both urban and rural, and the political insecurity that seems to be manifest among at least some of the elite. In those parts of China that have been available to foreigners recently, law and order appear to prevail, and one even suspects that the stories of chaos at the height of the Cultural Revolution in 1966–67 may on occasion have been exaggerated. That event was far more carefully managed than has commonly been realized, even though at times matters got out of hand.

At the beginning of 1973, the scene in the major eastern Chinese cities and their environs was characterized by a remarkable absence of the noise, confusion and gamut of colours and smells that one associated with pre-1949 China, and that still mark such Chinese cities in Asia as Singapore and Hong Kong. Only the children provide an exception. People move in large numbers silently and with apparent purposefulness. Winter clothing ranges from good to patched and faded but adequate. No one appears undernourished. In its essence, the atmosphere is one of functionalism, not spontaneity. Beauty is not created. Rather, it is preserved in the great monuments to China's "feudalist" past, and one visits it as one visits a museum or zoo. Modernity is being made synonymous with drabness. Perhaps this is the price to be paid for commitment to progress with a greater degree of egalitarianism than existed in the past.

When one visits a street committee or a commune work-team, moreover, one senses the secret of the order that prevails. At the grass-roots, the Chinese show their true genius for organization. In the historic past, that genius was expressed through the familial system, from the nuclear family to the extended family and clan. Even in periods of extensive confusion at higher political levels, these units generally held firm. Today, the basic units of Chinese social organization are non-kinship groupings, but they are performing a similar function.

Let us take a Shanghai street committee governing 68,000 people in the heart of the city as an example. That committee and its subunits at the neighbourhood level at least in theory control every aspect of the individual's life, and from cradle to grave. Thus, nursery schools operate

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for infants, while nearby, one discovers a political meeting underway for the elderly. Housewives are putting in an eight-hour day at a neighbourhood "factory," a productive unit often located in one or two rooms of what was once a private home. Working conditions can only be described as bad and wages are much lower than those paid to the large-scale factory worker. Capitalization is purely local, as are the administrative personnel. But the wages, however meagre, contribute to familial income—and the work adds to the national product. Suddenly one is reminded of the Japanese model of modernization and transported back in time to Meiji Japan.

If the children of these working mothers are of school age, they are attending primary and secondary schools located in the area, run either by the state or by the street committee. They are also involved in political activities as "Little Red Soldiers" or via the reorganized Communist Youth League, with the emphasis upon patriotism and service to nation. Soon, they will be sent down to the countryside or go to the factory, to put into practice the exhortations to sacrifice with which they have been schooled. In Shanghai alone, some 900,000 middle school graduates have been "sent down" in the previous four or five years, according to a municipal leader.

Even the surveillance of "bad elements" falls to the street committee. "Counter-revolutionaries" and other "anti-social elements" constitute 1–2 per cent of the populace according to informants, and their activities must be supervised. To leave the district they must receive permission, and reports on them are regularly submitted. Their political rights have been removed, although they are to be treated equally with respect to work and economic remuneration, and the possibility of ultimate rehabilitation is held out for most.

With this range of functions, it is scarcely surprising that a complex system of organization and a sizeable complement of cadres are required. The street committee visited in Shanghai had 24 cadres on its Revolutionary Committee, 13 of whom were full-time, operating in production supervision, public hygiene, propaganda, welfare, and public security affairs. Under this committee, moreover, 12 neighbourhood committees with a total of 194 members were functioning in the same fields. Some 91 of these members received subsidies for their committee services. In addition, a Communist Party Committee was operating at the street and neighbourhood levels, charged with the ultimate responsibility of governance. It had five full-time members at the street level, including one secretary, one deputy secretary, one organizational bureau head, one propaganda bureau head, and one individual in charge of youth work. At the neighbourhood branch level, three Party staff members functioned, a secretary, an organizational director, and a propaganda director.

Were units like this drastically affected by the Cultural Revolution? It is hazardous to generalize from the small sample of local units visited.

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The available evidence, however, strongly suggests that the vital nuclear units of Chinese communist society remained operative and, for the most part, intact despite the magnitude of the crisis that swept over the upper sections of the political system. At the Shanghai street committee visited, for example, there had been minimal changes in leadership, only one Party member had been ousted—on charges of being a follower of Liu Shao-ch'i, and on the other side of the ledger, ten new members had been admitted to the Party. Similar accounts were received at grass-roots levels elsewhere. And it is tempting to believe that if the primary units could survive the upheavals of 1966–68 with limited damage, they might well survive future crises emanating from the top as well.

BEFORE positing this as a probability, however, let us make an effort to fathom the evolving nature of Chinese politics, writ large. Nothing is more difficult, and with respect to such matters, a brief trip to China is of limited significance. Policy differences, factional cleavages, and power struggles are not likely to be shared with foreigners (or the average Chinese citizen) unless and until there is a compelling reason for so doing. Even specially-invited guests learned nothing of the overthrow of Lin Piao and his associates until they reached Hong Kong in October 1971, despite audiences with Chou En-lai and other prominent personages. Yet they had been in China—and in the presence of key actors—in the midst of one of the most dramatic events of recent Chinese political history, and some were regarded as "friends of China."

In my own experience at a later point however, one episode stands out. We were conversing privately, an intelligent, dedicated middle-level cadre and I, having traversed most of the major issues of international relations. "I should like to ask you a question pertaining to the domestic scene," I ventured. "After Chairman Mao passes away, what will be the nature of political leadership?"

After a pause and some effort to solicit my views first, the answer came, prosaic and directly from the words of Chou En-lai: "After Chairman Mao passes away, we shall have collective leadership."

"You have given me a one-sentence answer. I will give you a one-sentence response," I asserted. "After Chairman Mao passes away, China will have a coalition government composed of both civil and military elements, but there is a possibility that the military will predominate in the mixture."

Another pause, and then: "We wish Chairman Mao a long, long life!"

It is from incidents like this that one derives the sense of concern, even insecurity, regarding the future from elements within the elite. And why not? The recent past proved traumatic for every higher level cadre, whether his assignment was in the Party, the state or the military. The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution ironically had its major effect

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not upon the proletariat but upon the elite of this society. And even now, the Party—from whence all power and authority are supposed to flow—seems precariously fragile.

According to recent reports, a tenth Party congress is imminent and after it is held we shall probably have a clearer sense of the current power structure. Up to date, however, Party foundations have rested legally upon the 9th Party Congress, held in April 1969 and intended to bring to an end the political uncertainty that had marked the climatic phases of the Cultural Revolution. But both the Central Committee and the Politburo elected at that Congress were products of the Mao-Lin combination. Thus, they represented merely a snapshot of a scene that proved to be rapidly moving. The 9th Central Committee, indeed, was a hastily improvised and poorly integrated " alliance " intended to replace a once tightly-knit leadership suddenly destroyed.

Gone were scores of old Party and administrative cadres tarred with the brush of Liu Shao-ch'i. In their places sat professional military men who had previously not held high Party posts and " mass representatives " who for the most part were rank amateurs in big league Chinese politics. A third element consisted of the survivors—the veteran Party-administrative cadres who had managed to cling onto Mao, Lin or—in a few cases—Chou, and thereby save themselves. The 9th CC and its Politburo thus represented an uneasy coalition of elements who had not previously worked together and who remained to be integrated. The members covered a wide span not merely in terms of age, birthplace, and socio-economic background, but also with respect to revolutionary generation, political experience and career patterns.

The integration of these disparate elements, moreover, was not to happen because the men who had breathed life into the 9th CC at the top were soon to break violently with each other. Perhaps we shall someday know the full details of Lin Piao's demise. Perhaps we shall not. In any case, the fall of Lin and his associates in the late summer of 1971 threw the process of reconstituting China's national institutions —even the creation of a new Constitution—into confusion.

Some measure of this confusion with respect to the Party itself can be garnered from the astonishing fact that in recent times neither we nor the average Chinese citizen have known the exact membership of the Politburo. Thus we did not know precisely who stood with Mao and Chou at the summit of power in this, the most populous nation of the world. Nor did we know how many members of the 9th Central Committee remained active. The most elemental aspects of the state structure also remain unclear, including the number of ministries and commissions functioning under the State Council. Indeed, it is not an exaggeration to assert that the Chinese Communist Party and state in recent years have come close to constituting a secret society in so far as the scholar and student are concerned. This situa-

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tion cannot be assigned merely to some Chinese penchant for secrecy because in earlier, more "normal" days, basic information of the type noted above was readily available.

THE reason for secrecy has been clear. It has masked weakness, uncertainty, and the problems of reconstructing key institutions still in a state of disarray. Up to date, Chinese national politics remain fluid, involving as they do both the issues of succession and the continuing, commanding presence of Mao Tse-tung. In one sense, the problems of recent years can be seen in impersonal terms: the rise of complex problems attendant to Chinese modernization, and growing divisions among the elite as to fundamental policies; the functional division of an elite once relatively homogeneous, and consequently, a growing diversity of perspectives; and the corrosive effect of failure in such experiments as the Great Leap. In another sense, perhaps, the problems can be seen in personal *cum* institutional terms. In recent years at least, Mao Tse-tung has played a role not unfamiliar in certain respects to the student of the early Western nation-state and giving rise to the same issues. Is the "monarch" within the institutional framework or not? Is he bound by the Constitution or is he above it? Mao's political style and his anomalous institutional position have gone together. In part, Mao has been within the structure; in part, outside and above it. From the latter vantage-point, he has been able to intervene at any time, at any level, without having to take continuous responsibility for his actions. (Granted that intervention was difficult at times, and probably has become progressively more so.)

Mao's tactics have been suited to his position, but here, the analogy with the early Western monarch fades. At periodic intervals when dissatisfied with either the pace or direction of policies (or concerned over the threats to his authority), Mao has resorted to the tactics of the campaign. Playing the role of mobilizer, he has sought to enlist the masses by means of exhortations, promises and visions (hence the heavily ideological quotient in these campaigns).

The result has been great surges of political action that sweep over existing institutional barriers and plant the flag on some distant hill. Such tactics have been costly not merely because they spend lives figuratively speaking by destroying careers and thereby throwing away acquired skills, but because in their very nature, they promote excesses of all types, including the waste of scarce resources. Inevitably, the Maoist style promotes its own dialectic. The surge is followed by the retreat. Unity becomes disunity, and then unity has to be rebuilt.

Maoist politics have thus been directed in some measure against stability, against institutions, against routinization. Indeed, this is the intrinsic reason why Maoism has had an appeal to the most alienated elements of the West. In abstract philosophic terms, to be sure, one can make out a case for anarchism, particularly as the counterpoint to

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the type of statism implicit in the communist system. Herein lies the supreme paradox of Maoism. Janus-faced, Mao has presided over a nation-building process involving an unprecedented degree of centralization and bureaucratism while at the same time, leading a revolutionary process which serves to engender a scepticism if not hostility toward all institutions, including the Communist Party. Moreover, the elements of extreme centralization and bureaucratism are just as essential to Maoist values as are the anti-institutional mass mobilization elements.

As Mao's departure from the political scene nears, China thus inherits the confusion or contradictions inherent in Maoist theory and practice. The optimists or adherents, of course, will see the two central elements not as supreme contradictions but as essential counter-balancing forces capable of being harmonized. It can scarcely be denied, however, that the practical effect of recent events has been to deter institution-building at the national level in the New China, and to raise in a fairly profound manner, questions relating to authority and legitimacy. Indeed, this is one reason why in recent years, the cult of personality revolving around Mao has been so essential. And while reduced from the extreme heights of 1967–1968, the Maoist cult is still very powerful.

THE situation is made more complex by virtue of China's vast size and the diverse character of its various regions. Even if the institutions and personnel of the Centre were far more stable than currently appears to be the case, the issue of centralization versus decentralization would demand continuous attention and experimentation. But at present, that experimentation must take place when the Centre is relatively weak, at least in institutional terms, and governed by a small group of men, most of them elderly, whose interpersonal relations have been subject to sudden, dramatic shifts in recent years.

The Centre-regional issue is further complicated by the fact that the current and future role of the military at the regional, provincial and local levels remains unclear. No one denies that the military were given enormous power at these levels to bring the Cultural Revolution under control. That power, moreover, was confirmed when the Revolutionary Committees were established as administrative units, and when the Party was re-established at the provincial and municipal levels. The higher quotient of professional military men given top administrative and party assignments equalled, even exceeded their positions at the Centre. Moreover, the military regions appeared to take on special significance with respect to politics as well as defence, since most Regional Commanders simultaneously held key provincial Party and administrative posts.

It is therefore logical to be interested in the future of men like Ch'en Hsi-lien (Commander of the Shenyang Military Region encompassing the critically important provinces of Liaoning, Kirin and Heilungchang in Manchuria) since he is simultaneously first secretary of the Liaoning province Party and chairman of the Liaoning province Revolutionary

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Committee. Hsü Shih-yu holds the same positions, namely, those of Commander of the Nanking Military Region, first secretary of the Kiangsu Provincial Party, and chairman of the Kiangsu Revolutionary Committee. Both of these men also symbolize a broader development, namely, the tendency since the Cultural Revolution for the Centre to have a much larger quotient of individuals on the Central Committee and Politburo whose main power base is at the regional or provincial level.

Will it be necessary (and possible) for the Centre to clip the wings of such men at various points, lest they become too powerful, and be guilty of "mountaintopism," namely, creating their own independent kingdoms? Or will they be successfully integrated into a system federal in operation if not in formal name? The answer to these questions will be spelled out in the years immediately ahead. One can venture one prediction with some confidence. Whatever the turn of events, it will not be army versus party. Rather, it will be the question of whether one coalition of party-administrative-military forces is seriously challenged by another in the context of a situation where Centre-regional relations remain fluid and essentially unresolved.

Thus, it is not an answer to assert, as most official spokesmen do, that the men of the People's Liberation Army are thoroughly politicized, completely loyal to the Party, and not susceptible to the proclivities of military men in other modernizing societies. Of course future Chinese communist leaders will be Party men, and some type of civilian-military coalition will be created, assuming the continuing unity of the state. Precisely because China's professional military men are politicized, however, and have been made more politicized by the events of the past decade, their role in governance—at national and sub-national levels—becomes a variable of major importance. Unlike the situation in the Soviet Union where the military is primarily a pressure-group *upon* the Party, in China today, the military is an integral and powerful element *within* the Party. The difference is important.

IN most serious political discussions with the foreigner, the Chinese official is warned against dwelling too heavily upon personalities. Rather, he is told to concentrate upon basic issues such as the conflict between the two lines, the "correct line" of Chairman Mao and the "erroneous line" of his opponents; the absolute supremacy of the Party, and the principle of unified leadership under the Party; and hence, the subordination of other branches of the governance structure, including both the state and the military forces to Party control. Most political briefings are cast in these terms, with scarcely an individual name mentioned except that of Chairman Mao.

As has been suggested, however, even when the issues are viewed in these terms, more questions are raised than can be answered by current data or trends. As an additional example, Party supremacy does not yet extend to the establishment of a Party staff separate from that of the

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administrative system. At the sub-national levels at least, the Party and the Revolutionary Committees share staff in the name of de-bureaucratization—but with uncertain implications in terms of Party-state relations. Overlapping with respect to top personnel is also extensive, once again suggesting the problems engendered in recasting the institutional structure of the People's Republic.

Moreover, in unguarded moments, Chinese officials acknowledge that politics in China can be intensely personal, despite the injunctions noted above. In this connection, a briefing concerning the Cultural Revolution in Shanghai given by one of its senior cadres in December 1972 was fascinating. Suddenly, real people appeared on the political stage. There were heroes like Chiang Ching, Mao's wife, and the two Shanghai leaders often closely associated with her who are playing prominent roles at the Centre, namely, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao and Yao Wen-yüan. The villains were also identified, Ch'en Pi-hsien, the former first secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Committee, and the previous mayor, Ts'ao Ti-ch'iu, both assigned to the camp of Liu Shao-ch'i.

For an instant, one was given a glimpse of a government by men, men locked in mortal combat with the stakes being political survival or disgrace, and the tactics any that could be grasped by shrewd, experienced and, on occasion, desperate political operators. If one views Chinese politics in these terms, what observations are in order?

SOME onlookers see the Centre today as indicative of the extraordinary power of one man—Chou En-lai, who has survived when almost all others immediately around Mao (except his wife) have gone down. They see Chou supporters as now holding the critical gates to the summit: Yeh Chien-ying, the military gate-keeper, a man whose close associations with Chou go back more than four decades; Li Hsien-nien, a close confidant and symbol of the rising importance of the national bureaucracy; and Chou himself, who together with the aging Mao, now holds the reins of the Party, meanwhile selectively rehabilitating important figures such as Teng Hsiao-p'ing, so as to broaden his base in order to face any contingencies during the late-Mao and post-Mao period.

Others see the Centre today as already representative of the coalition politics that will endure in the years ahead. Chou with Mao's support holds a dominant position, and now seeks to rapidly expand the foundations of the Party and all supplementary organizations as well, including the Communist Youth League, the Trade Union Federation, and other fronts. At the same time, however, given the present situation, dominance cannot mean full control. Stability currently hinges upon an intricate combination of forces, both at the Centre and between the Centre and regional-provincial units. Thus, at the Centre, in addition to Chou (who currently has the support of Mao), there is also the Shanghai Group, namely, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao and Yao Wen-yüan, with

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Chiang Ching in the background. While Shanghai in certain respects is a vital region both economically and politically, the role of its leaders at the Centre seems due to their personal ties with Mao's wife—a woman now seemingly determined to play a continuing political role, but slipping according to some accounts.

Should the military and the bureaucracy be considered independent or quasi-independent elements of the coalition? In recent years, there is strong evidence suggesting that at points of crisis, the old Marshals—Chu Teh, Liu Po-ch'eng, Nieh Jung-chen, and until his death, Ch'en Yi—were utilized by Chou and Mao because of their prestige and the bonds of loyalty established between them and their subordinates during their long years of command. Thus, when Lin Piao and his associates fell, it was most frequently the military proteges of these men who rose, both in the regions and provinces and at the Centre. Whether one places primary emphasis upon old Field Army affiliations or upon a more intricate pattern of interpersonal relations, military politics has clearly involved associational patterns, with efforts at balance and generally reflecting the status at any given time of the key military figures of the past.

The bureaucracy also, while in some respects the personal bailiwick of Chou En-lai, has at least potentially an organizational quality and perspective of its own. If one thinks in institutional terms, therefore, the rise of Li Hsien-nien may represent the beginnings of a rehabilitation for the technician and the expert. In each of the main political branches, however, be it Party, state or military, the competition and tension between generalist and specialist is likely to be protracted, with the balance shifting from time to time, but with the generalist probably destined for dominance for the foreseeable future.

IN reality, the current status of Chinese politics is probably best grasped by combining the two perspectives outlined above. It is now appropriate to return to our point of departure. Bringing to bear such data as is available, we must assume that recurrent political instability in Chinese national politics is inevitable in the years immediately ahead. Most critical issues have not been fully or finally resolved. Of equal importance, the process of institution-building—difficult under the best of circumstances—has been interrupted by Maoist interventions. Hence, Chinese politics continues to be heavily dependent upon men rather than procedures, and institutional jurisdictions remain confused. Finally, Mao's death will itself bring to a close one political system, and it will also coincide more or less with the deaths of an entire revolutionary generation.

If political instability is very likely, however, it does not necessarily follow that China will be reduced to chaos. Such a development cannot be totally ruled out, but it seems more likely that the nation and its people will survive political crises at the Centre without crippling econo-

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mic or political consequences. Many such crises may pass as did the Lin Piao affair, without the masses being aware of events until long after their climax. If grass-roots stability is maintained, it will be due in no small measure to the operational and political strength of China's nuclear organizations, and their capacity for a considerable degree of self-sufficiency in time of stress. It will also be due to the relative success of the campaign to inculcate nationalist priorities in all Chinese, elite and masses.

Such events as the Lin Piao episode, however, can take their toll. They contribute greatly to elitist insecurity. Moreover, having been taught by Chairman Mao that institutions are as fallible as the men running them, even the masses may give their future allegiance in more qualified fashion. (Perhaps they have in the past.)

ONE scarcely needs to assert that the politics of China will powerfully affect that nation's prospects for economic development. In turning to this second question, let us again state our conclusions, and then briefly seek to defend them. Despite recent gains, the Chinese economy remains in fragile condition. Economic development has been generally satisfactory, but not spectacular during the past decade. In agriculture, dependence upon weather remains high. In industry, critical policy decisions confront the leadership. Assuming no political chaos, one important variable, and the absence of serious policy errors, an equally important variable, the Chinese leaders could increase the pace of development by engaging in more intensive economic intercourse with other nations, particularly the more advanced industrial societies. Such a course, however, faces political obstacles. It must be assumed, therefore, that while the economic policies of the past will be modified, there will be no radical departure from past policies. Hence, Chinese economic development will continue to be a relatively slow, painful process with periodic setbacks. The deeply pessimistic projections of an earlier period, however, do not seem warranted, unless political factors intervene.

What evidence exists to sustain such conclusions? Let us first deal merely with some impressions. Most foreign visitors to China have remarked upon the fact that the people whom one sees on the streets look reasonably well fed and at least adequately clothed. I agree with that statement. One of the most important accomplishments of the communists seems to have been that of putting a foundation under the lowest socio-economic classes, guaranteeing them a minimal livelihood, hence, some modicum of human dignity. One makes such a statement, of course, aware of the fact that he has seen only a small part of China, primarily the large eastern cities, and not the most underdeveloped regions. Nevertheless, in its control of the prices and distribution of necessities, the government has built an impressive record for itself.

There is equal visual evidence, however, that China remains an

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extraordinarily poor society. One cannot blame the communists for this situation. It is one which they inherited. And if they have raised some of the poorest segments of the old order, they have also eradicated private wealth and the style of life which it bred. More troublesome, perhaps, is the indication that a considerable proportion of the former middle class have also been reduced in living standards.

Despite such indications, however, China today is far from an egalitarian society. Wage differentials are surprisingly high. In the larger urban industries, they range from 18–22 yuan per month for beginning apprentices to 104–110 yuan per month for top skilled workers. Wages for technical and administrative personnel tend to go from 50 to 200 yuan per month, with some chief engineers and managers making over 300 yuan monthly.

The average urban industrial wage would appear to be about 60 yuan per month (for a worker with 10–15 years' experience), but the full-time employees of urban household industries are currently making half or less than one-half of that amount. In the small commune "factories," also, workers make only 30–40 yuan monthly. Even so, these wages are considerably higher than the farmers' income. Per capita farm income generally appears to range between 120 and 170 yuan per year. The rural-urban gap thus remains significant, although we must take account of the fact that farm families raise much of their own food other than grain on their private plots.

In universities too, there is a wide differential. A beginning teacher usually starts at 50 yuan per month. A senior Professor (of whom there are exceedingly few) might make up to 330 yuan monthly.

Income is meaningful only in terms of what it will purchase. In general terms, the current picture is one of making a minimal livelihood available to all, but with only a few able to enjoy a comfortable life, and with true luxury seemingly reserved for the foreign guest. Prices for basic necessities—essential food, cloth and housing—are reasonable, but these necessities, particularly food, consume the great bulk of the average family income even when, as is increasingly frequent, both husband and wife are employed. Housing, moreover, while very inexpensive, is also of a most rudimentary kind. In the great metropolitan areas, families generally live in one or two rooms, sharing kitchen and toilet facilities with two or three other families. Facilities for most farm families have changed very little since 1949.

Non-necessities remain expensive in relation to wages. A new bicycle, for example, costs between 138 and 172 yuan, approximately two to two-and-one-half months' wages for an experienced industrial worker (or the per capita cash income of a farm worker for a year). A small transistor radio requires at least one-half month's industrial wage; a domestically produced wristwatch from one and three-quarters to two months' wages; and a reasonably good pair of men's leather shoes, one-quarter of a month's wages (all figures based upon a wage of 60 yuan per

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month). China, in short, is not a consumer's paradise, although the variety of goods to be seen in the major department stores is surprisingly great, with quality varying considerably.

These facts are not damaging to the communists' case, given the background of their society and its stage of development. It is necessary to set them forth, however, because reports from certain visitors make it appear that in some miraculous way, the average Chinese citizen is currently enjoying a comfortable, even prosperous life. In actuality, the keynote is spartanism, not luxury; sacrifice, not indulgence; puritanism, not revelry. For the overwhelming majority of Chinese, life remains both harsh and monotonous, the climb upward exceedingly difficult.

What hard macro data exist to confirm or deny the above assertions? Precise statistical evidence of the most crucial type remains scanty and subject to challenge. As noted earlier, one suspects that even the top Chinese leaders cannot trust many of the figures given them. Nevertheless, using both official statements and the estimates of foreign observers, one can be reasonably confident of the basic trends.

LET us look first at the vital population-food issue. Officials now report that population growth has been reduced to 2 per cent. It is admitted that the rural hinterland still represents a problem, with the striking gains taking place in such cities as Shanghai. Is 2 per cent a reality or a target? Outside expert opinion is divided. All agree, however, that there have been impressive advances in the battle to slow the growth of the world's largest nation. It is possible that the population of the People's Republic is now increasing by a mere 14–15 million per year!

Grain production is also a debatable matter. For example, Chinese authorities have asserted that production in 1971 was 246–250 million metric tons (compared to a high in the 1950s of 204 million metric tons, in 1958), and approximately 4 per cent less in 1972 due to severely adverse climatic conditions. Certain Western experts believe that the 1971 figure should be somewhat lower, between 210–220 million metric tons.

Unquestionably, grain production has risen in the 1960s, perhaps on an average of 3 per cent per annum. The increases have been due primarily to water conservation work, including the strides made in irrigation. This has enabled double and triple cropping over a wider area. Per *mou* yield has also increased significantly in some regions, as a result of improved seeds, more fertilizer, and other advances made in scientific agriculture. In addition, China was blessed with a lengthy cycle of good to excellent weather during the period. The year 1972, on the contrary, was a bad harvest year and, according to some reports, 1973 has also presented problems. A second consecutive setback in agricultural production would call attention once again to the marginal popu-

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lation-food ratio and emphasize the fragile nature of the Chinese economy. Hence, Mao's injunction to "store grain everywhere."

Industrial production has increased at a higher, albeit uneven, rate, causing overall GNP gains to average 4–6 per cent in the past decade. American specialists tend to accept a figure of 4–5 per cent while certain Japanese experts believe the gain has been slightly higher. This is a modest to respectable showing, depending upon which figures are accurate. If sustained or improved, it could greatly abet political stability. It is not, however, a spectacular accomplishment and falls considerably behind the growth rates of certain other developing nations.

WHAT of the future? The basic pattern of Chinese development appears to be set. The key, or "main link" as the communists put it, will continue to be agriculture—*and* population control. Strenuous efforts will be made to advance water conservation and the three "ations," namely electrification, chemicalization, and mechanization. Semi-skilled manpower will be channelled to this sector of the economy, with millions of "educated youth," mostly middle school graduates, being sent down to the countryside both to alleviate pressures upon the metropolitan centres and to advance the development of the hinterland. China has only begun its era of "Go West, Young Man!"

Commune self-reliance will continue to be stressed, primarily because capital for rural development remains scarce. Thus, small and medium industries, rural based and using local resources, will be strongly pushed. Is the combination of patriotic appeals and economic incentives attractive enough to sustain the level of voluntarism essential if this programme is to work over the long haul? And can political controls remain strong enough to sustain support when voluntarism falters? The future of China in no small measure hinges upon answers to these questions.

Meanwhile, industrialization will also remain a prime target, being a prerequisite both for state power and an improved livelihood for the masses. The effort will be to abandon antiquated methods and machinery while acquiring improved labour skills. In recent times, a serious debate has been taking place within elitist circles relating to these matters. Up to date, Maoist economic policy has been associated with such themes as self-reliance, man over machines, and the type of human mobilization tactics that overwhelm a target at whatever cost in efficiency. Even now, the slogans on factory blackboards and Commune propaganda rooms call for "doing it oneself." In Shenyang, for example, the visitor is told with great enthusiasm that Liaoning province, one of China's most important heavy industry centres, has become self-sufficient in grain, overturning Liu Shao-ch'i's "revisionist doctrine" that the province should concentrate upon its specialty and import food.

Yet it is clear that self-sufficiency in many instances can be extremely uneconomic. If China is to take full advantage of the era in which we

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live, it must interact on a much more intense level with the advanced industrial societies. From them, it can acquire the technology and the machines necessary to leap over decades of painful pioneering. Obviously, many of China's leaders now recognize this fact, and while the signs are mixed, there are strong indications that " Maoist economic principles " are in the course of being modified. In the coming decade, we can expect the People's Republic to be increasingly receptive to advanced technology from abroad and to some expansion of trade.

Will the economic turn outward be a dramatic one? Probably not. First, there are the obstacles imposed by China's limited foreign exchange, although the recent discoveries of off-shore oil deposits promise to help with respect to this problem. Beyond this, the nationalist surge currently so intense makes itself manifest in economic as well as political affairs. In a curious manner, it contributes to the conservatism governing communist economic policies. Up to date, long-range credits have been rejected in favour of medium-range loans based upon commercial terms, and a determination not only to be " self-reliant," but also to be " debt-free." In addition, Chinese leaders are pledged to limit economic involvement with any one country so as to avoid the type of over-dependence that ended so disastrously in the case of the Sino-Russian relationship. Most importantly, the communist system itself inhibits the type of intense interaction involving a full range of capital assistance, large scale technician importation, and joint economic operations.

The " most probable case," therefore, is that the economic turn outward will be " within the system." It will represent a significant modification of the old isolationist policies, but foreign trade and technical aid will still constitute a relatively small portion of the total Chinese economy. Development will be abetted, but not dramatically accelerated. There is a bare possibility that spurred by their great needs, and aware of broad, new Russian moves, the Chinese will undertake truly major alterations in economic relations, alterations that affect the system itself in far-reaching ways. But this seems improbable.

LET us now turn to the third question posed at the outset, namely, China's role in the world, again setting forth our general hypotheses first. China's foreign policies will continue to be strongly influenced by the priorities that must be accorded domestic, political and economic problems. As in the case of domestic policies, moreover, foreign policies will continue to be marked by a distinction between rhetoric and action—so that both ideology and national interests can be accommodated. On balance, nationalism will prevail over competitive influences, including Marxism, in shaping Peking's foreign policies. Those policies will mirror the drive of a major society for international influence and recognition. While China's leaders want their society to have global political influence, however, priority will be given to regional concerns in Asia. Here, the major objective will be to avoid war, particularly with either superpower,

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while strengthening China's regional position. To these ends, Peking will use historic methods, varying state-to-state, people-to-people, and comrade-to-comrade relations in an effort to achieve results compatible with the political leaders' perception of Chinese national interests. Peking, however, will enter into no alliance, preferring an independent policy based essentially upon balance of power politics.

The general themes outlined above suggest a mixed picture from the standpoint of issues such as peaceful coexistence and international harmony. For example, in the foreseeable future, China is not likely to participate in meaningful discussions on nuclear weapons' control. Peking is determined to cultivate power in military as well as political terms. The current Chinese view is that one must bargain from as much strength as possible, whether with a superpower or with a small nation on one's peripheries. Hence, the drive to obtain a credible nuclear deterrent will continue. The portion of the Chinese national budget currently devoted to military expenditures must be very large. Simultaneously, the effort is to develop several nuclear weapon systems and to modernize selective elements of the conventional military structure. Moreover, domestic as well as foreign contingencies dictate that a large standing army be maintained. Even the casual visitor quickly becomes aware of this fact, since green (olive-coloured uniforms) vies with blue in capturing attention as one views the sea of humanity both in urban centres and throughout the country.

Despite the emphasis upon military development, the general tone is defensive, particularly vis-à-vis the "superpowers." Mao's injunction, "dig tunnels deep," accurately conveys the mood. China's leaders know that their military capacities cannot match those of the Soviet Union (or the United States) in the conceivable future. Consequently, their policy towards the Soviet Union today is similar to that conducted against the United States at an earlier point: confrontation—with caution. War must be avoided—but so must concessions, at least for the present.

DO China's leaders really fear a Soviet military attack? Their own people, and assorted foreign guests, are told that they do. Undoubtedly, that *was* the prime concern in 1968–69 after Czechoslovakia, the Brezhnev Doctrine, and veiled threats, passed second-hand, to the effect that if Chinese intransigence led to war, the conflict would not be limited to conventional weapons. And even now, both sides keep men and equipment in vast quantities along the lengthy border. There is good reason to believe, however, that the main concern with Russia today in Peking is not the imminent threat of war, but the possibility of Soviet involvement in domestic Chinese politics, particularly in the event of a post-Mao crisis over succession. Whatever the precise facts, the Lin Piao Affair—as officially explained in Peking—underlines that fear.

Behind this concern lies another: the likelihood that the issue of

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Sino-Soviet relations will be a recurrent one in Chinese decision-making circles. The present policy of confrontation is both costly and risky for China. Could it not be logically argued that certain concessions to the Soviet Union so as to reduce tension would be in China's interests, and would not necessitate a return to the old alliance? Indeed, such a proposal has on more than one occasion been advanced in the recent past, and it has cost certain individuals their political careers. Mao and Chou have crossed the Rubicon on this question, or so it appears. But is it not inevitable that the question will be raised again when one or both are gone? And are not their present policies dedicated in part to making any reversal as difficult as possible?

A case can also be made out against improved relations. One does not need to be reminded of the depth of the animus now current, nor the lengthy historic background of xenophobia and exclusiveness shared by these two societies. Further, some of the issues that divide China and Russia are not easily resolved. Thus in a succession crisis, the premium might be upon taking an anti-Soviet rather than a pro-Soviet stance. Despite these facts, however, there remain powerful reasons why some reduction of tensions would represent a rational course of action for Peking's leaders.

IF limited rapprochement between China and the USSR is a distinct possibility before the end of the 1970s, Chinese policies towards both the United States and Japan in the meantime are a direct reflection of the present status of Sino-Soviet hostility. The extraordinary shift in Peking's attitudes towards both nations can only be understood against the background of 1968–69. At present, the Chinese leaders have two broad objectives: the negative one is to prevent any Soviet-American or Soviet-Japanese *entente* that would be deleterious to Chinese interests, and to render ineffective what Peking regards as a Soviet attempt at containment of China via an Asian arc of alliances; the positive objective is that of utilizing certain Japanese and American capacities for China's development.

Current Chinese policies toward the United States and Japan, while dramatically different from those of a few years ago, are not without ambiguities. While cultivating state-to-state relations in both situations, Peking applies Cold War rhetoric when attacking those policies or personalities with which it takes issue. Moreover, in China's image of the world, the United States still occupies—with the Soviet Union—a threatening "superpower" position, one that challenges all other nations in some measure.

The anti-superpower themes so assiduously pursued by China are coupled with a new interest in "the second intermediate zone," namely, Western Europe and Japan, both of which areas are seen as regions intimately connected with American and Russian power, and both of which are also of potential utility to China's economic growth. Hence,

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among its objectives, Peking seeks to weaken Japanese ties with the United States as well as with the Soviet Union.

MEANWHILE, China promises " the third world " that it will *never* seek hegemony, attempting on the one hand to separate itself from the two superpowers, and on the other, to alleviate those fears and suspicions that remain widespread among the nations on China's borders. Can China continue its march towards military power while at the same time, successfully reassuring its small neighbours that it does not intend to interfere in their internal affairs, and living up to those assurances?

Chinese policies to date are not wholly encouraging. Peking has repeatedly indicated at least some commitment to the Asian communist movement, while publicly averring that " revolution cannot be exported." More importantly, comrade-to-comrade relations, along with other types of involvement in the internal affairs of other nations can be raised or lowered as a part of a carrot and stick policy. When a small nation is " friendly," Peking offers an exchange of tribute, defined in modern terms as economic interaction, cultural exchange and political reciprocity, with the emphasis upon official channels. When a government is deemed " unfriendly " (and the determination lies with Peking), people-to-people, or comrade-to-comrade relations can be expanded, in an effort to bring the maximum pressure to bear upon the recalcitrant parties in power.

It is very likely that such policies will continue, and it is possible that as China's power grows, so will her demands upon neighbouring societies—despite the insistence that hegemony will never be sought. Heavily armed nations currently engaged in powerful nationalist drives and with a strong xenophobic heritage do not generally make the best neighbours. Thus, the security and independence of the small countries of Asia—whatever their political complexion—would seem best assured if they can keep in balance their relations with all of the major societies of the area while acquiring the additional safeguard of major power agreements on peaceful coexistence and/or regional security compacts.

The restraints upon any overt Chinese expansionist policies, however, should be fully appreciated. First, as we have indicated, there is a strong likelihood that extensive domestic problems will remain and require top priority, both of attention and of resources. If logic prevails, the premium should be upon a low-risk foreign policy. To be sure, foreign adventurism is not unknown as an attempted antidote to domestic ills, and the usefulness of a foreign scapegoat has repeatedly been demonstrated—by Peking as well as others. When words are translated into actions, however, costs can rise precipitously, especially if the actions threaten to evoke retaliation from another major state.

As long as relations with the Soviet Union are bad, moreover, China should be doubly inhibited from contracting enemies or risks elsewhere.

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Indeed, this was the prime foreign policy lesson of the Cultural Revolution and its immediate aftermath.

Thus, if Chinese foreign policy is not likely to display the selfless altruism or spirit of internationalism so enthusiastically proclaimed by its spokesman, neither is it apt to pursue a blatantly adventurist policy, at least in the near future. Rather, China's leaders will attempt to gain their ends through fairly complex policies involving carrot-and-stick tactics combined with balance of power politics.

FINALLY, let us turn to the question of the "New Socialist Man" in China. Are new values and attitudes, new behavioural patterns being created among China's citizens? The answer can be either a qualified "yes," or a qualified "no," depending upon whether one wishes to see the glass as half-empty or half-full.

Not in modern times has the average Chinese been subjected to such constant and severe discipline, at least from public sources. Nor have such intensive indoctrination methods been applied at mass levels. The current intensity of nationalist propaganda, for example, can scarcely be exaggerated. From nursery school to the political meetings of the elderly, the themes are patriotism, sacrifice, love for the Fatherland and Chairman Mao, and hatred for the enemy—class or foreign. Today's Chinese citizen is rarely out of sight or sound of these messages.

It is inconceivable that the present admixture of coercion and persuasion utilized, or available to the state has not had some effect in remoulding thought and action, at least among the younger generations. Moreover, the society is on the move, despite the multitude of mistakes and retrenchments, and there is a sense of purpose, a set of fixed, clearly-defined national goals.

The "New Man" in China is more nationalist, one may presume. He (she) is prepared to sacrifice for nation and leader. Is he also socialist? Just as Chinese tradition bequeathed to the modern era a strong sense of cultural identity and correspondingly powerful feelings of the foreign character of the external world that have been useful in the cultivation of nationalism, so it also bequeathed the heritage of cooperativism, albeit a cooperativism centering upon family and clan. Thus, socialism, Chinese-style, may have represented a wrenching process in certain respects, but it has not involved a completely new way of life. Moreover, the current separation between rhetoric and reality masks the degree to which old instincts and behaviour patterns survive, even flourish. For example, economic incentives are very much the order of the day, and the desire for material benefits is growing, indeed, is encouraged by the new regime.

IN point of fact, the "New Socialist Man" or China bears a decided resemblance to the "Old Modern Man" of the West. First, his political values are increasingly centered around the nation-state. Pat-

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riotism is now " in " in China. Nationalism reigns triumphant, with its promises and its risks. Themes of love and hate abound, and the drive for a powerful state is defended as a necessary prerequisite for establishing the dignity of each citizen.

Second, status is increasingly associated with education, and an ever higher premium is placed upon science and technology. This development is occurring, to be sure, under conditions strongly antithetical to intellectual freedom. The Cultural Revolution left China's universities in deplorable condition, and that situation continues. A recent Peking *People's Daily* editorial on politics and art, moreover, makes it clear that Stalinism in pristine form currently holds sway in the cultural sphere. Echoing old, familiar themes, the editorial proclaims that all literature and art are the expressions of a given class and political viewpoint. Hence, despite the views of " swindlers like Liu Shao-ch'i," there can be no " art for art's sake " or " art above politics." The inevitable conclusion follows: " Political criteria should be put in first place, while art should be subordinate to politics." [1] Despite these strictures, and the likelihood of a long, uphill struggle before the cultural arena can be liberated from conformity and mediocrity, the inexorable demands of modernization will continue to advance education, and increasing numbers of Chinese will worship at the altar of science.

Finally, China's " New Socialist Man," like the West's " Old Modern Man," is being taught that material progress is the central task and the primary goal of government. The concept of progress—itself a revolutionary idea—is also " in " in contemporary China, and one assumes that at some point, the Chinese citizen will hold party and state accountable, insisting that progress be related increasingly to his personal livelihood.

To the Westerner and to the Japanese, the above themes are all familiar aspects of an era through which we have been passing, despite our diverse cultural backgrounds. Ironically, the most novel, and possibly the most radical changes taking place in human values and behaviour today are coming from certain sectors of the post-modern West. Here, a portion of the citizenry, surfeited with affluence and weary of routinization, denounce their state, decry their religion, and even disavow progress. " Post-Modern Man " in this form may be a temporary phenomenon and, at most, only one reaction among many to the current problems of the " advanced world," but he is symptomatic of the " After modernity, what? " issue—an issue that will not trouble the " New Socialist Man " of China for decades, if ever.

In essence, China is best seen as a part of the modernizing world, despite the fact that its ideology—or more precisely, its political system—is a variable of major consequence. As a developing society controlled by an elite committed to communism, China currently lives with a series of contradictions or paradoxes. Rhetoric and practice are in

[1] Chin Li, " Persistently Uphold the Unity of Politics and Art," *Jen-min Jih-pao*, 17 May 1973.

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striking and seemingly growing divergence. The relative weight to be given centralization and decentralization, an old problem with new dimensions in China's socialist era, is constantly debated, with "solutions" that appear to follow the Hegelian dialectic. The supremacy of politics at one level is contradicted by the supremacy of economics at another; Marx notwithstanding, structure and superstructure seem mixed and confused. Internationalism is the professed supreme objective, but nationalism dominates the New China at every point. Institutionalization and collective, impersonal governance via the mass line are the stipulated goals, but the personalization of all authority via the cult of Chairman Mao has constituted the essence of the political system in recent times, with the result that all political institutions are presently weak and elitist cliquism poses a serious threat.

Every nation lives with contradictions. The fascination of China lies partly in the fact that in the world's largest nation, the scope and depth of current contradictions appear greater. Whether, and how they are resolved or contained could well be of major consequence to the international order of the late twentieth century.

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New Politics in Russia?

Sidney Ploss

WHEN Khrushchev was the leader of Soviet policy, the nature of his power was frequently debated by Western analysts. Some portrayed him as an absolute personal ruler, who appointed and removed the members of the Soviet Communist Party Presidium (Politburo), the strategic hub of decision-making in Moscow. Although it was imagined that Khrushchev allowed freer expression of views within his entourage than had Stalin, the final decisions were assumed to have been his alone. Others held that Khrushchev's power was limited by colleagues whom he could neither oust nor always override in policy discussions. A decade later, this Kremlin mystery remains unsolved and specialists in Soviet politics are arguing about the still more basic question of the relationship between the top Party leadership and the rest of society.

A number of commentators believe that Khrushchev's downfall marked a real break in the history of the USSR. They acknowledge that the Brezhnev leadership tolerates no direct challenge to the basic legitimacy of one-party rule or to its ultimate authority. The repression of intellectual dissenters and halt to the debunking of the Stalin era is recognized. And a "military/heavy-industrial complex" is presumed to exist and carry great weight in the policy process. Nevertheless, these commentators talk of a devolution of power to the major institutional centres—regional Party machinery and State administrative bureaucracy—from which ideas and power are said to flow up to the Politburo. In the model of "institutional pluralism," the leading political actors are Party officials, civil servants, scholars and educators. The Politburo is thought to mediate the conflicts among these political participants in an environment of increasing public policy debate and erosion of ideological certainty under the impact of expanding sociological research.[1]

In the author's opinion, the interpretation of Soviet movement away from the dictatorship of the Politburo towards a pluralism of elites stands in need of greater documentary support. The data available seem to caution against drawing the kind of premature conclusions about evolution of the Soviet system which so coloured foreign reportage during Lenin's New Economic Policy, Stalin's constitutional image-making and Khrushchev's intermittent flirtation with liberalizing currents of communist opinion. What the facts appear to show is that the post-Khrushchev leadership is firmly in control of the levers of political command and has resurrected many of the secretive policy-making procedures and orthodox attitudes of a bygone age. The

[1] See, e.g. Jerry F. Hough, "The Soviet System. Petrification or Pluralism?," *Problems of Communism* (March–April 1972), pp. 25-45.

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present article looks at recent aspects of the world of Soviet politics which highlight an evidently successful effort by the supreme leaders of the USSR to keep that country going along authoritarian rails.

IRONICALLY, the gravest warnings about the danger of personal dictatorship over Soviet affairs were voiced by men who created and elaborated upon the myth of "socialist democracy." Yet in 1922, Lenin observed in a private letter to senior Party workers that Stalin as General Party Secretary had "accumulated in his hands immeasurable power and I am not certain whether he will be always able to use this power with the required care." [2] Almost 40 years later, the new Party Program written under Khrushchev's aegis outlined steps to rule out "the possibility of an excessive concentration of power in the hands of individual officials" and to prevent "cases of their getting beyond the control of the collective." [3] In the meantime, quite a few crucial policy decisions which shaped the lives of Soviet citizens were taken by no more than a handful of Politburo members, and without any canvassing of public opinion. This situation went unchanged between the adoption of the Party Program in 1961 and the overthrow of Khruschev in October 1964 for, among other things, deciding matters of state on his own.

The style of rulership was altered on the heels of Khrushchev's ouster. The First Party Secretary had used some unsettling techniques to maintain the sway of the main Party office over the bureaucracies which execute Kremlin directives. The leading officials at lower echelons were often shifted and outsiders brought in to combat the vice of putting local above all-Soviet interests. New agencies were set up to share authority with traditional ones that had grown too independent. Khrushchev also occupied the topmost State post, in part so as to ensure the fullest conformity of the organs for implementing Party policies. After Khrushchev, personnel changes were sharply reduced in number and vacant posts at the grass roots were often filled by local officials. Extraordinary organs which Khrushchev had set up as counterweights to the established Party apparatus and State agencies were abolished. The posts of Party leader and premier were separated in a move touted as a guarantee against strongmen and arbitrary decision-making.[4] Not since Stalin's rise to power in the 1920s did Kremlin policies appear to be so tailored to satisfy the craving of the governing class for stability and security.

Very soon, however, signs began to crop up which suggested that the inner circle of political leaders was holding the reins of power rather than allowing them to slip into the hands of lesser figures. Great rights of appointment and operational control were indicated to lay at the disposal of the central leadership. As early as December 1964, the

[2] V. I. Lenin, *Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii. Izdanie Piatoe* (Moscow, 1964), Vol. 45, p. 345.
[3] *Pravda*, 1 Nov. 1961.
[4] N. S. Shevtsov, N. I. Kolchenko, *Vozrastaniye Rukovodiashchey Roli KPSS v. Period Stroitelstva Kommunizma* (Moscow, 1967), pp. 325–26.

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Politburo's decisive say in determining who should run the local Party apparatus was registered through the attendance of Politburo member Shelepin at a meeting held in the town of Stavropol to install the new Party first secretary of the region.[5] The same function of tutelage from on high was later performed by Brezhnev in Gorky (1965); federal Party secretary Kapitonov in Baku (1969); and Politburo member Suslov in Leningrad (1970).[6] While giving back to local Party officials a certain leeway for operational manoeuvre, the Kremlin oligarchs made it clear that nothing like a free hand might be envisaged. A Party source affirmed that abolition of Khrushchev's special Party Bureau for the Russian Republic tended to broaden the scope for display of executive initiative by regional Party committees, but hastened to add that the committees worked " under the direct leadership " of the Politburo and Secretariat, or central Party headquarters.[7] The policy proposals of republic-level Party organs must indeed be approved at the central Party office before action could be taken. Party officials in Moscow had to bless an " initiative " of the Byelorussian leadership for local building enterprises to adopt pledges to speed-up the construction of light industry facilities and commission them ahead of schedule; and the central Party staff had to sanction " on an experimental basis " a request from Moldavian communist bosses to place the management functions of local collective farms under the farm councils which are run by Party officials and rural administrators.[8]

As has been usual during most of Soviet history, the Party apparatus remains the supreme bureaucracy in the Soviet system. It dominates the State administration through the schedule of appointments (*nomenklatura*), or the list of key posts for managing public affairs that can be filled only by candidates who have been chosen or confirmed by a given Party office. The chief of criminal police in the Leningrad Region, for example, is selected in the " CPSU Central Committee," meaning the Politburo or Secretariat.[9] On a lower rung of the hierarchical ladder, the *nomenklatura* of a Party committee in a city of about one million inhabitants may encompass about 800 jobs, including chairmen and deputy chairmen of district government committees, directors and chief engineers of large factories and building sites, and leaders of higher educational institutions.[10] The post-Khrushchev leadership has moved to expand *nomenklatura* so that scientists in particular become dependent on Party workers for their career fortunes. " In many institutes," writes a Party secretary of Moscow city, " besides the deputy directors and leaders of scientific subdivisions, senior associates responsible for

[5] Stravropol Radio, 1 Dec. 1964.
[6] *Pravda*, 28 Dec. 1965, 15 July 1969 and 17 Sept. 1970.
[7] P. A. Rodionov, *Kollektivnost—Vysshii Printsip Partiinogo Rukovodstva* (Moscow, 1967), p. 224.
[8] *Sovetskaia Belorussiia*, 1 March 1973 and Kishinev Radio, 10 March 1973.
[9] *Leningradskaia Pravda*, 25 Oct. 1972.
[10] *Lektsii po Partiinomu Stroitelstvu. Vypusk 1* (Moscow, 1971), p. 329.

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formulating scientific guidelines have been included in the *nomenklatura* of Party committees and bureaus." [11] Stalin's language is invoked to explain the deeply partisan workings of *nomenklatura.* A Party manual asserts that: "If leaders were chosen according to professional criteria alone, we would stray on to the path of narrow commercialism." [12] As far back as 1924, Stalin had lectured students at the Sverdlov Communist University about "this disease of narrow commercialism" which afflicted some Bolsheviks and caused them to function energetically, but without "revolutionary perspective." [13] Today's Party author who uses Stalinist terminology to rationalize *nomenklatura* appears to be saying in effect that if Soviet managerial groups were released from the fetters of the Party machine the dictatorial methods of conducting social relations which are prescribed by the Party's inherited ideology might yield ground to a Western system of contracts that are freely accepted. It will later be seen from a glance at published debate in 1965–68 that such apprehension in political circles is by no means unwarranted.

The State experts have certainly followed in the footsteps of their predecessors and tried to challenge the basis of Party-machine supremacy which the *nomenklatura* system represents. In 1968, Premier Kosygin made a well-publicized inspection trip to an outlying region where the local Party secretary was complaining that State experts "do not consult with us about the recruiting and placing of personnel and are therefore making gross mistakes." [14] A Party conference held in the Soviet capital a short time later was notified that leaders of the USSR Ministry of the Radio Industry did not always heed the opinion of Party men when promoting and assigning personnel.[15] Similar misgivings about the self-confident directors of research institutes at the USSR Academy of Sciences were later expressed by Party secretaries.[16] But the 24th Party Congress in 1971 ratified a step which even Stalin in his zeal for the political supervision of professional activities had avoided, granting the right of control over the administration to the Party cells of State-run scientific, educational, cultural and medical institutions.[17] In the light of other evidence, it may be reasonable to infer that Soviet history had essentially repeated itself: in the struggle for political succession after Khrushchev, the arch protector of the expert stratum (Kosygin) had lost effective influence to the head of the Party machine (Brezhnev) and his allies.

Any weakening of the Party hierarchy's grip on the varied elite formations might be expected to have energized the Plenum of the Party Central Committee. There, the major components of the Soviet political organism are broadly represented and power formally rests between the

[11] *Kommunist*, No. 11 (1972), p. 62.
[12] *Lektsii* . . . , p. 317.
[13] J. Stalin, *Problems of Leninism* (Moscow, 1953), pp. 111–12.
[14] *Pravda*, 26 Feb. 1968.
[15] Ibid. 30 March 1968.
[16] *Kommunist*, No. 6 (1972), p. 99.
[17] *Pravda*, 10 April 1971.

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Party congresses. But it is most unlikely that any important policy proposals have been submitted to a Central Committee session in recent times. For one thing, the full membership of this periodically-meeting body was increased to 195 persons in 1966 and 241 persons in 1971, making it no match for the stratagems of a permanent small group such as the 16-man Politburo and 10-man Secretariat. For another, the Central Committe sessions have been noticeably short-lived occurrences; of the twelve held from October 1968 through December 1972, three lasted only two days and the rest were concluded on the opening day. This bulldozing of the Central Committee membership is in stark contrast to the situation prevailing in the interregnum after Stalin's death: from July 1953 through February 1957 there were seven great plenums which on the average lasted six days each. And in Khrushchev's period of ascendancy from late 1957 through early 1964 the Party saw 13 plenums, each of a four day duration on the average. Small wonder that nowadays a Party spokesman is contemptuous of the "fruitless discussion" which might be triggered by "a group of confused or immature people"! [18] Moreover, communiqués issued after the post-Khrushchev sessions of the Party Central Committee sometimes even fail to mention the names of speakers who might have discussed the keynote reports, which are invariably delivered by Brezhnev and the State ministers for budgets and plans. The eclipsing of the Central Committee by the Politburo is further mirrored in Party propaganda, which extols the Politburo members as "the more experienced, tested and authoritative political leaders who are able to direct all of the multisided and complex work of Party and Soviet state." [19] Brezhnev's upper hand inside the Politburo has been made known in a variety of ways, including publicity of a personal "secretariat" with experts on domestic and international affairs.[20] Along with the branch departments of the Party Secretariat, these technical cabinets of Soviet leaders have always wielded great authority, sending detailed as well as generalized directives to the top State administrators. It bears noting that still vaster power was gathered at the top in April 1973, when the Politburo was reorganized along the lines of the defence committee which Stalin set up following the outbreak of war with Germany in 1941. In these circumstances of the centralization of power in one small ruling body the question arises of how far Brezhnev and his adherents have been willing to listen to policy advice from society at large.

HISTORICAL research on Stalinism informs that the Supreme Leader did not always tackle the problems of government in a state of self-isolation. Consultation was organized from time to time, occurring at

[18] N. A. Petrovichev, *Razvivtie KPSS i Vozrastanie eë Rukovodiashchei Roli v Usloviiakh Kommunisticheskogo Stroitelstva* (Moscow, 1972), p. 11.
[19] *Lektsii* . . ., p. 225.
[20] *Pravda*, 19 Sept. 1971.

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an infrequent plenary session of the Party Central Committee, during which Politburo members met in private; or in a Politburo commission on foreign-policy questions; or at Kremlin conferences attended by diplomatic and military experts. The local Party bosses sent policy memos to Party headquarters; intellectuals such as Professor Varga articulated special views in published works, using doctrinal formulas intelligible only to elite readers; and there were press articles by Party leaders "for purposes of discussion" which avoided ideological double-talk and directly felt out the influential circles. As a rule, however, the dialogue which preceded the Leader's decision was veiled so as to conceal from the public any disarray in ruling quarters: the Leader after all exacted obedience to his decisions by giving to Soviet citizens the impression of Kremlin unity on all important matters.

Under Khrushchev, the process of consultation was regularized. At top level were commissions of the Party Presidium for ideology, culture and world Communist liaison, defence and organizational-Party questions. Memos recommending specific courses of action were sent by Khrushchev to the Presidium and lower Party organs, which passed up their own proposals to Moscow. The Party Central Committee was on and off a real forum of debate over topical issues. Most important, Khrushchev tried to create a real public opinion, slightly lifting the cloak of secrecy around Politburo operations of the past and present. Both practitioners and theorists openly urged solutions to national dilemmas, going all the way to the Liberman proposals for steeply upgrading the role of profits in Soviet industry.

Since Khrushchev there have been open clashes of judgment on themes which are not directly related to the elemental security needs of the regime. A study of these open dialogue materials reveals that official permissiveness grew from 1965 to 1968 and waned from then to the present. The turning point in censorship policy was the April 1968 session of the Party Central Committee, which was convened to ratify the lessons drawn from the disintegration of communist political controls in Czechoslovakia. Soviet leaders who had tolerated some vigorous public discourse on how to cope with acute domestic problems evidently shrank before the spectre of an avalanche toward individual liberty among their subjects. The decree of the plenum ordained that nothing less than "irreconcilable struggle" be waged against "hostile ideology" in order to counter an alleged Western campaign to undermine the Soviet bloc.[21] A necessarily selective and cursory account of reform proposals made in the two phases of post-Khrushchev censorship may add to an appreciation of the real problems which beset the Soviet Union and the immense power of the regime to thwart meaningful change.

By far the most radical idea put forward in the Soviet press was to create an agricultural "free market." The ill of chronic food shortages

[21] Ibid. 11 April 1968.

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would be remedied by abolishing the centralized regulation of the prices for crops which the collective farms have to deliver to the government. The authorities were asked by economists and journalists to switch gradually from their assignment of output targets for collectives to the free contracting of all products, with prices shaped by market considerations of supply and demand. Dismantling of the bureaucratic planning system in the countryside was seen as a means to break the crusty apathy of farm workers, who might receive the fruits of their labour once prices were brought in line with the principle of parity, or balance between what farmers receive for their products and what they must pay for equipment and necessities. The advocates of this innovation assured that it would not lead to a rise of food prices but on the contrary prices would be reduced since State procurement agents would have to buy products where they were grown more cheaply, and prices, as a result, were lower.[22]

Not a single high official overtly identified with the free market proposal and a number soon unmasked their propaganda guns against those prone to surrender to spontaneous forces. The deputy chief editor of the Party journal *Kommunist* rebuked "some comrades" for "ignoring the truth that communism can be built only as a result of the conscious, planned activity of the people." It claimed these people were "arguing for a freedom of market relationships under which there would be no place for planned centralized leadership of the economy. For example, they are inclined to think that it is possible in general not to have plan orders from the State for purchase of produce in collective and state farms. The mistakenness of such views is obvious."[23] Brezhnev's personal assistant for agriculture edited a collection of articles which reproached supporters of the free market and stressed that the Kremlin had to be certain of gaining financial tribute from the peasantry if it was to pursue ambitious industrial-military goals.[24] Politburo member Polianski was equally insistent that it was wrong to call for priority to the market and purchases of farm products free from centralized planning.[25] Although the reformist viewpoint was subsequently aired in the literary magazine *Novy Mir*,[26] a cross was put over the heated controversy by a *Pravda* article of 4 March 1968 which rejected the free buying and selling of foodstuffs on doctrinal grounds that brooked no challenge.

The creation of a new marketplace of ideas was urged too in the early years of stocktaking by Khrushchev's successors. A special "political science" was requested for examining theoretical questions of

[22] *Novy Mir*, No. 9 (1965), pp. 212–29 and No. 2 (1967), pp. 160–185, V. G. Venzher, *Proizvodstvo, nakoplenie, potreblenie* (Moscow, 1965), p. 279 and *Kolkhoznyy Stroi na Sovremennom Etape* (Moscow, 1966), p. 176.
[23] *Partiinaia Zhizn*, No. 1 (1967), p. 14.
[24] V. A. Golikov, *Itogi i Perspektivy. Selskoe Khoziaystvo posle Martovskogo Plenuma TsK KPSS* (Moscow, 1967), pp. 235–36.
[25] *Kommunist*, No. 15 (1967), p. 28.
[26] No. 12 (1967), pp. 230–35.

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practical politics which had long been neglected in the Soviet setting.[27] The deductive mode of reasoning about economics, which is a hallmark of Soviet Marxism, was contested when a plea was made for a fresh branch of learning that would focus on specific problems of economic management.[28] Conservative ideologues, however, argued that only the existing desciplines of political economy and historical materialism can solve the problems of Soviet economics and politics as a unified whole.[29] Neither proposal met a better fate than the liberalizing alternative to the grossly inefficient method of command farming, which was presented at the time.

The published debate has been much less free and wide-ranging since *Pravda* on 22 Septetmber 1968 warned that " searches for truth " through discussion " must be conducted on the basis of scientific principles which have been irrefutably established by Marxism-Leninism and tested by the experience of struggle and victories." Press discussions are now organized around such less than breathtaking themes as whether the industrial ministries should be put on cost accounting, and the large work brigades on collective farms replaced by small teams.[30] The time-honoured principle of centralized economic planning is no longer exposed to assault from below. Only behind closed doors are scholars allowed to engage in theory disputes about the potentially explosive issue of social inequalities, and the proceedings are reported in specialized journals with limited circulations. We thus learn that at a conference of economists held in 1972 a speaker expressed thoughts which were " rather close to the thoroughly criticized views of certain economists who put in the foreground the social differences which still remain in our society. These economists have been doubtful of the existence in our country of real equality of the workers with respect to the means of production and have tried to distort the essence of public ownership of the means of production." [31] The underpaid worker or collective farmer is not apt to see or get excited about this scholastic treatment of the elite's overprivileged status and monopolistic disposition of the national wealth.

Within the Party's own councils there has likewise been a mounting reluctance to allow divergent attitudes toward policy issues to surge to the surface. Khrushchev in 1958 began the practice of publishing edited accounts of those Central Committee sessions which were devoted largely to economics. Occasionally these records told of divided counsels at all levels and gave an inkling of the consultative procedures in force at Party headquarters. Khrushchev's press hinted at opposition to this inchoate

[27] *Pravda*, 10 Jan. 1965.
[28] *Kommunist*, No. 1 (1966), p. 43.
[29] L. I. Abalkin, *Politicheskaia Ekonomika i Ekonomicheskaia Politika* (Moscow, 1970), pp. 143–45.
[30] On industry, see *Kommunist*, No. 11 (1972), pp. 29 ff and No. 13 (1972), p. 93; on farming, V. F. Stanis, *Sotsialisticheskie Preobrazovaniia Selskogo Khoziaystva* (Moscow, 1971), pp. 227–28 and *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, 21 Feb. 1971.
[31] *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, No. 11 (1972), p. 155.
[32] *Kommunist*, No. 18 (1961), p. 13.

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democratic tendency, attacking the long-ousted leaders Molotov and Malenkov for having been "accustomed to the secretive, anti-democratic discussion and decisions of the most important problems." [32] One of Khrushchev's last speeches pointed to his colleagues' resentment of his many violations of cabinet secrecy which were designed to bring moral pressure to bear on conservative forces. "Some comrades," Khrushchev told a farm rally in August 1964, "have said to me that perhaps we should not publish all these materials and divulge beforehand the contents of the report to the Central Committee plenary session." The objections were ridiculed by Khrushchev as expressive of the conspiratorial habits of Stalinism.[33]

With a lone exception in 1965, the verbatim trapscripts of Central Committee sessions held since Khrushchev's dismissal have gone unpublished. Brezhnev has made over 25 secret speeches to the Plenum and not a word of any of the resultant discussion on the floor was ever breathed. Nor have the texts of many addresses by other Politburo members at various conclaves seen the light of day. This is very unlike the case in Khrushchev's reign, when many speeches of top leaders were published and it was possible to detect inconsistencies which usually reflected disagreements in ruling circles. Diverse shades of orthodoxy do vie inside the Brezhnev team, to judge from the contradictory views of regional Party officials at the 23rd Party Congress in 1966. While one favoured personnel directorates in Party offices from top to bottom, which may have reduced the amount of day-to-day control of local enterprises by Party economic departments, another spoke against the directorates.[34] But the fearful cast of mind now prevailing in Soviet leadership is exemplified by rehearsal of the grim injunction of the 1921 Party Congress that "Anyone who comes forward with criticism must take into account the situation of the Party among the enemies which surround it." [35] As long as this anxious outlook guides the inner conduct of the pacesetting institution of Soviet society it would seem rash to talk about freer political debate in the USSR.

WHATEVER Khrushchev's responsibility for the virtually dictatorial powers of Academician Lysenko in the field of genetics, the late premier did set into motion a trend of exalting practice at the cost of ideological purity. It had been a cardinal tenet of Stalinist orthodoxy that the practical solution of Soviet problems always had to lag behind their definition and analysis on the plane of communist theory. If an innovative scheme happened to clash with the political dogma, that scheme had to be rejected as "anti-scientific" and "subjectivist." Khrushchev was thus faced with big doctrinal hurdles when he wanted

[32] *Kommunist*, No. 18 (1961), p. 13.
[33] *Pravda*, 10 Aug. 1964.
[34] *XXIII S'ezd Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soiuza. 29 Marta-8 Aprelia 1966 goda. Stenograficheskii Otchët* (Moscow, 1966), Vol. I, pp. 163 and 444.
[35] A. K. Kolesnikov, *Leninskie Printsipy Organizatsionnogo Rukovodstva KPSS (Oktiabr 1917–1923 g.)* (Moscow, 1971), p. 204.

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to change the standard arrangements of government for the sake of managerial efficiency. A good example of this was the uproar in Party quarters over Khrushchev's decision to sell the State-owned Machine and Tractor Stations to the collective farms. In theory, the gambit meant a downgrading of a higher (State) form of property to a lower (cooperative) form. Khrushchev veered around this barbed wire of canon, simply declaring that each new practical initiative was a further step in the development of theory. Moreover, Krushchev's ideological overlord Ilyichev went so far as to assert that the time-lag between the theoretical and practical solving of issues was being greatly reduced and would eventually disappear.[36] A freewheeling Soviet leader was given a mandate to rush ahead with modifications in the regime heedless of the disruptive effect which this might have on the communist belief system.

One of the initial acts of the Brezhnev leadership was to repudiate Khrushchev's down-to-earth view that Soviet practice and communist theory can be one and the same thing in every respect. This pragmatic approach was deplored as "an extreme vulgarization of Marxism-Leninism,"[37] and around the time that Ilyichev was removed from the ideology sector the editors of *Kommunist* cautiously preached an eternal interval between the resolution of problems in both theory and practice.[38] The Politburo majority hence signalled an intention to calculate the doctrinal implications of each new move that was recommended in the sphere of policy.

As the prestige of communist philosophy was reinforced, doctrine was again used to uphold the authoritarian features of the Soviet landscape. In line with the teaching of classical Marxism, wholesale public ownership and central social planning have long been deemed specific traits of the socialist order, proclaimed to have been built in the USSR during the 1930s, and the fully communist order of the future. Now the ideology is used to discredit the experimental thought of emulating communist leaders in Eastern Europe and to temporarily restore some branches of the economy to private entrepreneurs or decentralizing the top-heavy planning structure. A note of caution is sounded not to underrate "the conditions common to socialism and communism as levels of the single communist formation."[39] Socialism cannot be regarded as "a supposedly relatively autonomous mode of production" since this "objectively denigrates the unity of the basic traits of socialism and communism and the importance of all-sided uncovery of the final goal of our movement."[40] In effect, the Brezhnev regime intends to preserve the mechanisms for regulating the basic livelihood of Soviet citizens which Stalin created and Khrushchev perpetuated.

[36] *XXII S'ezd KPSS i Voprosy Ideologicheskoi Raboty* (Moscow, 1962), p. 12.
[37] *Kommunist*, No. 18 (1967), p. 55.
[38] Ibid. No. 4 (1965), p. 7.
[39] *Ekonomicheskaia Gazeta*, No. 9, 1972, p. 11 and *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, No. 5 (1972), pp. 3–11.
[40] Ibid.

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A lifeline to the past has been rebuilt in the realm of doctrine governing the relationship of State agencies to the public organizations, or soviets, trade unions and youth league. Khrushchev's slogan of the advent of an "all-people state" in place of the highly coercive "dictatorship of the proletariat" sparked hope that soon many of the disciplinary functions performed by State bodies might be transferred to the public organizations. This attraction to the idea of introducing self-government from below was severely condemned in post-Khrushchev literature, which stressed "the uniform essence" of the proletarian dictatorship and all-people state.[41] Public organizations, for their part, are again described in the idiom of Lenin and Stalin as "cog-wheels," "levers," and "conveyor belts" which link the Communist Party with the masses.[42] Vitality was lent to this reinstated abstraction in 1968 with the appointment of a 40-year-old Party official to head the Young Communist League.[43] The soviet and trade union apparatuses were already under the direction of Politburo members, neither of whom faltered in carrying out the Party line in his area of jurisdiction.

The backsliding toward old patterns of political thought is apparent too in the creation of a new course in Soviet universities devoted to Marxist-Leninist "strategy and tactics." A manual used in the course [44] regrets that under Khrushchev the Stalinist version of politics-as-war fell into disfavour. Accordingly restored is the military definition of politics for which Stalin was notorious, and the history of the USSR is examined once more in terms of "strategic stages." At each stage, Party leaders are said to have confronted "the main enemy" and targeted it for "the main blow." Invariably, this meant a fight to the finish with "class-hostile forces" inside the country and abroad. The manual pictures the Soviet Union today in a strategic stage requiring the utmost consolidation of bureaucratic edifices, massive indoctrination of the people and further build-up of military capability. In foreign affairs, the manual dubs the United States "the main enemy" of the Soviet Union and it urges the exploitation of the rivalries between America and other democratic states as a "strategic reserve" of communism. Approving of foreign-policy compromises of the kind made since Lenin's separate peace with Germany in 1918—a respite was obtained for Soviet Russia —the manual warns that some compromises may express "opportunism and betrayal of the workers' interests." Good Party members are asked to "pitilessly expose" and wage "irreconcilable struggle" against any who might be ready to strike that kind of bargain with Western statesmen. Sanctioned in 1970 by the USSR Ministry of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education, the manual is hardly inconsistent with the fact that after the May 1972 summit meeting, Brezhnev frowned upon "illusions"

41 *Voprosy Filosofii*, No. 4 (1967), pp. 134–43.
42 *Partiinoe Stroitelstvo. Uchebnoe posobie* (Moscow, 1970), p. 409.
43 "Tiazhelnikov, Evgenii Mikhailovich," in *Ezhegodnik Bolshoi Sovetskoi Entsiklopedii, 1971* (Moscow, 1971), p. 633.
44 V. S. Aleksandrov, *Marksistko-Leninskaia Strategiia i Taktika KPSS* (Moscow, 1970).

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about "the anti-popular essence of imperialism and its aggressive directions." [45]

Sociology is emerging amidst the virtual immobilism of Soviet governmental forms and Party doctrine. By the mid-1960s a small number of scholars were collecting data on class structure, dynamics of social groups and the use of free time. The further development of "concrete social studies" was encouraged in a Party decree of August 1967 on the social sciences, albeit a caveat was dropped about investigations that are strictly empirical.[46] A commentary amplified that excessive use was made of questionnaires and interviews to probe the depths of public opinion.[47] While agreeing with this cautious opinion, theorists concerned about streamlining the economic management system defended concrete social studies against the charge that it might cause the demise of the Party science of historical materialism. Shortly after the Institute of Concrete Social Studies (ICSS) was founded under the USSR Academy in 1968, the Party diehards were soothed with word that historical materialism is a "general sociology" not called upon to reveal the tendencies intrinsic to partial components of society. The thriving of industrial sociology in Eastern Europe was offered as proof of the legitimacy of the new discipline,[48] and the importance of ICSS was underlined by a decision to grant the direction of a laboratory there to Kosygin's son-in-law and deputy chairman of the State Committee for Science and Technology, Gvishiani.[49]

During the overall ideological tightening ordered in the wake of the May 1972 summit, ICSS was heavily criticized by the Presidium of the USSR Academy. Among the many defects attributed to ICSS were an aloofness from problems of political indoctrination and lack of a methodology with which to forecast and plan social development. The leadership of ICSS was rebuked for failing to ensure observance of communist principle in all of its publications, and in orthodox fashion ICSS was renamed the Institute of Sociological Studies.[50] The new ISS director, Party philosopher Rutkevich, pledged himself to strict reliance on historical materialism in the conduct of future research at the centre.[51] All this scarcely means that the clock has been turned back completely; Gvishiani will still have an influential voice in ISS affairs as chairman of the USSR Academy's new Council for Social-Economic and Ideological Problems of the Scientific-Technical Revolution.[52] But the tender shoots of nascent Soviet sociology cannot be expected to escape deformation in the musty atmosphere of political secrecy and suspicion which has accompanied the rise of Brezhnev.

[45] *Pravda*, 28 June, 1972.
[46] *Spravochnik Partiinogo Rabotnika. Vypusk Vosmoi* (Moscow, 1968), p. 248.
[47] *Kommunist*, No. 18 (1967), pp. 56–57.
[48] V. G. Afanasiev, *Nauchnoe Upravlenie Obshchestvom* (*Opyt sistemnogo issledovaniia*) (Moscow, 1968), pp. 274–80.
[49] "Gvishiani, Dzherman Mikhailovich," in *Ezhegodnik BSE, 1971*, p. 587.
[50] *Vestnik Akademii Nauk*, No. 10 (1972), pp. 9–10.
[51] *Literaturnaia Gazeta*, 17 Jan. 1973. [52] *Vestnik Akademii Nauk*, No. 4 (1972), p. 142.

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IT seems legitimate, in view of the present state of documentation, to reject the theory whereby the Soviet Union is moving in the direction of classical pluralism. The society and political system are still dominated by the power-political interest of the Communist Party apparatus, which exercises an almost iron control of elite recruitment and policy initiative. The sanctions at the disposal of the masters of the apparatus enable them to sharply curtail the spontaneous play of economic forces which is characteristic of the pluralistic polity and has a certain appeal to Soviet managerial personnel. Insofar as the mobilizational doctrine of Marxism-Leninism offers the Party apparatus a mandate to rule, this commitment of the apparatus to societal regulation is understandable, and makes it appropriate for observers to raise the question of Party controllers versus State experts as one of the explanations of Soviet politics.

Even during the era of Stalin there was room inside the framework of Soviet dictatorship for senior bureaucratic groupings to compete for influence and to argue about policy alternatives. The resultant process of closed politics was somewhat ventilated under Krushchev as the top leader reached out into society for moral support for his official actions and power position. The Brezhnev leadership, however, appears to share Stalin's concern about the cohesiveness of the system and it has accordingly restored the more covert forms of politics which are far removed from the open bargaining processes limiting arbitrary deeds of government in the modern societies of the West. A closing of the ranks at the centre of power in the face of perceived danger from society may help to explain the remarkable stability of the post-Khrushchev leadership, which virtually insures bureaucratic tenure since rival clans at the Politburo are reluctant to launch disruptive purges of each other's clients in the structure of authority.

While there has been no return to the mad obscurantism of the Stalin era—a counterproductive offshoot of the leader's whims and dread of foreign influences—the present Kremlin team has retreated into dogma in some important respects. They have reformulated the ideology as an independent factor which cannot be manipulated for practical purposes as easily as was the case in Khrushchev's day. Now it is heretical to urge a lesser degree of penetration of social-economic life by the political system which has set the communist movement in Russia off from other authoritarian governments in the twentieth century. And in vogue once more is the traditional way of thinking about global developments in the categories of military science. It is perhaps a serious mistake to ignore this ideological backsliding in Moscow, accompanied as it is by recentralizing policy trends and a steady build up of Soviet military strength. At any rate, the political principles laid down by the Brezhnev regime do have much more in common with the values of authoritarianism than those encountered in the conventional Western model of pluralism.

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The Concept of Planning in the Soviet Union*

Paul Craig Roberts

THE concept of planning in the Soviet Union is something about which little is known. This fact is striking, especially in view of the amount of detailed information we have about the functioning of that economy. We might expect the concept of planning to be revealed in this information, and I shall argue that it is. But I shall first acknowledge a difficulty in this approach, a difficulty that is apparent at first thought, yet revealing when probed. The difficulty is that, if we look critically at what we know about the functioning of the Soviet economy, it is hard to find a planned economy at all.

We know, for example, that the famous central plan is essentially a summation of the individual plans originating in the enterprises. In effect, the average firm's plan or target has been set in the following way. The manager is asked how much he can produce and the inputs he requires. He misrepresents, of course, on both counts. He understates his productive capacity and overstates his resource requirements. The "planners" know, of course, that he is misrepresenting, but if the manager has been careful in the past and has never significantly overproduced his target, he will win the game and get a target that is safely within the productive capabilities of his factory. The manager wants a target or quota that he can easily make because his income is maximized by making and slightly exceeding his quota. If he greatly exceeds it, he gives himself away and risks a target in the future that strains or exceeds his productive capacity.

If we look at this managerial behaviour in organizational terms, we find that it gives the Soviet economy a polycentric and not hierarchic structure. The Soviet manager may have more formal restraints than his Western counterpart, but, like him, he is essentially autonomous in that he organizes production by maximizing his own benefits. The difference between the Soviet and Western manager lies essentially in the signals that they interpret. Western managers organize production by interpreting price and profit movements, whereas Soviet managers have interpreted "success indicators" (which have essentially revolved around the gross output indicator).[1] This is a very real difference, but

* This article is based on a paper presented at the Slavic Studies section of the 14th annual conference of the Rocky Mountain Social Science Association, University of Utah, April 1972.

[1] See Paul Craig Roberts, "The Polycentric Soviet Economy," *Journal of Law and Economics*, Vol. XII (April 1969). In this article I am looking at the subject historically and not topically, and I abstract from the recent reforms which portended more changes than occurred.

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it is an efficiency difference and not an organizational one. It has meant that the Soviet manager could be successful even though his output may be poorly related to the needs of the users. In this he has enjoyed a freedom not known to his Western counterpart.

Western observers have been aware of the behaviour of Soviet managers for a number of years, but they were slow to realize its organizational meaning. They were misled by their knowledge of the fact that the Soviet manager receives numerous detailed instructions that seem to completely circumscribe his decisions, leaving no room for manoeuvre in the way he carries out his assigned task, much less allowing him control over his output assortment. In the past the fact of detailed instructions served to veil the underlying organizational reality, but today we are no longer misled thanks to economists in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union who have stripped away the veil. For example, the Hungarian economist, Tibor Liska, has written:

> As the number of directives to be observed increases, the more detailed and the stricter they become in a most intricate economic life hardly lending itself to standardization, the greater the liberty of individual planners and economic managers. The intricacy of economic life follows, namely, primarily from the fact that hosts of contrary tendencies must be brought into harmony with optimum efficiency. The stricter and more rigid the regulations prescribing the enforcement of such contrary tendencies, the more contradictory the directives must become. One receiving the directives has but a single choice: *not to observe all the directives.* On the other hand, in the decision to keep to one out of the necessarily contradictory directives, and drop the others, as well as in aiming at the issue of certain directives, he has a freedom almost greater than the most sovereign of tyrants.[2]

It is a misnomer to call even the supply system centrally planned. It is well known that the general supply system contains real market elements. Black markets are extensive and essential to the functioning of the economy. But even the official or "centrally planned" supply apparatus is polycentric and functions organizationally like a market. This has only recently been formally demonstrated.[3] The supply system cannot be understood in organizational terms without focusing on the

[2] Tibor Liska, "The Development of Market Relations and of the Theory and Practice of Price Mechanism in Socialism," lecture given at CESES International Seminar on Problems of Planning in Eastern Europe, Tremezzo, Italy, July 1967, mimeographed, p. 4. The de facto economic autonomy of managers is extra legal and does not translate into political power or political freedom. Indeed, since Soviet managers can function only by committing crimes against the state, their awareness that they can be prosecuted at any time for economic crimes is likely to restrain their participation in political protest.

[3] Professor E. G. Dolan has developed a mathematical polycentric model of the Soviet economy and experimented with computer simulations. See his "An Experimental Polycentric Model of the Soviet Economy," in Judith Thornton (ed.), *Planning in the Soviet-Type System* (forthcoming).

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managers' procurement activities, that is, on their exertion of pressure on suppliers (planners).

It is now recognized that the manager of a Soviet firm acts to maximize his own benefits. He has cost and benefit functions and weighs the costs of exerting procurement pressure against the benefits of making and slightly exceeding his target. In his cost function are such things as money and purchase authorizations used through official channels, cost of using a limited budget of credibility, good will, influence, and connections, psychological cost of battling red tape, cost of black market purchases and of hiring a procurement staff (expeditors), and risk of criminal prosecution. Benefits are the usual ones of monetary reward, promotion, fame.

The planner can be viewed as the head of a central inventory who controls the rate of shipment of a given product (input) from the inventory and divides it among the users. Among the many factors that affect his decisions are the quantity available for shipment, the backlog of unfilled orders, the amount of procurement pressure exerted by any firm's manager for the fulfillment of given orders, and the priority rating of the user. There is substitution between the last two factors. The lower the priority rating of a manager, the greater must be his exertion of procurement pressure. As his priority rating rises, the procurement pressure that he exerts must be lesser.

Obviously, if a manager's supply of inputs always arrives on time and in the correct amounts, he enjoys a system that maximizes his own benefits. But the average manager must compete for his inputs.

The system has feedbacks that carry information on scarcities. Inventory build-ups indicate inputs that are produced in excess relative to demands, whereas the greater the demand for an input, the higher the procurement cost. When the deliveries of an input get seriously behind the demands for it, the "planner" responds to the signal of increasing pressure exerted by managers by reassigning priorities and turning the lagging sector into a priority sector. Assigning a sector a higher priority subsidizes its procurement efforts, thus decreasing its costs and raising the level of output that maximizes the manager's welfare. In Dolan's model, if the procurement pressure mechanism is stopped from operating and managers are forced to abide by the formal rules, the economic system collapses. And indeed it would. The failures of the official supply system are notorious. They are acknowledged by the Soviet state through its toleration of extensive illegal black market activities.

Although many Soviet economists are now talking about "optimal planning," there is no evidence of any of it in practice. It is clear that the concept of planning in the Soviet Union has not involved deriving an optimal structure of output for the economy as a whole. Instead, the efforts of the planning apparatus have gone into the supply system. It functions essentially as supply agent for the enterprises, trying to ensure

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that enterprises get resources consistent with their productive capabilities. Economists have pointed out that if the "planners" simply stopped trying to perform the supply function, told managers to produce to the order of their customers, and allowed firms to purchase their inputs in a market, the problems of the system would disappear. It is in what looks to the economist as misguided activity that we find a key to the concept of planning in the Soviet Union.

IN the Soviet Union there have been no legal markets for industrial materials, and the planning apparatus has directed its efforts into supplying firms in lieu of their provisioning themselves through markets. These efforts are ideological in origin. They derive from Marx's analysis of the market system. According to Marx, the defining characteristic of capitalism is production for sale in the market. He called this "commodity production." Every aspect of capitalism of which he was critical—alienation, crises, private property, detail labour, the intensification of exploitation—he derived from its commodity character, that is, from market exchange.[4] He and Engels were categorical that the economic system that was to replace capitalism would not be characterized by buying and selling in markets. This is the reason that the primary function of the planning bureaucracy in the Soviet Union is to act as supply agent for enterprises. Free price formation and exchange in the market must be avoided so that productive inputs within the state sector do not have the character of commodities. If, as I argue,[5] the supply apparatus cannot perform its formal hierarchic function and must function informally and polycentrically by directing its activities towards overcoming problems created by its own existence, then commodity production has not been transcended but has acquired an abstract and irrational form. The heroic efforts, perhaps now largely traditional but once fiercely ideological, have succeeded only in avoiding the *appearance* of commodity production in the state sector.

I have argued elsewhere that the Soviet economy is a commodity economy in spite of the efforts to establish a non-commodity form of production, but this is not the issue. Neither is the issue that Soviet Marxists have traditionally viewed Marxian socialism as a non-commodity form of production. It is clear that they have. For example, the Soviet economist Eremin recently declared that "in the 'model of market socialism' the principal emphasis is on the need for the regeneration of commodity production," denied that socialism is "a species of commodity production," and strongly stated that market socialism is "a definite anti-Marxist concept."[6] The issue is the ideological origin of

[4] See Paul Craig Roberts and M. A. Stephenson, *Marx's Theory of Exchange, Alienation and Crisis* (Stanford University: Hoover Institution Press, 1973).
[5] See Paul Craig Roberts, *Alienation and the Soviet Economy* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1971).
[6] A. Eremin, "On the Concept of 'Market Socialism.'" *Problems of Economics*, Vol. XIII, No. 4 (August 1970), pp. 3–20.

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the concept of planning in the Soviet Union. Others will wish to say that the origin of the concept of planning lies in the mobilization of resources for rapid growth.

However, a desire to mobilize resources for rapid growth does not explain the efforts to eliminate commodity production. Such efforts continued along with the mobilization of resources, and in 1952 Stalin showed that he thought of planning in terms of establishing a non-commodity mode of production. In *Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.*, Stalin stated that the output of the collective farms belongs to the farms, and the state's role is that of outside customer. To Stalin this meant that the production of the collective farms was commodity production, and he saw this as a fundamental problem. His solution was that the commodity relation between the state and agriculture should be replaced by direct swap of products without purchase and sale. According to Stalin:

> such a system, by contracting the sphere of operation of commodity circulation, will facilitate the transition from socialism to communism. Moreover, it will make it possible to include the basic property of the collective farms, the product of collective farming, in the general system of national planning.[7]

I WILL now briefly sketch how the efforts to establish a non-commodity mode of production and the mobilization of resources for rapid growth have fitted together in the Soviet concept of planning. Each has its role in the story.

Having decided on the seizure of power, the Bolsheviks were committed to a transition to socialism. At first Lenin seems to have had the idea of a transitional period based on the seizure of the banking system, but when nothing came of this he undertook a direct transition. This also failed, and Lenin was confronted with the requirements of theory and reality contradicting each other. Lenin frankly acknowledged the failure and the dilemma. He understood the failure as a consequence of insufficient socialist consciousness among the population (particularly the peasants) and insufficient manufactured goods for distribution in kind to peasants in return for agricultural products.

There is some indication that Lenin and others were left with deeper doubts from the experience of "war communism" than were conveyed by this explanation of its failure. Some scepticism appeared about the possibility of a national economy operating without commercial principles, that is, without money, prices, profit, and markets. Trotsky seems to have gone beyond scepticism to disavowal. Speaking of the "war communism" period, Trotsky writes that "the Soviet government hoped and strove to develop these methods of regimentation directly into a system of planned economy in distribution as well as pro-

[7] J. Stalin, *Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.* (New York: International Publishers, 1952), p. 70.

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duction. In other words, from 'war communism' it hoped gradually, but without destroying the system to arrive at genuine communism." Trotsky goes on to say that "reality, however, came into increasing conflict with the program of 'war communism.' Production continually declined, and not only because of the destructive action of the war." A result was that "the collapse of the productive forces surpassed anything of the kind that history had ever seen. The country, and the government with it, were at the very edge of the abyss." Trotsky then speaks of "the utopian hopes of the epoch of war communism" and says that even if revolution had occurred in the west, it can be said with certainty that "it would still have been necessary to renounce the direct state distribution of products in favour of the methods of commerce." [8]

Lenin died without resolving the dilemma presented by the failure of "war communism": how to maintain a socialist political "superstructure" when the underlying mode of production was commodity production. His main line of reasoning seems to have been that the "superstructure" could be maintained for an unspecified period by Party control of the "commanding heights." During this period outputs would be increased to higher levels and a socialist consciousness instilled in the population. With outputs and consciousness at higher levels, a second attempt to achieve socialist economic organization would be successful. This line of reasoning remained committed to socialism as a non-commodity form of production.

The New Economic Policy presented a fundamental problem. After all, according to Marxism commodity production is bourgeois production and engenders bourgeois consciousness. Whereas Lenin thought that a revolutionary vanguard could seize power as carrier of the programme,[9] he did not think that power could be maintained indefinitely unless the mode of production was transformed into a socialist one.

[8] Irving Howe (ed.), *The Basic Writings of Trotsky* (London: Secker & Warburg, 1963), pp. 161, 162. Marxian socialist distribution of products (within industry and agriculture, between industry and agriculture, and to consumers) is non-market distribution. This organizational aspect has been obscured by many who emphasize equality of distribution.

[9] Oscar J. Hammen has argued that "the question of whether Lenin operated along truly Marxian lines in 1917 cannot be answered solely on the basis of an appeal to theory. One must take into account the actions, tactics and expectations of Marx and Engels in reasonably comparable circumstances. If Lenin appealed to the broad rural masses he certainly did not noticeably deviate from the tactics repeatedly advocated by the master." Hammen goes on to say that "it appears, then, if he had neglected to see the opportunity to act and if he had not acted as he had—with energy, decision and a total disregard of 'boring scruples'—Lenin would have failed Marx. . . . The gap that separated them [Marx and Engels] from Lenin's tactics in 1917 was not too formidable. Since Marx and Engels continually stressed the importance of getting a revolution started and the need to consolidate a revolutionary position, it might be presumptuous to assume that, given the same historical circumstances, they would have hesitated to take the step that Lenin took. They certainly always paid tribute to the virtue of 'audacity.'" See Oscar J. Hammen, "Marx and the Agrarian Question," *American Historical Review*, Vol 77 (June 1972), pp. 703–4. See also Tibor Szamuely, "The Birth of Russian Marxism," *Survey*, Summer 1972.

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Until the end of his life Lenin gave much thought to the problem of how to achieve socialist economic organization.

The ideological content of planning has been obscured by a prevalent misinterpretation of the "war communism" period which sees the policies as ad hoc, temporary expedients to meet wartime and inflationary conditions. This misinterpretation rests merely on assertions. But it served to deflect inquiry away from the ideological content of planning and prevented scholars from seeing the continuity between the "war communism" period and the revival of planning under Stalin.

SINCE the ideological content of planning has been obscured for three decades or more, much needs to be re-examined. I have recently documented from Lenin's writings that during the "war communism" period itself he spoke of the policies as efforts to eliminate market exchange and to establish socialism, and not as temporary expedients.[10] E. H. Carr reports that a resolution prepared by Lenin, approved by the Bolshevik Central Committee, and passed by a conference of representatives of factories and committees in Petrograd on 30 May 1917, "constituted the most important Bolshevik pronouncement before the revolution on the organization of industry." The resolution spoke of "the need of an 'all-state organization' for the purpose of 'the organization on a broad regional and finally all-state scale of the exchange of agricultural implements, clothing, boots and similar goods' for 'general labour service.'" [11] This resolution shows that the policies of "war communism" existed in the heads of Bolsheviks prior to the seizure of power.

When the re-examination of Soviet economic history is carried into subsequent periods, Stalin's view that the problem of collective farms is their commodity relation to the state suggests that he saw the functions of planning in terms of (1) the establishment of a non-commodity mode of production in the state (socialist) sector, that is, within industrial production, and (2) the rapid increase in industrial production so that this mode of production could be extended to agriculture and commodity relations brought to an end. Perhaps remembering the lesson of "war communism," Stalin says that the direct swap of products between town and country would have "to be introduced without any particular hurry and only as the products of the town multiply." Nevertheless, "it must be introduced unswervingly and unhesitatingly, step by step contracting the sphere of operation of commodity circulation and widening the sphere of operation of products-exchange." [12] This shows clearly how Stalin saw the relationship between rapid economic growth and socialist (or communist) economic organization. He thought, like Lenin, that

[10] Paul Craig Roberts, "'War Communism': A Re-examination," *Slavic Review*, Vol. 29 (June 1970).
[11] E. H. Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917–1923*, Vol. II (New York: Macmillan, 1952), pp. 60–61.
[12] *Op. cit.*

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socialist economic organization could not be achieved throughout the economy until industrial production reached higher levels. The more rapid the growth, the sooner socialist economic organization could be achieved.

Over time, the impossibility of achieving a non-commodity form of production in a complex economy and the problems associated with the rapid expansion of production have produced sufficient frustration and economic irrationality to weaken and undermine the ideological programme for the economy. Today the system of material supply might be seen as an institutional legacy of forgotten or vaguely understood aspirations. In the ruins of the ideological programme to transform man by transforming the basis for relations among men lives a bureaucratic vested interest. But too much has to be disregarded to find the origins of planning in a bureaucratic vested interest or in a need for a strong military to defend and extend the boundaries of socialism. Lenin, of course, did understand planning as a defence of socialism—but he saw it as a protection that followed from eliminating bourgeois consciousness by establishing a non-commodity mode of production.

TODAY in the Soviet Union there is no clear concept of planning. Economists and planners themselves have only recently begun to understand how their economy functions. The purposes of planning—to rapidly increase production and achieve a non-commodity mode of production—are embodied in hereditary institutions and seem to function as autonomous legacies, while at the same time straining against each other. "Rationalized" Soviet economists today no longer understand planning in ideological terms. Like Grinevetskii [13] of the revolutionary era and Western economists today, they presuppose market relations as the basis for planning. But movement to market rationality is blocked by the traditional ideological unacceptability of markets.

Even today the ghost of historical materialism shows its power. Both the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and scholars in the West seem committed to the belief that the introducion of economic rationality (markets) into the Soviet economy means the weakening of the Party. But the introduction of "market socialism" could weaken the Party only if the Party associated it with an unconscionable revision and dogmatically assumed it would weaken the Party. In fact, such revision would strengthen the Party. By removing itself from direct responsibility for the economy, it would remove itself from much criticism as well as benefit from results of increased rationality. At the same time it would free much of its energies for other aims and give scope to energies of others that might otherwise find expression in political opposition. But market rationality awaits the Party's affirmation of the primacy of politics over economics.[14]

[13] See Leon Smolinski, "Grinevetskii and Soviet Industrialisation," *Survey*, April 1968.

[14] Lenin's affirmation of the primacy of politics over economics legitimized the seizure of power. But Lenin did not understand this legitimization to throw out historical

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The real threat to the Party is the bureaucracy, not the market. Blinded by the doctrine of historical materialism, the Party thinks it has control and power only if it has administrative control over the economy. To establish such control it built a large state bureaucracy which then became a competitor for power. Power in a market is fragmented, whereas power in a bureaucracy is concentrated. By moving to a free market, the Party could dismantle the bureaucracy and be the sole concentration of power. The Party has long sacrificed the Soviet economy to the doctrine of historical materialism. It may yet sacrifice its power.

materialism—that is, that man's consciousness (excepting a revolutionary vanguard as carrier of the programme) is determined by the mode of production. According to this doctrine, to remain in power the revolutionary party must change the mode of production into a socialist one. Otherwise the party would lose its grip due to the incompatibility of socialist rule with bourgeois mode of production.

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Samizdat: USSR
Ignorance in the Service of Arbitrariness

(Essay on the state of psychiatry today in the USSR, Moscow, 1969–1970.)

THE story of the compulsory hospitalization of Alexander Esenin-Volpin which he has described in his writings, the Chaadayevan verdict of insanity pronounced upon General Grigorenko, and other similar psychiatric "exploits," cannot be a matter of indifference to any person with an informed knowledge of the subject.

All the more so because these events are not exceptions: we hear with ever-increasing frequency of the interference of psychiatrists in the thoughts and actions of citizens whose mental health no one had earlier doubted.

The purpose of these essays is to defend psychiatry and to explain to the non-specialist public with a keen interest in the problem that the blame for these outrages lies not with science but with those who have seized power in science.

In the story of Volpin's hospitalization, wnat strikes the layman first and foremost is the outward aspect of the affair—the crude, unceremonious behaviour of the orderlies and—equally bad—the insolent familiarity of the doctors and the astounding unscrupulousness (typical, though, of the "bosses" mentality) of the management of the psychiatric health service, who think nothing of denying statements they have themselves made.

Behind this horrifying facade the informed person can see an equally scandalous state of affairs at the very core. It can be described in a few words: the virtual liquidation of the science of psychiatry from above, and its replacement by a handful of ever more oversimplified dogmas which can be easily followed and even more easily sheltered behind by persons who are essentially ignorant.

Having worked in psychiatry for 18 years, I find it very painful to have to say these things. But the facts cannot be disputed: although in recent decades doctoral theses in psychiatry are being defended in the USSR almost every week, psychiatric practice in our country in this last third of the twentieth century has sunk to the level of philistinism (and incidentally the situation is no better in many other Western and Eastern bloc countries). The exceptions, even though by no means rare, prove nothing: we are speaking of a tendency. A terrible tendency: philistinism, having engulfed psychiatry, is actively encroaching upon time-honoured human values.

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It would be easy to explain the monstrous transformation of this most humane of all medical disciplines into an instrument of human degradation merely by pointing to a general hardening of attitudes, an overall lowering of culture, both intellectual and aesthetic, and the police mentality of departmental directives (for medicine is a department).

In many respects this is justifiable. But in the first place, it is a separate subject, and in the second place, it is not enough that the hangman should be unflinching and merciless. To mock at his victims he must not only have the right of mockery; he also needs the axe, the rack, the noose, the "Spanish boot" and all the other "tools of the trade."

Psychiatrists who have voluntarily taken on the job of hangman or, putting it more mildly, have assumed the responsibilities of the gendarme towards their patients, have their own "Spanish boot" which they are liable to use on anyone if the mood takes them. The instrument of this refined intellectual torture is the "doctrine of schizophrenia": for it was from this grain, transplanted to the soil of our country at the turn of the century, that there sprung the magnificent flowers of evil which for 15 years now have been zealously propagated in Soviet psychiatry by Professor A. V. Snezhnevsky and his increasingly fecund colleagues, who, as always, are more catholic than the Pope himself.

IT would not be entirely fair, however, to designate Snezhnevsky the arch-villain. He might even feel flattered; but if we look at the question from a chronological point of view, Snezhnevsky cannot take pride of place in the destruction of [Soviet] psychiatry. The foundations of this vicious doctrine were laid much earlier, and much as I would like to name the present Director of the Soviet Academy of Medical Sciences' Institute of Psychiatry as the root of all evil, I cannot do so. He and his co-religionists are merely the successors and emulators [of the doctrine's inventor], although they are so diligent that they have far surpassed Eugene Bleuler himself in the province of speculation and juggling with the facts, to conform with a self-delusory sense of "theoretical harmony." [The author goes on to expound the ideas of Bleuler, the inventor of the term *Schizophrenia*—a word which Bleuler applied, misguidedly, in the opinion of the author, to] . . . persons exhibiting a conflict of aims, the very dichotomy so typical of man as he approaches the end of the second millennium, that universally familiar inner perturbation, propensity to doubt, which mankind has acquired in the course of progress and which is a necessary feature not only of philosophers but of all mortal men.

This dichotomy, together with autism, became for Bleuler the cardinal symptom of what Kraepelin had termed "dementia praecox" and what came to be known after 1911 as schizophrenia: not the onset or

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the outcome of disease, not the usual normal criteria, but an agglomeration of contrived symptoms.

On the purely methodological plane this was a reversion to the earliest days of primitive clinical description, only on an even lower level. On the practical plane it was a turning away of psychiatry from the path of scientific quest, a rejection of [the principle of] strict analysis and equally strict selection of facts. Thus did psychiatry inevitably stray into the realm of unending and unsound fabrications whose only quality—if any—in common with fiction (for they have nothing at all to do with science) is their outwardly (for the philistine) engrossing fascination. . . .

NOW, after 50 years have passed, one can only be amazed that the fantastic jumble of ideas which Bleuler presented as a description of the "basic mental illness" did not fade away within a year of publication, to a mere tragi-comic memory of how a professor had once been seized by a hankering after scientific creativity.

The fact remains that the fabrications of Eugene Bleuler have held their ground and taken root in the minds of many psychiatrists as the ultimate truth.

WE lack the space to describe in detail here how the most far-sighted scientists raised decided objections to the "doctrine of schizophrenia" from the outset. How Professor V. P. Serbsky, a tenacious opponent of the schematic and artificial in science, and incidentally not one whit to blame for the acts perpetrated by the Institute of Forensic Psychiatry named after him (he died in 1918), accepted neither Kraepelin's doctrine of "dementia praecox" nor Bleuler's theory. How, to the credit of psychiatry in our country, many Soviet scientists were extremely wary of this insidious diagnosis. How in 1937, at the 2nd All-Union Congress of Psychiatrists, a genuine and relentless battle was joined, if not against schizophrenia as such, then against its no less monstrous offshoot, "mild schizophrenia," in other words, against the real extension of Bleuler's ideas to apply to the mentally healthy population, if the individual features of the particular citizen being examined by the devotees [of Bleuler] did not coincide with the "normal standards" devised by them (while the citizen had been writing poetry or founding steel without disturbing a soul). Or how, in the 1950s, Professors A. L. Epshtein from Dnepropetrovsk, A. S. Chistovich of Leningrad, P. F. Malkin of Kuibyshev, A. Yu. Vyasnovsky of Odessa, and their disciples, boldly proclaimed [their belief in] twentieth-century scientific thought, on the pages of journals and from congress platforms. . . . [The seeds of corruption in Soviet psychiatry] first flowered at the "historic" (for thus it was designated for 15 years in succession) joint session of the Academy of Sciences and the Academy of Medical Sciences of the USSR, which has been recorded in

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the Herostratean roll of the "great Stalin epoch" as the "Pavlovian" session—a worthy successor to the no less "historic" session of the All-Union Lenin Academy of Agricultural Sciences. The results of the "Pavlovian" session are well known—the hounding of L. A. Orbeli and other eminent scientists, the usurpation of unlimited power in the field of physiology by some of the most cunning "disciples of Pavlov," and so on.

But far less well known are the fruits of another "scientific assembly," the 1951 session of the Academy of Medical Sciences, expressly devoted to "the situation in psychiatry and physiology in the light of the doctrine of I. P. Pavlov." It was at this session in particular that the banners of infamy, unscrupulousness and careerism were waved in especial triumph. At this very "scientific assembly" the foundations were laid of the disastrous situation in present-day Soviet psychiatry. . . . The session overall was a grandiose settling of private accounts carried out on the initiative and with the blessing of the powers that be. It is interesting that chronologically the session was a continuation of the vociferous anti-semitic "purge of personnel" campaign waged in a number of medical institutes under the guise of so-called "attestation" (from the No. 1 Moscow Medical Institute alone 100 Jewish professors, senior lecturers and assistant lecturers were dismissed) and by 1952 it had merged with the equally vociferous anti-semitic campaign in search of the "assassins in white coats."

The main paper presented at the 1951 session was significantly anti-semitic in tone. It was the joint work of A. V. Snezhnevsky, I. V. Strelchuk, O. V. Kerbikov and V. B. Banshchikov—names to be noted for future reference. The most eminent Soviet psychiatrists—M. O. Gurevich, A. L. Epshtein, A. S. Shmaryan and R. Ya. Golant (a rather eloquent list from the point of view of nationality) were deemed "anti-Pavlovians." In those years this was almost tantamount to the notorious term "enemy of the people." True, no one was arrested there and then, after the session (they were arrested later, a year later, and they were not psychiatrists, therapeutists or neuro-pathologists); the "anti-Pavlovians" were simply branded and dismissed from their jobs . . . at best they were sent away from the capital into the provinces, in order to "strengthen departments in provincial institutes," where, incidentally, they were heartily welcomed and lavished with esteem, quite unlike recent "enemies of science." But the seats vacated by these enemies were promptly filled by the "victors"—the authors of that accusatory paper which was to serve as the starting-point of their dizzy careers, of which we shall speak in detail later. For the moment let us content ourselves with the dry facts: A. Snezhnevsky took over the Chair of Psychiatry at the Central Medical Institute, Banshchikov became Assistant Professor and later head of the Department of Psychiatry at the No. 1 Moscow Medical Institute, ousting even a senior Soviet psychiatrist of the standing of V. A. Gilyarovsky. The star of the present Director of the Serbsky Institute of Forensic Psychiatry,

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G. V. Morozov, rose refulgent over the psychiatric world at this time—he appeared in the Korsakov Clinic (No. 1 Moscow Medical Institute) as a senior lecturer.

There was a fantastical intermingling of different epochs—improvisation on "themes of Pavlov" harmonized perfectly with tea-leaf guesswork on themes by Bleuler, and superimposed on it all was the resplendent idea of "the struggle against servility and for the restoration of priorities in Russian science" with the "Michurin school of biology."

Floundering to the top through the troubled waters of swift change, and in some cases striding over the dead bodies of their drowned adversaries, there came personalities who not only bore no moral resemblance to nineteenth-century devotees of learning but whose baseness and pushfulness surpassed that of some of those politicians who were clustering in swarms around thrones great and small.

THE reader might be interested to learn some biographical details about the people who forced their way into positions of authority at this time.

We could begin with any of them—one is as good as another.

The most colourful figure must be that of V. M. Banshchikov. An alumnus of the Korsakov Clinic (No. 1 Moscow Medical Institute), he completed a post-graduate course and then became head doctor at one of the Moscow hospitals, where he became famous for his drinking bouts, debaucheries and ability to get on with his superiors. He got on so adroitly that after the war (during which he worked as a hospital director—for what is required of a wartime hospital director is, as we all know, not knowledge, but other qualities dictated by war) he suddenly became Director of Medgiz, the Publishing House of Medical Literature. Here he acquired a scandalous notoriety by virtue of his dishonest machinations, which included putting his signature—as author—to manuscripts that did not belong to him (a fact which was even written about in *Meditsinskii Rabotnik* [Medical Worker], the predecessor of *Meditsinskaya Gazeta* [Medical Gazette]).

No punishment was visited upon him, however, and he continued to "remain at his post" until 1952, though only indirectly concerned with psychiatry (he was officially working for his Doctor's degree at the Korsakov Clinic).

Everything changed after 1951. Banshchikov, who had set himself up during the "Pavlovian era" with a totally valueless doctoral thesis, became assistant professor and then Director of the Korsakov Clinic, actively ousting Professor Popov, who had replaced M. O. Gurevich, from his post; he also became head—and remained so for 15 years—of the All-Union and Moscow Association of Psychiatrists and Neuropathologists. In short, he became the official head of psychiatric science.

Throughout the whole of his staggering career Banshchikov nonetheless never gained the respect of even his most servile colleagues.

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All who have worked with him have pointed unanimously to his glaring lack of psychiatric literacy, his treatment of psychiatry as a collection of amusing anecdotes, his incapacity for creative scientific work—which has not prevented him from publishing several hundred scientific papers, signed, it is true, not by Banshchikov alone but in conjunction with co-authors (often Banshchikov had not so much as glanced at the work—the skills he had acquired as Director of Medgiz stood him in good stead . . .). Banshchikov's lustful inclinations were developed to the full during his period of power—his lectures over-abounded in scabrous remarks and obscenities, and he regarded each new female colleague as a potential mistress. And as for the banquets he literally ordered people to organize for him, they gave him opportunities to get drunk and indulge in excesses of behaviour with a total lack of embarrassment. . . .

And nothing, neither his absolute scientific bankruptcy nor his moral poverty, prevented Banshchikov all this time from directing congresses and conferences, and representing Soviet psychiatry at receptions for guests from abroad. Only in 1969 did he announce his intention to retire from all his posts "for a well-earned rest," and this was greeted by everyone with neither horror nor joy—people had long since grown accustomed to the vacuum at the very top of Soviet psychiatry.

THE biography of another leading light in Soviet psychiatry, A. V. Snezhnevsky, is more austere and seemly, although the harm he has done to society is immeasurably greater than that caused by Banshchikov. A young man of exceptional abilities, Snezhnevsky wrote several works of real value and was not unsuccessful as Director of Kostroma Psychiatric Hospital; but after 1950, having spent some time as head of the Serbsky Institute, which had been purged of many undesirable people after the "Pavlovian" session, he became an active participant in the "struggle for the Pavlovian doctrine" on a country-wide scale. Writing papers and delivering speeches like the papers and speeches at the Academy of Medical Sciences' session in 1951, and adapting Pavlov's naive hypotheses to clinical symptoms, he demonstrated for all to see his own uncommon talent for adaptation. From 1954 onwards he began to advocate his own "theory of schizophrenia" which first appeared as "schizophrenia explainable from Pavlovian positions," then "from the point of view of Sellier's [*sic*] adaptation syndrome," and later as schizophrenia "in the psycho-pharmacological context," schizophrenia "in an epidemic light" and finally "schizophrenia classified in accordance with development."

Thus it was Snezhnevsky's ability to fantasize that proved to be his most important quality as a "scientist"—a quality he possessed in common with Bleuler, whom he occasionally abuses, flaunting his erudition by quoting him in passable German. The main thing that helped

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Snezhnevsky to hold his ground so successfully at the top of his scientific profession without in any way adorning it was his intimacy with the former Minister Kurashov, not his authority in the scientific world (he acquired his "authority" at a later stage, and I shall deal with that further on in this essay). And the chief result of Snezhnevsky's activities (he is now a full member of the Academy of Medical Sciences and the editor of the *Journal of Neuropathology and Psychiatry*) was the creation of a school of militant ignoramuses, of which more anon.

ONE more biography, a little more brief but extremely typical of the age we are describing. Professor M. P. Nevsky now occupies a Chair at Rostov-on-Don; in 1951 he was an assistant lecturer at the Korsakov Clinic and a pupil of M. O. Gurevich, who had extricated him from impending trouble in the provinces (Nevsky had been head doctor at the Ulyanov Psychiatric Hospital during the war and was caught appropriating gold valuables belonging to evacuee mental patients who had died). For this good deed Nevsky more than repaid his teacher: in 1950 he denounced him publicly in the academic council of the No. 1 Medical Institute when the question of the "anti-Pavlovian transgressions" of the department of psychiatry was raised. Later, when Nevsky was a departmental head at Chelyabinsk, he acquired notoriety as a chaser of female students; the fact that he had four children of his own did not restrain him. . . . As regards Nevsky's scientific activities, apart from his Master's thesis which he wrote to Gurevich's dictation, he has done nothing original (a couple of dozen denunciations cannot, of course, be recognized as scientific work), although he has held the rank of Doctor of Sciences for a long time.

THE careers of the "younger generation"—G. V. Morozov, Romasenko, Portnov, and others, are no less sickening, based as they are on intrigues, informing, unconcealed infamy and scientific unscrupulousness. There is only one exception, and that is V. M. Morozov, at present head of a department at the Central Medical Institute. Born into a "scientific" family (his father is an internationally known virologist), V. M. Morozov received an excellent education and has read everything there is to read on psychiatry and related disciplines in four or more languages. But the erudition he has acquired as a result of this is dogmatical; Morozov has been unable to create anything original apart from the "virus theory of schizophrenia" earlier referred to. Having worked with Snezhnevsky for a long time, V. M. Morozov has subordinated himself entirely to him, trained himself to hang on the words of his forceful chief, and now appears merely as his shadow, producing nothing independently.

Thus the people who came into power in psychiatry on the crest of the Pavlovian wave were either those whose scientific potential was zero but who were utterly unscrupulous and capable of infamous

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behaviour and denunciation (not only public), or those who, although educated, had no scientific prospects and submitted entirely to circumstances. . . .

IGNORANCE at the top was matched by ignorance in the lower ranks. The inculcation of Bleuler's ideas proceeded at an intensive pace; even " hardened psychiatrists " were subjected to it, and so too were new graduates who felt a genuine inclination towards psychiatry. The system of periodically increasing the specialist qualifications of personnel in our country, which in theory is very fine, implanted the schizophrenic faith almost forcibly in those who thirsted after knowledge: the psychiatry lectures at training courses were delivered by none other than Snezhnevsky and Morozov. . . . Furthermore, people who had spent two or three months " at the top " saw how easy it was to become a professor by professing nothing more than the religion of schizophrenia. And who would refuse the chance of an easy life? The most far-sighted would estimate how many steps they would need to take to attain the summits that Banshchikov and Snezhnevsky had reached. And it must be admitted that only the most sluggish failed to accomplish [at least] some of these steps.

It is very typical that the mobilization of this schizophrenic guard took place in the years 1954–65, that is, during a period when the social atmosphere ought to have opened the door to fresh winds of change in science. But, as we have seen, the " new " leaders who had come to power in psychiatry during the last years of Stalin's life, and the army they had recruited, not only did *not* undergo a decline after the collapse of the " personality cult " but became extraordinarily strong.

As a result, by the end of the 1960s, schizophrenia had become firmly established as the scientific (or, more precisely, pseudo-scientific) philosophy of the majority of psychiatrists throughout the entire vast territory of the Soviet Union, with the exception of a few small islands in Leningrad, Kiev, the Urals, and one or two other places. The fact that there remained here and there doctors who, to the detriment of their material well-being, held different views served only to confirm the newly established order.

This order can be briefly characterized as the replacement of all the achievements of centuries of psychiatric science both in the USSR and abroad, with abbreviated " paragraphs of regulations " bearing no resemblance whatsoever to a scientific philosophy.

Of course, these rules are sometimes not fixed rules, and they have not been sanctioned by a single Minister, but nevertheless they do exist and 90 per cent of in-service psychiatrists, both in hospitals and in outpatient departments, are guided by them.

The sometimes horrifying consequences of their practical activities, the moral and criminal offences resulting from the scientific compromises and lack of principle on the part of " psychiatric personnel," in short,

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the vast psychiatric-police detachment which stands in opposition to reason in the Soviet Union at the present time, will be described in detail in what follows.

WHAT did reconciliation to Bleuler's "ideas" mean initially? A very small compromise, one would think—the assumption, as a working hypothesis, that along with other points of view there might be one which did not appear to be based on methods that were objective in the full sense of the word.

. . . We already know that the number of persons in the medical profession who rejoiced in the opportunity to decide questions relating to the mental health or otherwise of patients uncontrolledly and independently (or rather, tyranically), proved to be not merely considerable but enormous. Thus a small compromise brought in its train a multitude of large bargains with conscience.

And when scientific conscience had been consigned to oblivion, it was only a small step to compromising with the conscience of mankind, to executing the orders of higher authorities, to devising a justification for lawless deeds, and simply, to committing these lawless deeds on one's own initiative and at one's pleasure.

The present situation in the psychiatric service in the USSR confirms absolutely what I have said. As with very many things in our country, the ends of the psychiatric service are definitely at variance with the means it has at its disposal and to which it resorts (the fairly large number of laudable exceptions does not alter the dismal overall picture).

The psychiatric service in the USSR exists within the "general health service" system, where it ranks as "specialized help," that is, help which must be given to patients by persons specializing exclusively in this field. The unified system of psychiatric help, the foundations of which were laid as early as the *zemstvo* system and then developed by the first Soviet psychiatrists, is extremely progressive in its ideas as such—even after his discharge from the in-patient clinic the patient remains in touch with a doctor who gives him advice, prescribes treatment, etc. No other country in the world has a planned state system on such a large scale, presupposing such great public concern for the mentally sick. And many foreign psychiatrists are rightly envious of the Soviet system of psychiatric help when they see how excellently equipped it is—in the capital cities and a few other places—with new buildings, and new drugs (this last also mainly in the capital cities, beyond which foreign delegations never travel), and so on.

The trouble lies not in the system but in the people who go to make it up and whom it employs. As everywhere, they can be divided into scientific directors, administrators, and "implementers of ideas."

And the overwhelming majority of them, schooled either as students or later in the art of compromise—first small, "purely scientific" compromise, then big, worldly compromise, which we have already

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described in general terms—the majority of them labour in the final analysis in the service *not* of humane ideals or of science, but of the most shameless arbitrariness.

WE shall take as an example of this complex moral capitulation just one of the countless instances that are of no great import or social significance but are extremely typical illustrations of what we have said above.

This is the story: at the instigation of the KGB a semi-literate worker who had been gripped by the desire to indulge in literary creation was interned in a psychiatric hospital. As long as he had sent his stories to various editorial offices neither the KGB nor the psychiatrists had shown any interest. But as soon as he took the liberty (based, no doubt, on an overestimation of his capablities) of sending his manuscripts to the West German Embassy, at the same time requesting " the right to live somewhere where he would be published," the KGB and psychiatric authorities paid immediate attention to his case.

It was an act of foolishness on the part of the " patient " which any naïve graphomaniac is liable to commit, but anyone could see that it was nothing more than an act of foolishness (it is unlikely that editors in the Federal Republic of Germany are any more indulgent than ours . . .). However, the authorities were seriously disturbed by the " incredible fact " that a Soviet citizen had appealed for, and submitted to, a foreign inspection.

Two weeks later a learned lady of the rank of assistant lecturer in the psychiatry department of the Central Medical Institute, and a loyal disciple of A. V. Snezhnevsky and V. M. Morozov, offered her specialist advice.

A slightly flabbergasted medical audience heard that it was a case of . . . schizophrenia. Not of foolishness, not of idiotic pretensions (which are the property, incidentally, not only of illiterate graphomaniacs but even of widely published writers)—but of a mental illness supposedly manifesting itself in the fact that the unfortunate " fabricator " wanted to write and did not understand the futility of his intentions. . . .

The timid voices of objectors were overruled by the confident voice of the consultant, and the doctors who rushed to express their absolute assent, supposing that anything " coming from Snezhnevsky " was the most important and final word on the subject.

This mentally healthy man (for one cannot surely consider the aspiration to literary creation a " morbid symptom," for in that case a good nine-tenths of all members of the Writers' Union are schizophrenics twice over), was declared mentally ill, registered as a disabled person (group II), dismissed from his job, then refused admittance to a course of instruction in photography. . . . A new life began for him—the life of an ex-mental patient, deprived of many of his rights and continually expecting to be re-incarcerated in a mental hospital (which

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was in fact suggested to a district psychiatrist when the " schizophrenic " complained to the Ministry of Health that he was getting only 40 rubles a month instead of 120-130 . . . ; to the credit of the local doctor the order was not carried out).

This case can be regarded as a particularly revealing example of the relations between the scientific upper crust in psychiatry, the psychiatric " rank and file," and the authorities, both medical and—more frequently—non-medical.

But whereas in this insignificant and trifling (though not, of course, from the patient's point of view) hospital episode, the " scientific leadership " was represented by a rank-and-file consultant, in real life, especially in Moscow cases, it is the Academy of Medical Sciences Institute of Psychiatry which speaks as the " guiding scientific power." We have already met the director of this Institute; he is Member of the Academy of Medical Sciences Professor and Doctor of Medical Sciences Andrei Vladimirovich Snezhnevsky.

His " Pavlovian " career has already been described. It remains only to outline his " scientific exploits " of recent years.

WHEN in 1954 Snezhnevsky first proclaimed his intention of " founding a school," he occupied the post of head of the department of psychiatry at the Central Medical Institute and had only 10 or 20 colleagues in his charge. Now he has an immeasurably greater number of staff subordinate to him and, what is particularly dangerous, his " illegal," if one may so express it, almost monopolistic influence on medical minds has increased immensely.

Snezhnevsky established this influence with the assistance—yet again—of schizophrenia. In 1954 he advanced for the first time the apology for a conception that the main feature of this disease was a progression, a succession of clinical phases. To satisfy this conception Snezhnevsky's colleagues pored over piles of case histories of schizophrenia, " proving " that everything happened in practice precisely as their chief ordained. The Snezhnevsky group, still small at the time, chose the 1954 Korsakov Conference at which to make the first announcement of their " discovery." But the platform at the same conference was also given over to a very different psychiatric school of thought, one which doubted altogether that schizophrenia existed at all in the fantastic interpretation laid down by Bleuler.

Thus the conference was the scene of an uncompromising clash between two mutually exclusive trends of thought—the critical quest, the denial of Pavlovian psychological speculation, and so on (A. S. Chistovich, A. L. Epshtein, N. E. Vishnevsky), and the " colloquial " trend, where scientific thought had been replaced with a juggling with words and arbitrarily selected symptoms.

Both points of view were given an equal hearing at the conference. A scientific controversy raged and, incidentally, more apropos of what Chistovich and his supporters had said—for the audience was so struck

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by the boldness of an idea that refuted the usual conservative notions than apropos of Snezhnevsky's "researches." In practice, about six years later, the Snezhnevsky line prevailed, and moreover in a far uglier form than the one in which it had been propounded to his listeners at the conference.

In the first place, Snezhnevsky had his hands on countless administrative levers (the late Minister of Health, S. V. Kurashov, happened to have been a senior lecturer in psychiatry at the Central Medical Institute . . .).

By pressing these levers Snezhnevsky was able, most importantly, to remove by various ways and means all his more or less dangerous (that is, scientifically intransigent) opponents. The main opposition was expected, and not without reason, to come from the widely recognized school of V. M. Bekhter, recorded in psychiatric history as the "Leningrad" (Petersburg) school. Although psychiatrists have short memories and, by way of illustration, no one at the 1954 Korsakov Conference remembered the 2nd Congress of Psychiatrists in 1937, in the same way that no one at the 4th and 5th Congresses of Psychiatrists in 1963 and 1969 remembered the Korsakov Conference, Snezhnevsky was naturally aware that, at the 2nd Congress, his unfounded widening of the boundaries of schizophrenia ("schizophrenic pandemia," to use Professor V. P. Osipov's apt expression) had been ridiculed precisely by psychiatrists from Leningrad who were disciples of Bekhter.

However, the Leningrad school had thinned out considerably during the period of the "struggle for Pavlovian doctrine" (and, as the reader is aware, Snezhnevsky was more than a little in evidence at that time); many of the most eminent psychiatrists had been eliminated from active scientific life. And bearing in mind that by that time both Osipov and Ostankov, the most faithful and consistent followers of Bekhter, were dead, it becomes clear that the opponents both of the "doctrine of schizophrenia" and of the propagators of this doctrine in a wider application had no leaders of any standing (from the authorities' point of view).

Consequently, from the outset Snezhnevsky and his confederates were confronted, not with the solid front of resistance which had barred the way of "mild schizophrenia" in 1936, for instance, but merely with isolated centres of opposition.

We have already related how they were put down; let us add simply that adminstrative shuffles played more than a small part in this. Thus for instance, after the ouster of A. S. Chistovich from his post as head of the department of psychiatry at the Military Medical Academy, Portnov—one of the psychiatrists who was fairly devoted if not to Snezhnevsky then at least to his methods of careerism and scientific fact-juggling—was appointed in his place (as Chistovich later wittily remarked at the 4th Congress of Psychiatrists, emissaries from Moscow were arriving in Leningrad . . .).

At all events, in the final analysis Snezhnevsky was left with a

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completely free hand; he could "invent whatever he liked" without fear of public criticism, after all, he was also the editor of the journal of the All-Union Association of Psychiatrists and Neuro-pathologists. . . .

BY advancing the thesis that the most important object of study in schizophrenia must be its course, and not the concrete content of the clinical picture, Snezhnevsky uncovered an unlimited field of speculation for many people and in the first instance, of course, for himself. There is nothing wrong with the criterion of progression, which is in itself irreproachable; our quarrel is with the interpretation placed upon it by the "Snezhnevsky school." In the first place, it would be very risky to call the idea an original one. The criterion of progression had been posited as a fundamental of psychiatric posology by Kraepelin, whom Snezhnevsky, of course, seizes every opportunity of calling old-fashioned, claiming that science, in the person of Snezhnevsky, has left Kraepelin far behind.

True, Snezhnevsky is far removed from that epoch—but in the reverse direction. If Snezhnevsky's "criterion on progression" proves anything at all, then it is only the unoriginality of his scientific thought: for he bases his criterion not on an in-depth somatic study of the patient, as general medical theory requires, but on his utterances, on a determination of the "subtle condition" [of the patient] almost solely on the basis of his word-formation in a single phrase.* This was Bleuler's method absolutely—the equation of the manifestations of the ordinary human psyche with disease, if the doctor was so inclined; although, as we have already observed, Bleuler has been repeatedly branded by Snezhnevsky as an idealist and a Freudian from many platforms and pulpits. . . .

This is the first and, it must be said, the most "outstanding" feature of the "Snezhnevsky theory"—plagiarism posing as originality. . . .

In the second place, the "doctrine of stages of the schizophrenic process," first formulated in 1954, has not remained invariable; it has been modified and "perfected" to the point where it has ceased to bear any resemblance to the initial model: over a period of 15 years Snezhnevsky's "collective" has suggested a dozen or so different classifications of this same schizophrenia. This would appear to indicate a scientific conscientiousness—as facts were accumulated, alterations were made to the hypothesis in order to define it with greater precision.

But the reader would be cruelly deceived if he were to believe in the scientific conscientiousness of Snezhnevsky's colleagues on the basis of the annual erasures they make in their own theories. The determining

* The author has had occasion to read advice given by consultant professors, "coming from Snezhnevsky." In one case-history, on the basis of the fact that the patient had said: "I am meditating on the essence of the world," the conclusion was reached that he was 'inclined to futile discourse, to philosophizing, a cardinal symptom of creeping schizophrenia. The structure of his condition is determined by his use of the verb 'meditate' instead of the normal word 'think.'"

The patient, incidentally, was a trained philosopher by profession. . . .

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factors in the modification and perfection of the notorious "classification system" have been, not facts obtained in the course of painstaking scientific researches, but Snezhnevsky's trips abroad, from which he has returned with smatterings of knowledge and information. And in any case, for all the adaptations, the essence of the "theory" has remained unchanged: the substitution of idle talk for precise knowledge. . . .

EVERYTHING ever isolated from the overall mass of "psychoses in general" during the course of a century by tens and hundreds of psychiatrists, everything involving different concrete aetiological factors, has been "cancelled." According to Snezhnevsky, if a patient is discovered to have symptoms of "schizophrenia" (and we know how these are looked for), the cause "is of no importance," as long as the "stage is correctly determined." Thus the whole of psychiatry is amalgamated under the single, sinister sign of schizophrenia.

For Snezhnevsky and his stooges ascribe almost all the syndromes known in psychiatry to schizophrenia, discerning (or rather contriving to see in them) the "subtle features of the schizophrenic process." So subtle as to be quite invisible. . . .

And these "subtle symptoms" have apparently been found by Snezhnevsky's colleagues and confederates in manic depressives, in patients suffering from organic psychoses and alcoholism, in psychopathic personalities and neurotics, in mentally retarded and in mentally healthy persons.

Yes, healthy persons. The reader will not need to search his memory long before he recalls the names of Pyotr Grigorenko, Zhores Medvedev, Ilya Rips, Valeria Novodvorskaya. . . . For all of them "displayed" signs of mental illness, and the latter three, symptoms of schizophrenia. But what of the fact that these people's families and close friends had never noticed anything pathological in their utterances and behaviour? The reader would not be so astonished or indignant if he had previously heard a favourite dictum of one of Snezhnevsky's closest colleagues, Professor V. M. Morozov: "No symptoms of schizophrenia? Everyone knows you can have schizophrenia without any symptoms. . . ." The reader has only to translate this pearl of wisdom into ordinary language—"disease without any symptoms of disease"—and the vacuous ignorance of this "diagnostic principle" needs no further demonstration.

But students in the psychiatry department at the Central Medical Institute hear precisely this slogan every day, for V. M. Morozov is the head of this department. Countless colleagues of Snezhnevsky who favour psychiatric hospitals remote from the "source of scientific light," i.e. the clinic presided over by Snezhnevsky with consultative visits, apply precisely this slogan. It alone is followed by the energetic young people who study under Snezhnevsky's wing and determinedly seize every post in psychiatry as it falls vacant (chairs, departments in institutes, administration of "special help" in the provinces and so on);

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it alone is inculcated into respectfully attentive uneducated medical audiences.

Thus, thanks to the engine (or rather, the bulldozer) set in motion by Snezhnevsky, schizophrenia has become a synonym for any mental illness or even its absence. . . .

SOME of Snezhnevsky's most zealous colleagues—Smulevich for instance—do not even trouble to conceal [their opinion] that psychiatry has reverted to the conception of a "single psychosis" long since buried by science. And although they do not express this point of view officially, but only allude to it behind the scenes, this barbaric, scientifically illiterate concept alone is sufficient to create vast opportunities for inundating psychiatric hospitals with doctors who are ignoramuses, and who, "since all kinds of madness are one, and that is, schizophrenia," not only see all sick people as equal but even put sick and healthy on the same level.

Moreover, "total schizophrenia" is equally valid in the conception of psychiatry held by both doctors and bureaucrats, specialists and philistines, a fact which the philistines—the bureaucrats in the various departments—make use of; the model presented to the reader earlier in this essay proves this beyond all doubt, as do a whole series of cases he will know of, in which perfectly healthy persons have been "declared insane."

BUT, if the reader remembers, other forces were at work in that model over and above the "theoretical component." The consultant, despite all his scientific erudition, remained a lone voice, and was opposed (or at any rate, ought to have been opposed) by the medical practitioners who come into daily contact with the patient, perform direct diagnoses, determine the patient's regimen and prescribe his treatment. . . .

These practical workers did not dare to raise any objection to the view of a consultant who had, before their very eyes, quite openly affixed the label of lunacy to a perfectly healthy man.

And these practical workers are legion. When we talk of the disastrous state of Soviet psychiatry we have to mention some of the typical features of this legion. Otherwise it will be hard to understand where on earth they ever spring from, these sadists who call themselves humanists, Lifshits, for example, the head doctor at the Kaluga Psychiatric Hospital. . . .*

As we have already noted, psychiatrists in the USSR are regarded as "exclusive specialists." However, very often these "specialists" are less qualified than medical orderlies, so that "medium-level" psychiatrists of the older generation are frequently superior to their medical

* Lifshits was responsible for, among other things, the "incarceration" of Zhores Medveder in 1970 (translator's note).

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" supervisors " in many professional qualities acquired over long years of experience, not to speak of their moral standards. . . . Of course, it would be quite unfair to say that absolutely every medical student who goes into psychiatry is gripped by the thirst for enrichment (although a certain percentage undoubtedly is). No, the overwhelming majority aspire to practise their profession in psychiatric hospitals and health centres for the most noble of reasons—out of compassion for the sick, desire to do something to help them, to join personally in the fight against the spiritual ailments of mankind and, if not personally to achieve a revolution in a backward science, then at least to wait for the time when some " great mind " will do so.

But what can one do when great minds are so few and far between? And when the concept of what is a " great mind " is quite different at different times?

We have already seen who the great minds of today are. It is they who teach the young psychiatrists of the future, who in their turn acquire, from the lap of these gods, a scientific unscrupulousness which is well matched, as we shall show, by their moral turpitude.

Only it is unlikely that the alumni of our modern psychiatric prophets realize this. On the other hand, they are quick to sense that they are the elite of the medical world, that they possess knowledge which is beyond the comprehension of the backward medical masses: their gods suggest to them daily that the psychiatrist's vocation is to " probe the subtleties of man's spiritual life."

This, incidentally, is a grave delusion, and one not only of professors, research students and senior lecturers, but also of many patients and their families. . . . In the matter of knowledge of man's spiritual life psychiatrists must take second place to psychologists and writers, and not encroach upon the infinitely varied mental activities of man. . . .

THOSE who dismiss the work of Picasso and Malevich with psychiatric swagger, or who regard the entire output of Churlenis as pathological (Professor V. A. Gilyarovsky included photographs of his pictures in a textbook on psychiatry as an illustration of morbid perception), are all the more inflexible towards ordinary people who exhibit a penchant for artistic creation, if this is outside their " acquired professional skill." Thus all engineers who write poetry, all mathematicians who compose satirical ballads, and with them all accountants with an interest in history, and all students excited by abstract problems of justice, are psychiatrically suspect. In the eyes of the arrogant psychiatric elite they are all " deviations from the norm." From the meek, submissive, philistine norm—from the rules of conduct laid down by the authorities for the dutiful citizen. . . . The philistine conceit of psychiatrists (the exceptions, as always, only prove the rule) is the First Deadly Sin in modern psychiatric practice. . . .

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TWO kinds of people are now swelling the ranks of this self-styled elite.

First—the former *troyechniki*, the poor students who only just hung on through six years of medical courses, forgot the most elementary notions of medicine as soon as they had taken their exams, culturally speaking, never rose far above pithecanthropus level, then suddenly gained the chance to wreak relentless revenge for all their past torments in the examination hall, the gibes of their cleverer fellow-students and their humiliating silence during conversations on subjects beyond their comprehension (of which there might be an infinite variety from cybernetics to numismatics).

Now the "doctrine of schizophrenia" has given these former *troyechniki* their opportunity to get even with all those clever dicks and know-alls, because all deviations from the quiet, replete life are, as Professor Snezhnevsky and his disciples have proved, schizophrenia. And for the same reason, the fluctuating moods of adolescent Werthers are also schizophrenia. So is the passion for writing complaints, and the striving to get hold of a rare postage stamp from Mauritius, and the intention to change one's profession if one does not like the occupation one has been trained for—it is all schizophrenia. The ex-*troyechnik* is incapable of thinking otherwise, for did he not hear with his own ears (as did the author of this essay) what a representative of psychiatry at the Central Institute said of a student he did not know, who was the daughter of one of his registered (that is, sentenced to schizophrenia) patients? Upon hearing that this student intended to leave her institute and enter another because she was more attracted to "pure mathematics" than to engineering, an assistant of V. M. Morozov gravely remarked: "The girl's in a bad way . . . it's the onset of the inertia state. . . ."

The reader will immediately draw the conclusion that "scientific pronouncements" of this sort are no more than philistinism—and he will be absolutely right.

However much Snezhnevsky may dissociate himself from the stupid things that his disciples' assistants say, and that thousands of practising doctors trained by these assistants and consultants do, it is precisely these stupidities that reveal the true essence of the "doctrine of schizophrenia" as modified by Snezhnevsky, Morozov and the rest of them, just as X-rays reveal a cancerous tumour in an [apparently] healthy body.

The essence is this: the establishment, albeit almost forcibly (we have already described the methods used), of the views of the "Snezhnevsky school" in mass psychiatric practice, a triumph of philistinism. It is the demagogic recruitment of supporters from the ranks of the *troyechniki* referred to earlier—otherwise the circle of supporters for the Director of the Academy of Medical Sciences Institute would be too small. . . .

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BUT Snezhnevsky and the Morozovs, both V. M. and G. V., have other supporters, less numerous, of course, who are fairly well educated, unlike the ex-stomatologists, obstetricians, and greenhorn psychiatrists of only two months' standing.

These other supporters are the most dangerous of all. It is in their midst that the "Lifshitses" * spring up. They are not stupid; they have sufficient common sense to realize that not every word uttered by a professor is the truth simply because the person who uttered it is a professor. They are familiar with the elements of logic and can easily perceive that "schizophrenia without the symptoms of schizophrenia" is as absurd as "death without signs of death."

But they also hold to the view that "everything that's not like people (i.e. not like me) is schizophrenia," or, as one worthy doctor with a higher degree in medicine put it in popular language when he explained to a dumbstruck patient why the latter must not swear at his wife: "otherwise they'll come for you, old chap. . . ."

Why do these clever ones too follow in the train of Snezhnevsky's stooges? The answer is very simple: to make a career for themselves. There can be no other explanation—here is firsthand evidence of the corrupting influence of the "doctrine of schizophrenia." Anyone who is not a fool, and with the necessary grain of cynicism in his soul, will see at once that, given the hullabaloo surrounding the "Snezhnevsky theory," the kind of scientific activity that holds out the most prospects is that which pleases the head of the school. Anyone with his wits about him will soon realize how many material blessings can be derived from a "safe diagnosis," as the now deceased senior lecturer Vishnevsky once wittily called schizophrenia. (He was later hounded out of the Military Medical Academy.)

THE results of this sharp and speedy realization are well known: an inflationary, mass increase in the number of theses (to which we referred earlier), the natural progression from scientific to worldly cynicism, and, to strengthen the "vital" foundations of the powerful men in the modern psychiatric world, an adroit juggling with figures to muffle scientific and psychiatric statistics. . . . Exultant supporters of the revival of genetics in psychiatry (apparently genetics too, long-suffering classical genetics, can be manipulated to advantage . . .) talk of the "stability of pathological mutations, if the natural obstacles to the continuation of the species of the schizophrenic do not reduce the incidence of schizophrenia in the population. . . ." And triumphant phrases about the "endogenization (meaning—'schizophrenization') of the structure of psychic disorders" ring out at plenary sessions of the Association of Psychiatrists. . . .

WHAT is "endogenization of structure"? Formally speaking, the increase in the percentage of "endogenous" disorders (that is, disorders most probably resulting from inner, hereditary factors) among

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all mental illnesses. And although science knows of several endogenous psychoses (Kraepelin believed there were two; contemporary German psychiatrists reckon on three), the "Snezhnevsky school" uses the word "endogenous" to refer solely to schizophrenia—for how could they otherwise preserve their shaky position in science? And in order to confirm "endogenization of structure" and to justify their own presence in various learned institutions in ever-increasing numbers, and to prove that they are vital to society, the "Snezhnevsky school" does its utmost to make sure everyone understands that the number of schizophrenia cases is growing, and the disease must be studied more widely; more and more people must be drawn into the "fight against the scourge of mankind," and must concentrate exclusively on this. . . .

But everyone knows that there is no truth upon this earth that cannot be used by a deceiver to cause falsehood to triumph. And this is precisely what the "Snezhnevsky school" does. Because mankind really does dread mental illness—including, of course, the few cases attributed to Kraepelin's *dementia praecox*. And because the *absolute* number of mental patients really is rising—because the population is on the increase. But an increase in the incidence of schizophrenia in particular? Fallacious "primary documentation" permits worshippers of Bleuler's ghost to perform any conjuring tricks they please with statistics, including this one. And moreover, to the delight of Snezhnevsky & Co., not only in the Soviet Union, but abroad also—in the USA, for example. And if there are any "anti-schizophrenic islands" (such as Leningrad, or, outside the Soviet Union, France) where the percentage "incidence of schizophrenia" is quite different from and much less than that calculated by admirers and servants of Snezhnevsky, this provokes categorical assertions as to the "statistical untrustworthiness of individual indices by virtue of their failure to coincide with mean All-Union (or world) data." How agile statistics can be, and how powerful the argument of the "mean index." . . .

The root of the matter is that the "mean" index (whether "world" or "Soviet Union" is unimportant) is calculated on the basis of semi-illiterate diagnoses thrust upon patients by doctors trained in the "Snezhnevsky school." If the foundations of a building are rotten, how can the building be pronounced stable?

BUT that is not the only significance of "pro-schizophrenic" statistics; that they justify the activities of psychiatrists on behalf of these hordes of "schizophrenics"—activities which cost the state (in other words, the patients) a considerable amount of money. Their significance lies also—and this finds great favour with the authorities—in the fact that the "growth of schizophrenia" (which in reality does not exist) helps to conceal a growth in the incidence of other psychic disorders, and to hide the *social* nature of their causes. This applies particularly to alcoholic psychoses; the incidence of these is very high and increasing annually, but the reclassification of a good half of them

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under the heading of " schizophrenia " obviates the need to " sound the alarm." Precisely thus the number of alcoholics among the population is minimized; if alcoholic psychoses are referred to in [medical] papers as " paranoid schizophrenia complicated by alcoholism," degraded alcoholics find themselves ranked as suffering from " creeping schizophrenia complicated by alcoholism."

To a lesser degree, but still very often, the label " schizophrenia " in research papers conceals infectious, organic, toxic and reactive psychoses (for the " Snezhnevsky school," as we have seen, attributes almost the entire content of psychiatry to schizophrenia); recently it has been mental backwardness that has more and more frequently " turned out to be " schizophrenia—oligophrenia, which really is on the increase (this can be deduced from even the shakiest psychiatric statistics); with each successive generation there appear more and more people who are incapable of instruction in an ordinary school. One would think that here was where psychiatrists ought to be sounding the alarm, but why do so, why try to seek the mass causes of a phenomenon that is so disagreeable for society, when it is so much simpler to call all these cases " infantile forms of schizophrenia "? . . .

Is it any wonder in this situation that other, administrative components feel free to act unconstrainedly: since " everything is permitted " for the scientists, then it is all the more for them. And if Snezhnevsky's interpretation of the concept of schizophrenia resurrected Bleuler's fantasies on an unlimited scale, the administrators, both medical and non-medical, whose rights to carry out an investigation are also unlimited, immediately assumed for themselves the authority to stretch these fantasies as far as possible and make use of them as widely as possible.

Some readers may perhaps pity psychiatry because it has to execute orders that conflict with the principles of this most humane of all the sciences. I should like these readers to understand that present-day psychiatry has willingly brought this fate upon itself by making very clear to the authorities the great prospects of the combination of scientific unscrupulousness, elementary ignorance and moral omnivorousness for the curbing of dissenters. So there is no one they need pity.

And I should also like the reader to realize that the hero of our story, the " doctrine of schizophrenia," is represented in many cities of the Soviet Union either by pupils of, or by people sharing the same views as, Snezhnevsky (whichever is more to his advantage). . . .

Let the reader imagine a medical conference, not a small one, but the Fifth All-Union Congress of Psychiatrists. It is the final day—5 July 1969, a symposium on " the classification of schizophrenia " and Snezhnevsky is putting his " doctrine " on the forms of " Bleuler's disease " to the Congress.

Snezhnevsky comes onto the platform to the applause of the entire auditorium, like some popular juggler or baritone in a variety show. Then he mounts the rostrum and, playfully affected, parades his tolerable

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diction and skilfully shaped sentences before the audience. And the overwhelming majority of his listeners believe that the stream of words spewed out by this Academician is the greatest discovery they have heard in the whole of their psychiatric life. His listeners cannot know that the "classification of the forms of flow of schizophrenia" for which they are about to cast a unanimous vote will be rejected only a few months later by a World Health Organization commission appointed to work out an international system of disease classification.

And, of course, his listeners cannot see the thousands of mentally healthy people declared insane or, more precisely, "suffering from schizophrenia," by adherents of Academician Snezhnevsky; they cannot see either General Grigorenko, or Ilya Rips, or the many others. Snezhnevsky's victims do not stand beside him on the platform; they can neither share in the rapture of the audience nor heap down curses upon the head of the pseudo-scholar.

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The Communist Party of Germany (KPD), 1956-1968

Richard Loss

FOR many years, runs a customary refrain, the KPD functioned as the most important non-Russian member of the Communist International. The hope of a communist revolution in Weimar Germany, it is also urged, enlisted the support of Russian leaders anxious to secure their own revolution by establishing a revolution in an advanced Western society. All this seems sensible enough as far as it goes, and the study of the KPD often goes no farther than 1933 or, rarely, 1945.

As one of the less imposing of the non-ruling parties, the KPD has tended to become a forgotten party of postwar Europe. This article attempts an assessment of the KPD's potential as the Marxist-Leninist component of West German labour, with special attention to the Party's constitutional status. The years 1956 to 1968 have been chosen for analysis because they mark a transitional phase of West German communism: in 1956, a prohibition; from 1956 to 1967, the fugitive years; and in 1968, the KPD's reappearance as an open movement named the German Communist Party (DKP).

Complying with the request of the Adenauer government, on 17 August 1956, the Federal Constitutional Court dissolved the KPD, charging it as a violator of Article 21 (2) of the Basic Law, which reads:

> Parties which proceed, according to their goals or the behaviour of their adherents, to impair or to eliminate the free, democratic, basic order or to endanger the existence of the Federal German Republic, are unconstitutional. The Federal Constitutional Court decides the question of unconstitutionality.

The Court said the Party wished to eliminate the free, democratic, basic order through the dictatorship of the proletariat [1]; the KPD had also tried to impair the constitutional order by calling for the "fall" of the Adenauer regime and of one part of the opposition Social Democrats. The Court added that certain values, such as a legal parliamentary opposition, become absolutes if they are realized in a democratic and representative manner. Article 21 (2) protects these absolute values from all attacks [2]; hence, the Court needed to draw no distinction between the gravity of attacks. As a result of this legal decision, Bonn joined the nearly two score governments that have restrained communist parties in the postwar period.[3]

[1] *Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts*, Vol. V, p. 237; cited hereafter as *BVerfGE*, followed by the volume and page. [2] *BVerfGE*, V, 139.
[3] *World Strength of the Communist Party Organizations* Annual Report, US Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, January, 1965, p. 2.

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Some 10 years after the dissolution, the KPD's Central Committee implied that the ban marked a turning point for German communism. Labelling its own pre-dissolution propaganda a "very serious error," and citing the contribution of this propaganda to the Party's conviction, the Central Committee in effect criticized Party propaganda for having brought about a damaging prohibition.[4] Just as in 1962, when a distinguished editor of Party documents wrote that the "history of German communism is until now a little known and scarcely investigated region," so today one must note the scarcity of detailed analyses of the prohibition years, 1956 to 1968.[5] Enough data are in hand to investigate certain familiar hypotheses, especially those on how the prohibition shaped party activity and organization.

THE prohibition has inspired five major hypotheses which, for brief reference, I have named the internal security, the rearmament, the camouflage, the propaganda and the immunization hypotheses. The internal security and rearmament hypotheses purport to explain the origins of the dissolution. According to the internal security hypothesis, the fledgling Bonn Republic was so weak internally that it could not risk the assault of a well-organized opponent such as the KPD; hence, the Allies and the Adenauer government supported the KPD prohibition as a means of promoting internal security. According to the rearmament hypothesis, the government feared the obstructions the KPD might throw in the path of Germany's rearmament, and so decided to request the Party's prohibition; the KPD itself is foremost among the adherents of the rearmament hypothesis.

The camouflage, propaganda and immunization hypotheses purport to explain the specific effects of the dissolution on the KPD. Driving the party underground has made it at least as formidable as it was above ground, according to respected defenders of the camouflage hypothesis such as *The Economist*, the Deputy Chairman of the Social Democratic Party, Wilhelm Mellies, and *The Times* (London).[6] Dr Max Güde, chairman of the Bundestag's Special Committee on Criminal Law Reform, held that the prohibition rendered the party "completely undangerous"; in this view, the prohibition has reduced rather than increased the formidability of the KPD.[7] According to the propaganda hypothesis of *The Manchester Guardian* and Professor Alfred Grosser, as a result of the ban, East Germany has gained more in propaganda

[4] Central Committee of the Communist Party of Germany, *KPD 1945–1965: Abriss. Dokumente. Zeittafel.* (Berlin: Dietz, 1966), p. 78.

[5] Hermann Weber (ed.), *Der deutsche Kommunismus: Dokumente* (Köln: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1963), Foreword; for a bibliography of monographs and essays on the KPD, see Hans G. Schumann, *Die politischen Parteien in Deutschland nach 1945* (Frankfurt a.M.: Bernard & Graefe Verlag für Wehrwesen, 1967), pp. 137–38.

[6] *The Economist*, 25 August 1956, p. 621; *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 18 August 1956; *New York Times*, 19 August 1956, p. 10; *The Times* (London), 31 August 1956, p. 9.

[7] Quoted in Lutz Lehmann, *Legal und opportun: politische Justiz in der Bundesrepublik* (Berlin: Voltaire, 1966), p. 107.

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material than West Germany has achieved in control over the KPD.[8] The immunization hypothesis says the prohibition has ushered in a tightening of party discipline; the organizational change has supposedly shielded the KPD from the factionalism which the Sino-Soviet split has fostered in some legal communist parties. The purpose of this essay is to weigh the empirical strength of these hypotheses.

Origins

The formation and endeavours of the KPD after 1945 shed light on the government's readiness in 1951 to resort to Article 21 (2). Between 1945 and 1951, the KPD's titular centre of control changed four times, and these changes reflect the main events of Party history from the collapse of the Third Reich to the birth of the Bonn Republic. From May to June 1945 the Ulbricht Group formed the local centre of the communist movement in Germany.[9] Led by Walter Ulbricht, ten carefully selected *emigrés* from Hitler's Germany returned to set up the administration of the Soviet zone of occupation. Stalin had apparently wanted the Ulbricht Group to create an anti-fascist mass organization rather than to form the KPD or any other political parties. But in early June 1945, according to Wolfgang Leonhard, a member of the Ulbricht Group, Moscow abruptly ordered the formation of the KPD as rapidly as possible.

The dissolution of the Ulbricht Group followed shortly after the founding of the KPD on 12 June 1945; in July 1945 the Central Committee of the KPD became the second centre of the communist movement in Germany. The Central Committee performed this function from about July 1945 until April 1946, when the KPD and the Social Democrats merged as the Socialist Unity Party (SED) of the Soviet zone. The formation of the SED moved the titular centre of control of the KPD in the Western zones from its Central Committee to the SED/KPD "Labour Community" which, from 1946 to 1949, actively promoted the fusion of the KPD and the Social Democrats in the Western zones. The reluctance of the communists to admit the failure of Popular Front tactics in the Eastern zones produced what the SED has named the "relatively late" separation of the Western KPD from the organization of the SED.[10] In 1949, the KPD's Central Committee emerged as the fourth centre of the communist movement since 1945.

Why did Stalin suddenly favour the formation of the KPD in 1945?

[8] *The Manchester Guardian Weekly*, 23 August 1956, pp. 15, 9; Alfred Grosser, *The Federal Republic of Germany*, trans. Nelson Aldrich (New York: Praeger, 1964), p. 55: "And it [the ban] was at least as useful to the KPD as it was embarrassing. . . . It can hardly be said that the judgment at Karlsruhe has had any positive effect whatsoever on the cause of anti-Communism in the Federal Republic."

[9] Wolfgang Leonhard "Es muss demokratisch aussehen . . ." *Die Zeit* 14 May 1965, p. 8.

[10] Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus beim Zentralkomitee der SED, *Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung in Acht Bänden* (8 Vols.; Berlin: Dietz, 1966), VI, 103, 294; cited hereafter as *Geschichte der deut. Arbeiterbewegung*.

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According to one authority, the knowledge gained in the conquest of Germany abated Soviet fears of a fascist resistance powerful enough to infiltrate any political parties allowed to organize.[11] Another authority says that in light of the worsening of Soviet-Allied relations, Stalin permitted political parties as a means of accelerating his German policy.[12] Whichever explanation is correct, the KPD was initially well suited to executing the political side of Soviet policy. Twelve of the sixteen seats on the KPD's Central Committee were held by USSR-trained *emigrés*, thus assuring the reliability of the Party's top command.[13]

Nor were Western pronouncements necessarily hostile to the formation of the KPD. After what George Kennan has called "confused and unreal" discussions, Prime Minister Attlee, Generalissimo Stalin, and President Truman signed the Potsdam Declaration which, coming as it did only a month after the formation of the KPD, held out intriguing possibilities for the development of a Marxist party active in all the occupation zones.[14] Kennan criticizes the Declaration's statement on political parties:

> For the further statement that "democratic" political parties would be not only permitted but "encouraged" to function throughout Germany "with rights of assembly and of public discussion" it is difficult to find any ameliorating explanation whatsoever. Anyone in Moscow could have told our negotiators what it was that the Soviet leaders had in mind when they used the term "democratic parties." Not even the greatest naïveté could excuse the confusion worked on public understanding in Germany itself and the other Western countries by the use of this term in a document signed by Stalin as well as by Messrs Truman and Attlee.

However that may be, initially the KPD tried to disarm bourgeois fears of a party which had played a reckless hand in the Weimar Republic. Arguing that conditions differed in Germany and the Soviet Union, in June 1945 the KPD's founding document rejected as "false" the imposition of the Soviet model on Germany; prior to the formation of the SED in 1946, the KPD also mentioned the possibility of a relatively peaceful transition to socialism.[15] In 1949, the latter thesis gave way to the argument that the Soviet Union had revealed the only true path to socialism.

After the formation of the SED, the KPD increasingly revealed itself as a pawn in the SED's strategy of creating a fusion party in the Western zones. In retrospect, the SED's official history of German labour admits that the KPD under SED direction did "not always" suit its tactics to

[11] Carola Stern, *Porträt einer bolschewistischen Partei* (Köln: Verlag f. Politik u. Wirtschaft, 1957), p. 14.
[12] Leonhard, *Die Zeit*, 14 May 1965, p. 8.
[13] Stern, p. 20.
[14] George F. Kennan, *Memoirs 1925–1950* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), pp. 258–59.
[15] Stern, p. 39; the following lines rely heavily on Stern.

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the circumstances of West Germany [16]; the obsolescence of KPD policy arose from the presence of Allied troops in Western Germany and the opposition of Kurt Schumacher, the Social Democratic leader, to a Popular Front. As the SED history comments, "not everyone" who supported the KPD's mass actions also voted for it.[17] During all elections of state legislatures from 1945 to 1951, the KPD never surpassed the 14 per cent it won in the 1947 election of North Rhine-Westphalia. The SED history complains that communists were saddled with the "less influential" and "most thankless" tasks.[18] The state cabinets normally excluded the communists from the interior and justice posts, assigning Party members, at various times, the portfolios of the commerce, education, health, housing, labour, refugee, reconstruction and social ministries.

The SED history accused the Allied Military governments of harassing the KPD, but, except to forbid the formation of a unity party modelled on the SED, the Military governments stopped far short of the limits of their powers in harassing German communists. For example, in 1947, two years after licensing the KPD as a democratic party under the Potsdam Declaration, the American Military government declined to prosecute the KPD and its fronts for the alleged theft of over a million dollars of rationed paper on which to print propaganda. An intelligence officer assigned to the case gives the following paraphrase of the Military government's order to him [19]:

> We [US authorities in Germany] licensed the Communist Party as part of the re-education programme promoting the democratic processes, part of which is the unhampered functioning of political parties. Putting the Communist Party out of business would certainly be construed by the Germans as an act by the American occupation authorities of political persecution. German faith in democratic methods and procedures would therefore be shaken and anti-American propaganda supplied with a powerful argument. It is therefore in the interest of US policy that this case not be prosecuted.

According to the Party's data, the Allied Military governments sparingly used their power to prohibit KPD publications and to punish Party members.[20] In 1951, therefore, Adenauer's decision to move against the KPD ran counter to the previous policy of the American Military government. Indeed, by 1951, the dispute between the Allies

16 *Geschichte der deut. Arbeiterbewegung*, VI, 294.

17 Ibid. p. 218.

18 Ibid. p. 102.

19 Guenther Reinhardt, *Crime Without Punishment* (New York: Hermitage House, 1952), p. 264.

20 *KPD 1945–1965*, pp. 43, 55–56; cf. pp. 43, 72; for the reactions of the SED and of the American Military government to the activities of the American Federation of Labour in Germany, cf. *Geschichte der deut. Arbeiterbewegung*, VI, 94; Eugene Davidson, *The Death and Life of Germany* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1959), p. 91.

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in general and West Germany led "Allied sources" to predict that the lack of a legal KPD would ruin any chance of concluding an agreement for all-German elections.[21]

WHY did Adenauer propose the dissolution of the KPD? The political climate of the proposal lends limited support to the internal security hypothesis. In November 1951, after the outbreak of the Korean War, the Adenauer government deemed it politically prudent to ask the Court for a dissolution. Both Korea and Germany were divided into communist and non-communist sections; the success of the assault from North Korea together with Western uncertainty over whether Korea presaged other invasions elsewhere made a military action against West Germany a possibility not to be dismissed. Protecting an arm of the foreign policy of East Germany, the KPD, under the constitutional law of West Germany might have seemed an insupportable carelessness. Amidst the anxiety fanned by the Korean War, the Christian Democrats seized upon a KPD gesture towards a Popular Front as the occasion for the dissolution request. On the very day the KPD offered to support a Social Democratic candidate in a special election to the Bundestag, an offer rejected by the Social Democrats, the press service of Adenauer's party asked the new Federal Constitutional Court to assume its duties promptly in order to commence the trial of the KPD.[22]

The internal security hypothesis, however, fails as a sufficient explanation of the prohibition. Judging from the form in which the government submitted its request to the Federal Constitutional Court, the proposal to prohibit the KPD was the political price the government had to pay in order to dissolve the Socialist Reich Party (SRP), a neo-Nazi group. In November 1951, the Interior Ministry formally asked for the prohibition of both the KPD and the SRP. Combining these requests shielded the proceeding against the SRP from the attack of moderate nationalists, who would have harped on the inconsistency of suppressing the extreme right while tolerating the extreme left. Asking the Court to prohibit the KPD was thus a compromise required by a more comprehensive and, perhaps, more important effort to clear away the remains of National Socialism. Academic critics of the government grow impatient with the internal security hypothesis. Alfred Grosser, for example, called the request to dissolve the Communist Party "as ludicrous as a kick in the pants from a donkey."[23] Chancellor Adenauer conceded the numerical impotence of the KPD as well as its isolation

21 *New York Times*, 17 November 1951, p. 5.

22 See *New York Times*, 28 February 1951, p. 15; *Freies Volk*, 28 September 1951 in Max Reimann, *Aus Reden und Aufsätzen 1946–1963* (Berlin: Dietz, 1963), pp. 149–54.

23 Grosser, p. 55.

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from labour, deeming the KPD "dangerous . . . only as the Fifth Column of Soviet Russia." [24]

Adenauer defended the prohibition as a moral corrective of the tolerance of Weimar Germany that had allowed its "own deadly enemies to become great and powerful." For example, in the 1932 edition of a standard work on Prussian administrative law, Arnold Brecht, the long time leader of the constitutional division of the Reich Interior Ministry and contributor to the 1922 Law for the Protection of the Republic, opposed the prohibition of political organizations in the name of what one may call the effervescence theory of free speech: free public debate is the quickest and safest antidote to "false and dangerous ideas." [25] To Brecht in 1932 the suppression of political organizations might have recalled the odious Socialist Laws under Bismarck; to Adenauer after 1945 the collapse of Weimar Germany demonstrated the weakness of justice without a sword. Seen in this light, the KPD prohibition allowed Adenauer to exclude in postwar Germany the permissive understanding of democratic tolerance that had eased the victory of National Socialism. The internal security hypothesis fails as a sufficient explanation because Adenauer intended the KPD prohibition as an ounce of prevention applied, when the urgency was quite low, in order to avoid the necessity of a pound of cure.

THE KPD's rearmament hypothesis asserts that communist agitation and propaganda threatened to undermine the rearmament of West Germany, forcing Adenauer to request the dissolution of the Communist Party.[26] As a sufficient explanation of the prohibition, the rearmament hypothesis is inconsistent with the condition of the Party organization and the Party's strength in the Bundestag. The Party has traced its postwar weakness in organization to the Gestapo's murder, between 1933 and 1945, of ten thousand KPD members and functionaries.[27] If this figure truly reflects the sanguinary policy of the Gestapo, and if, as the Party said, the murders impaired the organization as late as 1952, how could the KPD have seriously endangered the rearmament of West Germany? Neither the KPD's fifteen seats in the Bundestag nor its isolation from the Social Democrats equipped it to endanger the rearmament of West Germany: the KPD's hypothesis assumes that the Party had the capacity to sabotage governmental policy, but the Gestapo had eliminated the organizational base and the West German voters the parliamentary base of successful obstructionism.

[24] Konrad Adenauer, *Journey to America* (Washington: German Diplomatic Mission, 1953), p. 118.

[25] Brecht from M. v. Brauchtisch, *Verwaltungsgesetze für Preussen*, 2. Bde. 22. Aufl. Berlin 1932, p. 264, quoted in Gotthard Jasper, *Die abwehrbereitete Demokratie* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1965), p. 49.

[26] *KPD 1945–1965*, pp. 82–83; Central Committee of the Communist Party of Germany (ed.), *Freiheit für die KPD: Weissbuch über 10 Jahre KPD Verbot* (Berlin: Dietz, 1966), pp. 14–15.

[27] *Geschichte der deut. Arbeiterbewegung*, V, 436; *KPD 1945–1965*, p. 9.

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NEITHER the internal security nor the rearmament hypotheses adequately explain the origins of the KPD prohibition. The prohibition was intended as a security against future dangers, as a corrective of permissive doctrines on the inherent liberty of political parties and as a compromise leading to an equilibrium of illegal extremes. In 1956, the year of the KPD's dissolution, Adenauer's policy won the support of the directorate of the German Labour Federation. The directorate's manifesto accused the German communists of having done "nothing" after 1945 to create progressive relations among occupational groups.[28] The Federation denounced as "undemocratic and destructive" the political work of the KPD in administration, industry and public life; since the ruling party of the German Democratic Republic tolerated "neither free, nor democratic" groups, its deputy in West Germany, the KPD, had forfeited the right even to allude to democratic principles. The directorate's attempt to isolate German communism from labour helped Adenauer to implement the dissolution with a minimum of internal strife. Factors that could not be foreseen from 1956 were the detailed effects of the prohibition on Party operations, the growth of the non-communist opposition to the prohibition and the transition from the KPD to the recently formed DKP, the German Communist Party.

KPD Operations

A communist party adapts to a prohibition by going underground in order to conceal its activities from the voters, the courts and the police, according to the camouflage hypothesis; a communist party underground therefore remains at least as formidable an organization as it was above ground. It is essential to the camouflage hypothesis that the cumulative effects of the prohibition leave the party largely unimpaired. The survival of the organization in roughly the same condition as before the prohibition is the empirical proof of the camouflage hypothesis.[29] The following indicators of the party's condition will be used in investigating the camouflage hypothesis: the party statute; relations of leaders and followers; morale; communications; relations with the Social Democrats; membership; finances; elections; trades unions and extra-parliamentary action; agitation and propaganda; and the party's effect on the politics of West Germany.

The prohibition has significantly altered the environment of German communism, according to party leaders such as Politburo member Erich Glückauf, who said that before 1956 the Party faced "difficult" conditions in West Germany, but the prohibition introduced "extraordinarily difficult conditions."[30] At the seventh meeting of the Central

[28] *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 18 August 1956; Theo Pirker, *Die blinde Macht* (2 Vols.; Munich: Mercator, 1960) II, 189–190.

[29] For the criticism that the prohibition has failed to "kill" the party in West Germany, see Milton A. Konvitz, *Expanding Liberties* (New York: Viking Press, 1966), p. 162.

[30] Erich Glückauf, "Wohin steuert die Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands," *Wissen und Tat*, XVI, Heft 9 (September, 1961), 21, 25; as of 1968, the KPD

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Committee, First Secretary Max Reimann traced certain limitations and conspiratorial measures in the party statute to the prohibition.[31] The 1963 statute, for example, orders all members to adhere "most firmly" to party discipline, to protect party secrets and to refuse to cooperate with the courts and police of the "class enemy" or else suffer expulsion for betraying the party. In 1956 the prohibition confronted the KPD with a predicament reminiscent of its situation in the 1930s: whether to try to be a mass party under adverse conditions or to transform itself into a cadre. A cadre restricts the number of members to those able to carry on political activity under essentially military discipline. When the legal process endangers a communist party, it typically alters its internal organization by, for example, restricting the contacts of members with one another. At the end of 1934 the KPD adopted the "three system," which permitted only three men to know each other and work together.[32] After the Bonn prohibition, the KPD reorganized its basic units in dwellings and factories into groups of five.[33] The difference between the "three system" and the "five system" implied that the Party anticipated a looser enforcement of the prohibition under Adenauer than under Hitler.

Even so, after 1956 the KPD had little use for members who gave only an abstract endorsement to Marxism-Leninism, much less for the subscribers to "Better capitalist than in prison." Party activity under a prohibition requires an understanding of conspiratorial methods and the sustained ability to practise them, a requirement which eliminated, in effect, the passive members who cluster around even a revolutionary party, leaving the field of action to those whom the communists style the "best of the best."[34] In 1956, as in the 1930s, the Party's internal security and the exacting requirements of underground work made the cadre the optimum form of organization.

The suspension of certain elements of party democracy accompanied the transition from a mass to a cadre party. Although democratic centralism calls for the election of all leading organs from bottom to top, in 1963 the party statute said:

Politburo included the following members (names followed by ages, which have been rounded, and birthplaces): Josef Angenfort, 44, Düsseldorf; Heinrich Fink, 66, Kiel; Kurt Fritsch, 39, Neumarkt; Erich Glückauf, 65, Wittlich/Mosel; Manfred Kapluck, 39, Essen; Josef Ledwohn, 61, Rünthe/Unna; Willi Mohn, 56, Langenselbold/Hanau; Otto Niebergall, 64, Kusel (Pfalz); Max Reimann, 70, Elbing; Friedrich Rische, 54, Bochum; Max Schäfer, 55, Duisburg. The Politburo candidates: Erich Jungmann, 61, Reichenberg; Herbert Mies, 39, Mannheim; Josef Schleifstein, 53, Lodz.

31 Max Reimann, "Die Verschärfung der Lage und die westdeutsche Arbeiterbewegung," *Wissen und Tat*, XXI, Heft 5/6 (May–June 1966), 21.

32 Report of the Police Institute, Berlin-Charlottenberg 1935, in Weber (ed.), *Der deutsche Kommunismus: Dokumente*, p. 405; see the source cited.

33 Karl Merten (pseud.), *Die roten Maulwürfe* (Donauwörth: Ludwig Auer, 1964?), p. 46.

34 Gerhard Nitzsche, *Die Saefkow-Jacob-Bästlein-Gruppe: Dokumente und Materialien des illegalen antifaschistischen Kampfes* (Berlin: Dietz, 1957), pp. 137–49, quoted in Weber (ed.), *Der deutsche Kommunismus: Dokumente*, p. 416.

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> Under the contemporary conditions of illegality the principle of democratic centralism concerning the election of the leading party organs . . . cannot be completely guaranteed. The appointment of lower organs by higher party organs is permissible.

The KPD's leaders understand the political suicide inherent in a full retreat, for only if the party persuades the masses will they compel the government to lift the prohibition.[35] The cultivation of the masses requires some open work of the sort carried on by a mass party under no threat from the law; but open work jeopardizes the internal security contributed by the cadre.

The KPD developed the formula of "legal [i.e. open work] as much as possible and illegal [i.e. clandestine work] only as much as necessary" in order to govern the relationship of open and clandestine work.[36] In spite of this glib formula, the KPD has met serious reverses in clandestine and open work, the source of which goes back to the "extraordinarily difficult conditions" in West Germany. Such expedients as the removal of Party headquarters to East Berlin, the flight of Party leaders, decentralization and the development of an internal security apparatus have failed to render the Party invulnerable. Communications, the life lines of a prohibited party, have proved to be especially vulnerable to interference and interception. The West German government has short-circuited communications between the brain in East Germany and the hand in West Germany by, for example, intercepting couriers from East Berlin, arresting members of a state directorate and confiscating lists of rendezvous.[37]

Improving relations with the Social Democrats has held a high priority for the KPD, yet in his list of "weaknesses of the party" during the 1965 election, First Secretary Reimann ranked in "first" place the political-ideological type.[38] *Freies Volk*, the organ of the Central Committee, admitted that not all members, nor even "many" of the directorates, had sufficiently prepared themselves for conversations with the Social Democrats.[39] At the seventh meeting of the Central Committee, Reimann lamented the "unclarities" among a "not small number" of comrades concerning the party's relationship to the Social Democrats.[40] Since the Social Democratic leaders refused to help the KPD, the communists attempted a "United Front from Below" with the rank and file of the Social Democratic Party. But

35 Reimann, *Wissen und Tat*, XXI, Heft 5/6 (May–June, 1966), 24.

36 *Freies Volk*, XX, No. 9 (274), (September 1965), 9; for the meaning of "legal" and "illegal" in Bolshevist semantics and practice, see Günther Nollau, *International Communism and World Revolution: History and Methods*, trans. by Victor Andersen (New York: Praeger, 1961), p. 157.

37 *Der Spiegel*, 25 September 1963, pp. 34, 37.

38 Max Reimann, "Für den Zusammenschluss aller Kräfte im Kampf für Frieden, soziale Sicherheit und den Schutz des Grundgesetzes," *Freies Volk*, XX, No. 12 (277), (December 1965), 5.

39 "Die Zeit drängt," *Freies Volk*, XXI, No. 3 (280), (March 1966), 2.

40 Max Reimann, "Die Verschärfung der Lage und die westdeutsche Arbeiterbewegung," *Freies Volk*, XXI, No. 4 (281), (April 1966), 5.

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according to Politburo member Willi Mohn, only the most active communists joined in the "decisive" task of cultivating Social Democrats.[41] After several weeks of conversations with Social Democrats, one *Bezirksleitung* reported that it had accomplished "as good as nothing."[42] Party leaders blamed the failure of the "United Front" upon the members' unfamiliarity with Party policy, their arrogance, the Party's legal status and the disbelief among "many" citizens of the Federal Republic that their government was preparing for aggressive war.[43] The KPD laid supreme stress on the "United Front from Below" as the means of rallying the Social Democrats and West German masses behind the central objective of KPD strategy, controlling the "bellicosity" of the Bonn government.[44] Thus, in failing to influence either the leaders or the members of the Social Democratic Party, German communism suffered a serious reverse.

ANOTHER indicator of the Party's condition is the number of members enrolled during the prohibition. Estimates of the KPD's membership have varied, making it difficult though not impossible to trace the extent of the decline under East German and Soviet domination. Outside of party headquarters, the most authoritative estimates amidst a sea of confusion come from Bonn and Washington, but these sources have reached no consensus in their estimates for 1956, the initial year of the prohibition: the Interior Ministry of West Germany estimated the membership at 70,000 and the State Department of the United States at 50,000.[45] In addition to this initial difference of 20,000 members, the West German and American estimates differ further on the rate of attrition since 1956. The State Department, for example, estimated 50,000 members until 1965, when it reduced the total by some 40,000 to arrive at a new estimate of 10,000[46]; during both 1964 and 1965 the Interior Ministry estimated the membership at between 6,000 and 7,000.[47]

[41] Willi Mohn, "Aus dem Bericht des Politbüros an die 8. Tagung des Zentralkomitees," *Wissen und Tat*, XXI, Heft 9/10 (September–October 1966), 13.

[42] *Freies Volk*, XXI, No. 3 (280), (March 1966), 9.

[43] Max Reimann, *Die Lage nach der Bildung der Regierung der grossen Koalition und unsere nächsten Aufgaben* (Ninth Meeting of the Central Committee), p. 21; Reimann, *Freies Volk*, XX, No. 12 (277), (December 1965), 8; Reimann, *Wissen und Tat*, XXI, Heft 1/2 (January–February 1966), 19–20; Mohn, *Wissen und Tat*, XXI, Heft 9/10 (September–October, 1966), 12.

[44] "Ist Aktionseinheit eine taktische Frage?" *Freies Volk*, XXI, No. 6 (283), (June 1966), 7; Reimann, *Wissen und Tat*, XXI, Heft 1/2 (January–February 1966), 13–14.

[45] *Bulletin* (English edition) of the Federal Press and Information Office, 23 August 1956, p. 2; compare to *Bulletin* (German edition), 4 August 1965, p. 1073; *World Strength of the Communist Party Organizations*, Intelligence Report No. 4489–R–10 (Washington: US Department of State, 1958), "estimate as of August, 1956," p. 17.

[46] *World Strength of the Communist Party Organizations* (Washington: US Department of State, 1966), pp. i, 19.

[47] Der Bundesminister des Innern, *Die kommunistische Tätigkeit im Jahre 1964* (Bonn: Federal Minister of the Interior, 1965), p. 42; Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, *Kommunistische Tätigkeit in der Bundesrepublik im Jahre 1965* in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* (supplement to the weekly, *das Parlament*), p. 20.

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Between 1956 and 1964, the State Department observed no significant drop in membership, but according to the Interior Ministry, in the same period nine tenths of the membership left the Party. Where authorities disagree, the outsider can venture only a tentative solution: the disagreement may be less important than at first glance if the State Department and the Interior Ministry used different systems of accounting. The State Department may have added both active and inactive members, explaining why its estimates topped those of the Interior Ministry, which counted only active members. When the State Department singles out the active members, its estimate approaches the range of the West German estimates, justifying the conclusion that according to both Bonn and Washington a sharp decline in the Party's membership has paralleled the prohibition.

The prohibition has also aggravated the difficulties of recruitment. In 1960, for example, persons who had reached adulthood in the Hitler years and recent graduates from the "Free German Youth" formed the nucleus of the Party; as of 1966 only 5·7 per cent of the active membership fell into the under-30 age bracket.[48] The connexion between the recruitment of youth and the survival of the Party gives recruitment a prominent place on the agenda of the Central Committee meetings.[49] Almost ten years after the prohibition entered into effect, Max Reimann stressed the "extreme seriousness" of recruitment—"above all" of youth—in his scheme for the renaissance of the party.[50] The cause of Reimann's concern emerges from a comparison of the Party's past aims and achievements. For example, in December 1961, the Central Committee set a target of 3,000 enrolments to occur between January and August 1962; during all of 1962, however, the Party enrolled no more than 600 members, and some of these were drop-outs who returned to the fold.[51] A small party that recruits mainly from the acquaintances, friends and relatives of the existing membership has poor prospects of becoming a success, either in numerical or financial terms. A party with few members receives a low income from dues and is hard-pressed to execute its assignments in agitation, agriculture, cadres, communal politics, fronts, press, propaganda, the Social Democratic Party and the unions. It is no surprise, therefore, that at the twenty-second meeting of the Soviet Communist Party in 1961, Krushchev informed Max

48 Karl W. Fricke, "Die kommunistische Partei in Illegalität," *SBZ-Archiv*, No. 12 (June 1960), p. 186; Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, *Kommunistische Tätigkeit in der Bundesrepublik im Jahre 1966* in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, p. 15.

49 Willi Mohn, *Wissen und Tat*, XXI, Heft 9/10 (September–October 1966), 20.

50 Max Reimann, "Für den Zusammenschluss aller Kräfte im Kampf für Frieden, soziale Sicherheit und den Schutz des Grundgesetzes," *Wissen und Tat*, XXI, Heft 1/2 (January-February 1966), 23.

51 *Freies Volk*, No. 26 (Third December edition, 1961); *Deutsche Zeitung*, 21 May 1963, p. 3; on balancing the security of the party with trust in colleagues, see "Neue Mitglieder für die Partei: Ein Interview mit einem Betriebsgruppensekretär," *Freies Volk*, XXI, No. 12 (289), (December 1966), 11.

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Reimann that the KPD's failures obliged the Soviet Union to reduce its financial support for German communism.[52]

YET German communism has seen in the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary aspects of open work a means of influence and, ultimately, of freedom from the shackles of the law. The parliamentary aspects of open work would include electoral campaigns and liaison with other parties, but courts and electoral commissions have forbidden active communists to campaign for the Bundestag and the KPD is isolated from the Social Democrats. As a result, in the 1965 election the KPD banked its hopes on the German Peace Union (DFU), between which and the KPD the respected *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* had already noted an "astonishing" continuity.[53] Despite or perhaps because of this support from the KPD, the DFU won a lower percentage (1·3 per cent) of votes than the KPD itself had won at its last test in elections. Though the prohibition permits active communists to campaign in municipal elections, public opinion has policed the zone uncovered by the law, allowing to the KPD in 1964 only forty-eight of over 140,000 seats.

The extra-parliamentary targets of open work include industry, women, youth and Christians. In the 1963 revision of the party statute, the KPD named the factory group as the most important basic unit and ordered each party member to participate in a union. By the end of 1964, the KPD had founded or reactivated some 300 factory groups, including ninety-eight among the industrial concerns in defence.[54] In addition to spreading party bulletins in industries of military importance, the factory groups campaign for the election of communists to the factory councils; seven years after the prohibition, the election awarded a tiny (1·4) percentage of seats to active communists.

After the 1965 elections to the Bundestag, in which women voters powerfully aided the Christian Democrats, *Freies Volk* gingerly addressed the topic of why women lacked confidence in communists.[55] Though in 1964 the 19th Delegates Conference of the Socialist German Student Federation (SDS) demanded the lifting of the KPD prohibition as an "essential contribution" to relaxing tensions between the two Germanies, the SDS and KPD have yet to establish close relations.[56] As an entering wedge in the dialogue of communists and Christians in Western Europe, the KPD has launched an effort to influence

52 *Der Spiegel*, 7 February 1962, p. 32.

53 *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 9 July 1961; see also *Rheinischer Merkur*, 3 September 1965; *Der Spiegel*, 8 September 1965, p. 52.

54 Karl W. Fricke, "Taktischer Kurswechsel der K.P.D.," *SBZ-Archiv*, No. 12 (June 1964), p. 183.

55 "Die Frauen, die CDU und wir," *Freies Volk*, XX, No. 12 (277), (December 1965), 9; Ibid., XXI, No. 1 (278), (January 1966), 11.

56 *KPD 1945–1965*, p. 137; Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, *Linksradikalismus in der Bundesrepublik im Jahre 1967*, pp. 27–28.

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Christian labour and church spokesmen, promising freedom of religion in exchange for toleration of communists.[57]

HAS the prohibition had the unintended effect of immunizing the KPD against the virus spread among the legal communist parties of Western Europe by the Sino-Soviet schism? Despite reports that they are "responsive to pro-Chinese theses," the rank and file of the KPD have remained largely unaffected by the Sino-Soviet split.[58] A mild dissatisfaction does exist among the rank and file with the formula of the Soviet Union and East Germany for the unity of communists and Social Democrats. At the 1963 meeting of the KPD, Max Reimann referred to this feeling and in 1959 the East German SED publicly criticized the belief that a change in Soviet policy on West Germany had to precede any improvement in the position of the KPD.

The KPD members unable to adhere to the Soviet line have either left the Party or it has expelled them.[59] The absence of a visible pro-Chinese faction within the Party implies, among other things, the efficiency of the Party's Central Control Commission in rooting out deviationists, and the failure of a splitting effort begun as the Sino-Soviet quarrel intensified. To the discomfort of the Soviets and the KPD, the West German government has winked at Chinese communist propaganda entering Germany, and the Chinese have at least tacitly repaid the favour. At the February 1964 plenary meeting of the Soviet Communist Party, M. A. Suslov found it "extremely surprising" that Chinese propaganda simplified the entire struggle against imperialism to a struggle with the United States, by-passing such American allies as West Germany.[60] Using propaganda issued by the Chinese communists, Bonn sowed enough "confusion" for Reimann to plead in an open letter to the Chinese leaders[61]:

> After all, you cannot fail to realize what it means for a party outlawed by a monopoly government to find its policy attacked by the leadership of a fraternal party in documents circulated with the aid of that very government.

Aside from this episode, the divisions within international communism have had little access to the KPD organization.

57 Max Reimann, *Wissen und Tat*, XXI, Heft 5/6 (May-June 1966), 16–17.

58 *Communist Affairs*, II (May-June 1964), 18.

59 Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, *Linksradikalismus in der Bundesrepublik im Jahre 1967*, pp. 20, 22.

60 M. A. Suslov, "Struggle of the CPSU for the Unity of the World Communist Movement," *Documents of the Communist and Workers Parties*, Nos. 8–9 (Prague: Peace and Socialism Publishers, 1964), p. 338; cited hereafter as *Documents*.

61 "Letter from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Germany to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China," *Documents*, No. 11, 1964, p. 483; see also *Documents*, No. 6, 1964, pp. 187–189; *Der Spiegel*, 19 February 1964, p. 48.

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PARTY headquarters reviews the discussions of the prohibition in the world press, but for several reasons the Party has held back from the maximum effort in propaganda. First, the Party publications distributed clandestinely in West Germany have strict limitations of space that preclude a sustained discussion of the prohibition. Secondly, unless they wish to lower morale and to frighten away potential recruits, the editors of these publications must give a subdued treatment to the ban. Thirdly, and related to the second point, the party publications assign propaganda against the ban a lower priority than the statement of party policies. Fourthly, the KPD itself has conceded that West Germans reject propaganda of a known communist origin; as one spokesman wrote in 1960, workers, farmers and intellectuals failed to see a "close" connection between "militarism," the "elimination of democratic rights" and the KPD prohibition [62]; the absence of such a connection in the minds of West Germans "chiefly" thwarted the legalization of the Party. Fifthly, East German propaganda has varied the importance of a legal KPD according to the needs of the moment: though in 1956 Ulbricht demanded the suspension of the ban as a pre-condition of German reunification, later statements of both Ulbricht and the KPD have sometimes omitted the legalization of the KPD as the price for cooperation with West Germany.[63] In short, the KPD itself has mounted ineffectual propaganda against the prohibition, whose suspension has held an ambiguous status in East German propaganda. When the Communist Party of the Netherlands rebukes the KPD for its "passivity," one may fairly conclude that the prohibition has given more control advantages to Bonn than propaganda fuel to East Berlin.[64]

The Opposition

The Spanish government effectively deters campaigns to legalize the Spanish Communist Party, while the West German government permits such campaigns on behalf of the KPD. In light of the comparative softness of the KPD prohibition, it is appropriate to review the means of removing the KPD from the frown of the law. At various conferences legal authorities have publicized the procedures available for restoring the KPD to the political arena: the abolition of Article 21 (2) of the Basic Law that now permits the dissolution of political parties or a legislative act enabling the Federal Constitutional Court to review the constitutionality of the current programme of the KPD.[65] But

[62] Claus Bär, "Verstärkter Kampf für die Legalität der KPD," *Neue Justiz*, XIV, No. 12 (20 June 1960), 383.

[63] *SBZ-Archiv*, VIII, No. 17 (September 1956), 269; Max Reimann, *Die Lage nach der Bildung der Regierung der grossen Koalition und unsere nächsten Aufgaben* (n.p., n.d.), p. 9; *Die grosse Koalition und das werktätige Volk* (Resolution of the Ninth Meeting of the KPD Central Committee), (n.p., n.d.).

[64] *SBZ-Archiv*, XVIII, No. 16 (2. Augustheft 1967), 243.

[65] Helmut Ridder, "Gibt es nach dem geltenden Recht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland Möglichkeiten einer 'Legalisierung' der KPD?" *Konferenz über die Problematik des KPD—Verbots: Protokoll* (Düsseldorf, 6–7 May 1967), p. 125.

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neither of these solutions satisfies both the KPD and the Bundestag. Wishing to prohibit what it understands as right-wing parties, the KPD opposes the deletion of Article 21 (2) from the Basic Law; and the Bundestag will be unlikely to alter the procedure of the Federal Constitutional Court solely for the convenience of German communism.

Politics poses a more serious obstacle to a legal KPD than constitutional law, according to the KPD's First Secretary Max Reimann. In West Germany, the supporters of the KPD have pinned their hopes on the existing party, while the KPD's opponents have recommended the formation of an independent communist party. Among the non-communist supporters of the KPD in West Germany, the most eminent is Professor Dr. Helmut Ridder, who argues that the Party's years as a fugitive have purified it of absolutism and of disregard for the equal rights of all persons and organizations.[66] The leading spokesman of the KPD's opponents in East and West Germany was Professor Robert Havemann; he preferred a new communist party on the ground that legalizing the KPD would perhaps delay the effects of the liberalization current in international communism.[67] In October 1967 the State Ministers of the Interior in West Germany announced that they would tolerate the formation of a new communist party, even one using the old name and members of the KPD, so long as its goals remained constitutional. A month later, Foreign Minister Willy Brandt made a similar proposal. Tass, the Soviet news agency, and Reimann scorned this "Bonn trick" and both sides used the following year to negotiate an alternative to the prohibition.

The Outcome

On 26 September 1968, a *communiqué* from Frankfurt reported the birth of a new communist party named the German Communist Party (DKP). Ulbricht's biographer, Carola Stern, has labelled the DKP the "party of Brezhnev and Ulbricht," a judgment consistent with the attitude of the Soviet press, the background of the DKP's leader, the reported estimates of DKP membership and the DKP's stand on the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Judging from the attitude of the Soviet press, some time between November 1967 and September 1968, Bonn and the KPD must have come to agreement about the disposition of German communism. In November 1967 the Soviet press condemned the new party thesis; in September 1968 the Soviet press applauded the debut of the DKP: a *Pravda* commentary defined the mission of the DKP as the mobilization of the workers and progressives of West Germany against revanchism and aggression.[68]

[66] Helmut Ridder, *Aktuelle Rechtsfragen des KPD—Verbots* (Neuwied und Berlin: Luchterhand, 1966), p. 37; see *Freies Volk*, XXI, No. 12 (289), (December 1966), 7.

[67] Robert Havemann, "Die Partei ist kein Gepenst," *Der Spiegel*, 22 December 1965, p. 30; see also *Neues Deutschland*, 22 December 1965, p. 6; and Reimann (ed.), *Informationsdienst*, No. 25 (December, 1965), pp. 19–20.

[68] *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (hereafter cited: SZ), 30 September 1968, p. 2.

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Kurt Bachmann, the DKP's leader, had served as secretary to the KPD's executive after 1956, thus ensuring the continued loyalty of German communism to the leading role of the Soviet Communist Party. Though Bachmann denied the organizational identity of the KPD and the DKP, he also conceded his reliance upon the illegal KPD for recruits. Bachmann is said to have retorted to the charges that KPD members now sat on the executive of the DKP: "What do you expect? The DKP could not be recruited from the Salvation Army."[69] Only a month after its birth the DKP reported 9,084 members scattered throughout all the states of West Germany; Reimann, First Secretary of the KPD, welcomed the DKP; and the reported membership of the DKP approximated the estimate for the still illegal KPD.[70] The DKP defended the Soviet invasion of 21 August 1968 as the remedy for the "serious danger" Czechoslovakia posed to the socialist camp, the Warsaw Pact and the peace of Europe.[71] In the 1969 federal elections, the DKP joined the Action for Democratic Progress (ADF), a left wing coalition that failed to win more than 0·6 per cent of the votes; the DKP rejected coalitions in future federal elections and decided to enter the elections only on a case by case basis.[72] The DKP has replaced the KPD's standard and somewhat ponderous organs (*Freies Volk*, *Wissen und Tat*) with *Unsere Zeitung*, a popular weekly that publishes television listings, puzzles and other diversions of bourgeois culture. The promotion of the DKP in this fashion seems to imply the de-emphasis, if not the abandonment, of decades of tradition and symbolism linked with the name "KPD" in Germany. But before drawing this conclusion, it would be useful to point out a little-known clause of the DKP's statute, which authorizes the party's "dissolution" or "fusion" with other parties. Lacking any precedent in the KPD's 1963 statute, these provisions seem to be designed to facilitate the KPD's eventual reappearance.[73]

West German communism surfaced as an open movement in a fresh era of German politics with different prevailing assumptions concerning the voter, the stability of political institutions and the proper forms of control on extremist parties in a liberal democracy. As a symptom of their growing confidence in the Federal Republic, the voters in federal elections raised their support for the three major parties, the Christian Democrats-Christian Socialists, Social Democrats and Free Democrats from under 75 per cent in 1949 to over 95 per cent in 1965. By 1966 Konrad Adenauer, the architect of the prohibition, saw so little danger in the KPD that he supported its legalization.[74] A senior official of the

[69] Cf. *New York Times*, 28 October 1968, p. 4; *SZ*, 3 October 1968, p. 3.
[70] *SZ*, 28 October 1968, p. 2; *ibid.*, 3 October 1968, p. 3.
[71] *SZ*, 2 September 1968, p. 2; *ibid*, 27 September 1968, p. 8.
[72] *SZ*, 14 October 1969, p. 2.
[73] DKP, *Statut der deutschen kommunistischen Partei* (Hamburg: Blinkfüer Verlag, 1969), p. 10; cf. "Statut der kommunistischen Partei Deutschlands," *Freies Volk* (special supplement), August 1963.
[74] *Die Zeit*, 6 September 1966, p. 2.

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Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution declared that the "Federal Republic does not stand or fall with the ban."[75] In 1968 Chancellor Kiesinger reportedly refused to dissolve the SDS because a dissolution would repeat the "same error we have made with the KPD ban."[76] Kiesinger planned to control the National Democratic Party, accused of being neo-nazi, "democratically" through elections; and in 1969 the Interior Minister warned the public and the press to avoid even discussing a prohibition of the National Democrats.[77] Article 21 (2) has evolved from an early protection of the constitution order to a weapon of last resort.

PROHIBITING a political party in West Germany is a complicated process that includes: preliminary curbs; the government's request to the Court; the Court's determination of unconstitutionality; party dissolution; prohibition of substitute organizations; and enforcement. This essay has assessed five major hypotheses concerning the motivation of the government's request and the consequences of enforcement. According to the first hypothesis, Adenauer requested the prohibition because he feared the KPD as a genuine danger to internal security. Internal security anxieties, however, were a dramatic occasion rather than a source of the prohibition request. A prohibition is either redundant or inefficient on parties that seriously threaten internal security in advanced Western societies. The classic technique of long range penetration is the preferred method of controlling parties that constitute genuine dangers. The vicissitudes of public opinion and the unpredictability of an independent judiciary make prohibitions a fragile and precarious method of control.

The government's request and the Court's determination met broad symbolic and moral needs of West Germany. The KPD prohibition eased the difficulties of removing the neo-nazi SRP from public life; it served to appease moderate nationalists whom the prohibition of the SRP alone might have provoked. In the foreign policy perspective of the 1950s, the KPD prohibition applied Bonn's claim to be the legitimate German government by stripping the KPD, an East German instrument, of democratic credentials under the Basic Law. Adenauer broke with the toleration of Weimar by moving against both political extremes while they remained in the incubation stage. The KPD prohibition would seem to have originated in the internal politics and foreign policy of the day and in Adenauer's attempt to distinguish the moral basis of West Germany from Hitler's one party rule and Weimar's moral-political chaos.

According to the KPD's hypothesis, Adenauer and the Allies agreed on the prohibition in order to remove the KPD as an obstacle to West

[75] *Die Welt*, 18 August 1966, p. 5.
[76] *Die Zeit*, 30 April 1968, p. 2.
[77] *SZ*, 4 November 1969, p. 2.

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German rearmament. This hypothesis is inconsistent with the Party's weakness in organization and in the Bundestag; these weaknesses must be glossed over before the rearmament hypothesis becomes credible. Adenauer and the Allies disagreed rather than agreed on the soundness of the prohibition; the suggestion of a conspiracy between the Allies and Adenauer becomes implausible after a comparison of Adenauer's policy to the Allied, especially the American, policy during the occupation.

The camouflage hypothesis—that a prohibited party thrives underground—has had an unrivalled influence in the discussion of communism and the Basic Law. The popularity of the camouflage argument arises from the manifest constitutionality of party dissolutions under the Basic Law. The remaining questions are: (1) whether party "x" is unconstitutional; (2) the probable consequences of a dissolution on party "x"; and (3) the likely impact of a party dissolution on the Federal Republic and foreign opinion. In tackling question (2), "pernicious abstractions" of constitutional law are no substitute for counsels of prudence and experience—judgments citing the consequences of past prohibitions on party organization and making inferences as to the likely consequences of future dissolutions.

The traceable effects of the prohibition upon party organization are inconsistent with the hypothesis that proscription *per se* effectively camouflaged the party's activities underground. From 1956 to 1968, the prohibition hampered the KPD according to the party statute, relations of leaders and followers, organizational morale, communications, relations with the Social Democrats, membership (size, comparative rise or fall and age), finances, elections, trade unions and extra-parliamentary work generally, agitation and propaganda and the party's effect on the politics of West Germany. On the other hand, the KPD has won the sympathy of prominent non-communists whose advocacy has endowed the party with a respectability it never could have earned by itself. The KPD was almost dead politically even before the prohibition, which has damaged the KPD organizationally, but may have helped it politically. The demonstrable weakness of the camouflage argument is, of course, insufficient evidence to assess the soundness or unsoundness of the prohibition itself. Such an assessment requires a review of all the relevant pros and cons and falls outside the scope of this essay.

According to the propaganda hypothesis, the prohibition gave more to East Berlin in propaganda than to Bonn in control over the party. In fact, the exigencies of underground work kept the KPD from making an extensive use of anti-ban propaganda and the SED had altered the importance of a legal KPD. Nevertheless, the supporters of the propaganda hypothesis saw that the prohibition might have diplomatic repercussions. Over a decade, the rigidity of the prohibition may have prevented significant adjustments to the KPD's legal status in return for concessions by East Berlin and Moscow. On the other hand, the Nazi-Soviet pact of 1939 shows that Soviet diplomacy has acquiesced

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in stern measures against foreign communist parties, including the KPD, while simultaneously seeking closer relations with the perpetrator of those measures. According to a precedent of Soviet diplomacy, the prohibition of the KPD would not necessarily have disturbed the relations of Moscow and Bonn [78]; nor would the suspension of the prohibition *per se* necessarily improve these relations.

The immunization hypothesis asserts that the prohibition has protected the KPD from the factionalism, nationalism and comparative independence which the Sino-Soviet split has stimulated in the legal communist parties of Western Europe. Yet in its initial stage, the de facto successor of the KPD, the DKP, acclaimed the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, suggesting that a liberated party is neither immediately nor necessarily a liberalized party. The division and paralysis of German communism by Soviet and Chinese factions remains a hope rather than a fact. Since the DKP is both legal and subservient to Moscow, there is no necessary relationship between legality and independence of Moscow in a communist party of Western Europe. Does it suffice, then, to say that twelve years as a fugitive have left German communism the "completely undangerous" "Fifth Column of Soviet Russia?" German communism remains a spear carrier for the Soviet Union, but dismissing the Party as "completely undangerous" may be premature in light of its factory groups in the defence plants of West Germany. During acute tension between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, these factory groups would offer strong centres for industrial sabotage.

Two keen observers have explained the KPD's condition as a "special case of small party vulnerability." [79] But how did the KPD, whose votes never fell below one-third of the Social Democrats' in the best days of the Weimar Republic and whose membership numbered some 300,000, ever change into a small and vulnerable party? In what sense is the KPD a "special case?" Unlike the French Communist Party, whose "very long period of legality has made their task easier for the leaders," the KPD has eked out a clandestine existence from 1933 to 1945 and again from 1956 to 1968. It has broken the record among communist parties of the major states of Western Europe, previously held by the Italian Communist Party which from 1926 to 1943 was suppressed by fascism.[80] The cautious suggestion offered here is that legal constraints are one key to understanding the KPD's decline and partial recovery.

[78] See Litvinov's remarks to a German diplomat, quoted in Gustav Hilger's *Wir und der Kreml* (Berlin: Alfred Metzner, 1955), p. 243; and Molotov's advice of 1955 to French Foreign Minister Antoine Pinay, quoted in Louis L. Gerson, *John Foster Dulles* (New York: Cooper Square, 1967), p. 225.

[79] Eric Willenz, Pio Uliassi, "Western Europe," *Survey* (January 1965), p. 51.

[80] François Fejtö, *The French Communist Party and the Crisis of International Communsm* (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1967), p. 18.

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The Comintern and the "Negro Question": Communist Policy in the United States and Africa, 1921—1941*

Roger E. Kanet

DURING the two decades between the World Wars, the importance of the colonial question was regularly discussed at the meetings of the Communist International. Closely related to this question was the policy that should be followed toward Negroes both in Africa and in the United States. Throughout most of the period an attempt was made to develop a general policy that would apply to both groups. The purpose of this study is to examine changes in Comintern policy on "The Negro Question" and to show that a principal reason for the failure of the communists to develop strong revolutionary movements in either Africa or the United States among the black population was their dependence on the vagaries of Soviet foreign policy.

The Comintern and the Colonial Question

At the second congress of the Comintern, held in Petrograd and Moscow in July 1920, the theoretical foundations for communist policy in the colonial areas were laid down. After a long and rather heated debate Lenin's major argument that "all Communist parties must give active support to the revolutionary movements of liberation" of the bourgeoisie was finally accepted.[1] This view was opposed by the Indian communist, M. N. Roy, who took a stronger stand on the need for communist organization in colonial areas and warned of the dangers involved in an alliance with national-bourgeois leaders.[2]

In the discussions on the colonial question that took place at the congress, Lenin stated that the main reason for supporting the nationalists was the fact that "the overwhelming mass of the population in backward countries consists of peasants" and "it would be utopian to believe that proletarian parties . . . could pursue communist tactics and a communist policy without establishing definite ties with the peasant movement and without giving it effective support."[3] Much earlier in his

* An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 54th Annual Meeting of The Association for the Study of Negro Life and History, Birmingham, Alabama, 9–12 Oct. 1969. The author wishes to express his appreciation for financial assistance from The University of Kansas.

1 Communist International, *Kommunisticheskii Internatsional v dokumentakh . . . 1919–1934*, edited by Bela Kun (Moscow: Partiinoe izdatel'stvo, 1933), p. 128.

2 Communist International, *Protokoll des II. Weltkongresses der Kommunistischen Internatsionale* (Hamburg: Verlag der Kommunistischen Internationale, 1921), pp. 145ff.

3 *Protokoll des II. Weltkongresses*, p. 139.

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career Lenin had begun to support the idea of self-determination. George Padmore, one of the fathers of modern African nationalism and a former Comintern official, maintained that Lenin's policy of offering self-determination to the non-Russian nationalities had a:

> tremendous psychological effect upon the backward peoples not only in Asiatic Russia . . . but throughout the Orient. It inspired confidence in the Bolsheviks at a time when the supporters of the former regime were conducting a bitter civil war in the hope of restoring the Czarist Empire. It rallied millions of the newly-emancipated coloured peoples of the Asiatic borderlands of "Mother Russia" to the side of the Red Army and the young Soviet Government. . . .
>
> The reactionaries failed largely because Lenin's bold anti-colonial strategy paid such rich dividends.[4]

The colonial doctrine developed by Lenin was an attempt to provide new answers for the problem presented by backward areas lacking capital accumulation and an organized proletariat and thus did not fit the Marxist model for revolution. In the development of his doctrine, Lenin departed from Marx's position on a number of basic points. Most important was his emphasis on the significance of colonial revolution for the collapse of capitalism. In the last article written before his death, Lenin even maintained that "the outcome of the [revolutionary] struggle will be determined by the fact that Russia, India, and China, and so forth, account for the overwhelming majority of the population of the globe." [5]

Lenin's interest in the colonial question was quite evident in the early activities of the Comintern. For example, in September 1920, a meeting of nationalist and revolutionary leaders from Asia convened at Baku, in the Caucasus, to plan strategy for the revolution in Asia. The Russian Communist Zinoviev, one of the organizers of the meeting, made an impassioned appeal for "all of toiling humanity living in Asia and Africa" to follow the communists. "The European proletariat," he said, "cannot help seeing now that the course of historical development has bound together the toilers of the East to the workers of the West. We must conquer or perish together." [6]

THE demands of Soviet domestic and foreign policy, however, soon brought about a more moderate Soviet and Comintern policy toward the colonies. Revolution had collapsed in Europe, the Soviet economy was devastated by eight years of war and the Soviet leadership recognized its need for improved relations with the European countries—in particular, trade—if it was to be successful in rebuilding the country. The emphasis was now placed on the construction of a strong socialist fatherland in Russia, rather than on a proliferation of weak revolutionary

[4] George Padmore, *Pan-Africanism or Communism? The Coming Struggle for Africa* (London: Dobson; New York: Roy, 1955), p. 292.

[5] "Luchshe men'she, da luchshe," in V. I. Lenin, *Sochineniia*, 4th edn., Vol. XXXIII, p. 458.

[6] *Pervyi s"ezd narodov Vostoka. Baku 1–8 sentiabria 1920g.: Stenografischeskie otchety* (Petrograd: Izd. Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionala, 1920), pp. 12, 35-36.

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movements. The result for the colonies was a drop in Comintern interest in the colonial question. At the third congress of the Comintern, for example, a number of speakers from Asia complained that the colonial question was being ignored.[7] At the fifth congress in 1924, Ho Chih-Minh, then a young delegate from Vietnam, condemned the existence of Westernism in the Comintern, and other Asian delegates criticized the lack of attention to the colonial and semi-colonial countries. John Pepper, an American delegate, complained that the "congress has become one-sidedly a German Congress, or at best a Central European Congress. So far it has been too little of a world congress."[8] Instead of supporting the most radical movements, the leaders of the Comintern now opted for the policy of a united front with social democrats in Europe and more limited activities in the colonial areas. In Asia communists were told to cooperate with all types of nationalist movements.[9]

Beginning in 1925 and 1926, Soviet leaders began to lose their optimism about the progressive character of various nationalist movements and the Comintern was forced to admit that the Indian bourgeoisie was not as revolutionary as most communists—with the major exception of Roy—had believed.[10] By 1927, the government of Kemal Attaturk of Turkey, which had maintained proper and even friendly relations with the Soviet Union, was called an oppressor of the working class and the Turkish communists began a propaganda campaign against the government.[11]

The major blow to the communist policy of supporting national liberation movements, however, was the destruction of the Chinese Communist Party by Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang. During the mid-twenties the communists had worked closely with the Chinese nationalists and had gained great influence within the KMT. Once Chiang Kai-shek had consolidated his position, however, he turned on the communists and in the spring of 1927 he ordered a raid on the Soviet embassy in Peking. A few months later he expelled the communists from the Kuomintang and in December he suppressed the Canton commune.[12]

[7] See Demetrio Boersner, *The Bolsheviks and the National and Colonial Question, 1917–1928* (Paris: Librarie Minand; Geneva: Droz, 1957), p. 106.

[8] Ibid. p. 153 and *International Press Correspondence*, Vol. IV, No. 47 (1924), p. 483. This publication, usually referred to as *Inprecorr*, appeared weekly until shortly before World War II.

[9] Kun (ed.), *Kommunisticheskii Internatsional*, pp. 321–22 and *Inprekorr* (German edn.), Vol. II, No. 2 (1932), p. 9, reprinted in Janes Degras (ed.), *The Communist International 1919–1943. Documents* (London: Oxford University Press, 1956), Vol. I, pp. 326–27.

[10] Communist International, *Ein Jahr Kampf und Arbeit: Tätigkeitsbericht der Exekutive der Kommunistischen Internationale 1925–1926* (Hamburg: Verlag der Kommunistischen Internationale, 1926), pp. 334–48.

[11] "Kemalism on the Road to Capitalist Development," *The Communist International*, Vol. IV, No. 11 (1927), pp. 223–27.

[12] See Harold R. Isaacs, *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1951), rev. edn., pp. 102–3 and Xenia J. Eudin and Robert C. North, *Soviet Russia and the East, 1920–1927* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957), pp. 299–10.

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By 1927, the whole policy of the united front in Europe and support for nationalist movements in colonial areas was in disrepute. Nowhere had expectations been fulfilled and communists throughout Asia had been persecuted, exiled, and killed. China, the main focus of Comintern colonial policy, had proved a disaster. The communists had followed a dual policy during the twenties, but the main emphasis had been placed on cooperation with the national bourgeoisie rather than on a policy of setting up revolutionary peasant and worker groups. However, in 1927–28 an abrupt shift was made to a militant line which virtually excluded support for nationalist movements.

This policy began with a call for the establishment of independent mass organizations led by the communists. The thesis on "The Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies," approved at the Sixth Congress of the Comintern in the summer of 1928 played down the positive role of the national bourgeoisie. The new programme called for the creation and development of communist parties in the colonial areas and, although collaboration with "truly revolutionary" nationalist groups was permitted, communists were seriously warned of the dangers of such cooperation.[13]

In many respects the new line meant a reduction of communist concern with the colonies until after the second world war. The new leftist line signified, first of all, a break with nationalist movements.[14] In addition, collectivization in the Soviet Union itself and the rising threat of Nazi Germany after 1932 distracted Soviet interest from the colonial question. By the mid-thirties most front organizations that had been created were focusing on the struggle against fascism.

The Negro Question and the American Communist Party, 1921–27

Already at the second Comintern congress in 1920, the American John Reed introduced the problem of dealing with the Negro and outlined a policy that the communists should use in carrying out their work among Negroes. The policy was followed, in general, both in the United States and in Africa until 1928. According to Reed, the Negro must be dealt with as a part of the working class and must be brought into "the same labour unions with the whites." This would be the most efficient means of eliminating racial prejudice from among the ranks of the white workers. The communists should also make use of the various Negro movements which sought the improvement of conditions for members of

[13] A. Lozovsky, "Results and Prospects of the United Front," *The Communist International*, Vol. V, No. 6 (1928), p. 142. For an excellent discussion of the relationship between the new line in foreign policy and Stalin's struggle with the right-wing within the CPSU, see Boersner, *The Bolsheviks*, p. 259. See, also, Franz Borkenau, *World Communism* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1912), pp. 332ff.

[14] Communist International, *Protokoll: Sechster Weltkongress der Kommunistischen Internationale, Moskau, 17. Juni—1. September 1928* (Hamburg: Verlag Carl Hoym Nachfolger, 1929), Vol. IV, p. 159.

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their race.[15] The policy outlined by Reed was based on the attainment of complete equality for blacks and did not attempt to employ racial attitudes in its appeal. Two years later, however, Otto Huiswood, a Negro American communist, pointed out to the Comintern that the Negro Question was more than just one aspect of the colonial problem, for special psychological factors had to be taken into account. He continued that "we must realise that different peoples at certain given times reaching a special stage of development must of necessity have certain different psychological reactions towards the world in general." He warned that the communists must take these factors into consideration when they approached the Negro masses. He strongly criticized the approach taken in the United States by organizations such as the NAACP and the Urban League, as well as the programme of the Garvey Movement, although he praised the approach of the African Blood Brotherhood as the only organization that based its programme "upon the abolition of capitalism."[16]

The Negro Commission of the Comintern prepared a statement on the Negro Question and made proposals which supposedly took the psychological factors mentioned by Huiswood into consideration. It strongly suggested that work among blacks throughout the world should begin immediately, and outlined the changes that had occurred in the relationship between the capitalist and colonial countries, including Africa, since first world war. It stated—more as a hope than as a fact—that the revolutionary movements in Russia, Asia and the Arab countries had "aroused the consciousness of the millions of the Negro race whom capitalism has oppressed and degraded beyond all others for hundreds of years not only in Africa, but perhaps even more in America, where the movement of revolt has grown more and more intense." For this reason, the commission maintained, the Negro problem had become a "vital question of world revolution."[17] The communists, who had recognized the role that colonial revolt could play in the struggle against the capitalist states, now proposed to use the unrest among blacks in the United States, represented especially by Marcus Garvey's "back-to-Africa movement." The commission outlined a programme for agitation and revolutionary activity among the Negroes that included the following points.

1. Support for "every form of Negro movement which tends to undermine or weaken capitalism or imperialism, or to impede its further penetration";
2. Work to organize black workers and, wherever possible, form a united front between Negro and white working masses;
3. Whenever possible, work among the blacks would be carried on by Negro party members;

[15] *Protokoll des II. Weltkongresses*, pp. 780–88.
[16] Otto Huiswood (pseud. "Billings"), "Report on the Negro Question," *Inprecorr*, Vol. III, No. 2 (1923), pp. 14–15.
[17] Ibid. pp. 15–16.

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4. Calling of a Negro congress in Moscow to initiate contact with Negro organizations and begin the work of influencing their leaders to more revolutionary activity.[18]

THE fourth Comintern congress accepted these proposals but made a few additions to them. The most important was the decision to employ American Negroes as propagandists throughout Africa, for, it was argued, the "history of the American Negro in America fits him for an important role in the liberation struggle of the entire African race."[19] The communists saw black Americans as the "historical leaders of their comrades in Africa" in the struggle for the liberation of the colonies and decided that they must be organized for that purpose.[20] George Padmore, the one-time director of communist activity among the Negroes, has remarked that the communists in the United States tried to capture the Garvey Movement and to gain control over the other black nationalist groups in order to recruit specially selected Negro militants and train them in Moscow as cadres for work in Africa. However, they were unable to find the necessary black recruits, either in Africa or the United States, for their training programme and never more than a dozen Africans were at The University for the Toilers of the East, which had been established in the Soviet Union.[21] Those American Negro communists who were trained in Moscow were sent back to the United States rather than assigned to organizational work in the colonies. Padmore, Otto Huiswood and James Ford did work with the International Trade Union Committee of Negro Workers for a few years in the early thirties, but they operated from Hamburg, rather than in Africa.[22]

The fourth congress made a number of other additions to the proposals of the Negro Commission, including a specific reference to the task of the Comintern to "fight for race equality of the Negro with the white people, for equal wages and political and social rights." Besides, the Comintern must "use every instrument within its control to compel the trade unions to admit Negro workers." If this should fail, then the communists must organize the Negroes into their own unions."[23] The whole emphasis in early communist policy towards the Negro was on equality and no attempt was made to appeal on racial grounds. In fact, the communists strongly condemned those Negro organizations, such as the Garveyites, who did base their programme on racial distinctions.[24]

[18] Ibid. p. 16.
[19] Rose P. Stokes (pseud. "Sasha"), "Report and Resolution on the Negro Question," *Inprecorr*, Vol. III, No. 2 (1923), p. 21.
[20] See William F. Dunne, "Negroes in American Industries," *The Workers' Monthly*, Vol. IV (1925), p. 260. See, also, Wilson Record, *The Negro and the Communist Party* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1951), p. 37 and Rolf Italiaander, *Schwarze Haut im roten Griff* (Dusseldorf-Vienna: Econ Verlag, 1962), p. 140.
[21] Padmore, *Pan Africanism*, pp. 317–18.
[22] See Italiaander, *Schwarze Haut*, p. 140 and Record, *The Negro and the Communist Party*, p. 109.
[23] *Inprecorr*, Vol. III, No. 2 (1923), p. 22.
[24] See, for example, the article by Ivon Jones, "Africa's Awakening," *Inprecorr*, Vol. III, No. 25 (1923), p. 422.

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ONE of the major problems facing the communists in their attempt to gain Negro support was the racial prejudice exhibited by white workers. One white American communist argued that the Workers' (communist) Party in the United States must show the Negro workers that it was the only party which was willing to "fight their class and racial struggle uncompromisingly and without counting the cost." The communists must show the Negroes by actual activity that they are "the foe of every enemy of the Negro worker whether he be Negro-hating trade union official or capitalist." [25] An editorial in the theoretical journal of the Comintern advised the American Party that it must not evade "the ticklish question of race antagonism in America," but must expose its class bases and make clear to the workers, both black and white, that racial prejudice is a "product of a society divided into classes, that it will only disappear when the proletariat is victorious." The racial prejudice of white workers merely "proves that a considerable section of white American workers is still under the ideological influence of the bourgeoisie and has been contaminated by bourgeois prejudices against which we must fight with the utmost energy." This bourgeois ideology concerning the Negro has been developed in order to improve the capitalists' possibility of acquiring profits. Racism is a result of capitalism and those Negroes who support a "back-to-Africa" movement are deluded into believing that there can be "in the world (besides the Soviet Republic) another such promised land where national and racial oppression does not exist." [26]

The Party was not successful, however, in dispelling the "bourgeois" prejudices of the white workers or even of its own members—and during the early 1930s the American communists fought against what they called "white chauvinism." In the words of one Party member, the CPUSA continued to "burn out of its ranks the influence of bourgeois ideas on the Negro question, and particularly the open and concealed forms of white chauvinism." [27] This meant the expulsion of a number of Party members, but still the problem remained.

THE Garvey Movement has already been mentioned a number of times in the discussion of the development of communist policy towards the Negroes in the United States. Marcus Garvey, the founder of the Universal Negro Improvement Association, began his activity

[25] Dunne, "Negroes in American Industries," p. 259. The Black American writer, Claude McKay, who never became a Party member, although he was favourably impressed by the racial tolerance exhibited by the Russians, pointed out that the communists would not succeed in their work among the blacks as long as the latter viewed communism as a white working class movement, for they considered the white workers "their greatest enemy." See Claude McKay, "The Racial Issue in the USA," *Inprecorr*, Vol. II, No. 101 (1922), p. 817.

[26] "Editorial Comment on 'The Negro Question,'" *The Communist International*, n.s. No. 8 (1925), pp. 53–54.

[27] B. D. Amis, "How We Carried Out the Decision of the 1930 C.I. Resolution on the Negro Question in the United States," *The Communist International*, Vol. XII (1935), p. 499.

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among blacks in the Northern industrial centres during the first world war. He was an extremely able speaker who was able to capitalize on the discontent among American Negroes. His appeal was based largely on a glorification of dark skin and on the virtue of "blackness," and he rejected cooperation with light-skinned Negro leaders.[28] Garvey called for complete separation between blacks and whites and vigorously condemned the "vile effects of the miscegenationists of the white race, and their associates, the hybrids of the Negro race."[29] In 1920, Garvey founded a "Negro Empire," convened a parliament, and established a provisional government which was to liberate Africa in order to enable the blacks in America to migrate to their old homeland. The movement eventually began to founder when President King of Liberia expelled UNIA officials who had been sent to Liberia to construct housing for the first immigrants from America, and confiscated machinery and building materials valued at hundreds of thousands of dollars. Additional problems developed when many of Garvey's lieutenants deserted him. Garvey himself was finally arrested for using the United States mails to defraud and two years later was deported to his birthplace, Jamaica. Thus, the movement collapsed, but not before it had aroused mass enthusiasm among blacks in the United States.[30]

In the early 1920s the communists saw great value in Garvey's movement, and Huiswood, in his report on the Negro question at the fourth Comintern congress, noted that the movement had a "rebel rank and file element." In spite of the cheap schemes which it drafted, he continued, it "is influencing the minds of the Negroes against imperialism." The congress agreed that every Negro movement which impeded or undermined capitalism or imperialism was to be supported.[31] The American Party, therefore, began a policy aimed at infiltrating the Garvey Movement, but was totally unsuccessful. Padmore summarizes the experiences of the communists as follows:

> Armed with an acid tongue and a sharp pen, Garvey turned upon the infiltrators and ejected them, lock, stock and barrel. He then took the offensive right into the Communist ranks by inciting his fanatical disciples to break up Communist street-corner meetings in Harlem. Negro members were denounced as "Red Uncle Toms" and "traitors to the black race," for Garvey's racialism made him intolerant of any kind of co-operation with white radicals. . . .

[28] St Clair Drake and Horace R. Cayton, *Black Metropolis* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1945), p. 752, and Padmore, *Pan-Africanism*, p. 89 ff. For a biography of Garvey, see Edmund D. Cronon, *Black Moses: The Story of Marcus Garvey and the Universal Negro Improvement Association* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1955).

[29] Marcus Garvey, *Philosophy and Opinions*, edited by Amy Jacques Garvey (New York: Universal Publishing House, 1926), Vol. I, p. 37. Cited in Cronon, *Black Moses*, p. 193.

[30] Padmore, *Pan-Africanism*, pp. 100–1. The exact membership of the UNIA is not known, but estimates range from one million to over six million. Ibid. p. 87 and Record, *The Negro and the Communist Party*, p. 40.

[31] *Inprecorr*, Vol. III, No. 2 (1923), pp. 15–16.

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> Garvey's anti-Communist tirades had a demoralizing effect upon neophyte Negro party members, some of whom were expelled for " black nationalist deviations.". . .
>
> The biggest mistake that the white Communists made was to attack Garvey openly and try to disrupt his movement before they had won confidence among the Negroes as a party different from the old-established Republicans and Democrats to which the Negroes gave their divided loyalty.[32]

After their failure to capture the Garvey movement, the communists began an offensive against the movement which they now called a " dangerous ideology, which bears not a single genuine democratic trait, and which toys with the aristocratic attributes of a non-existent ' Negro kingdom.'. . . ." [33] Garveyism, according to the Negro communist, Harry Haywood, diverted the potential revolutionary movement of the Negro masses into the " utopian, reactionary channels of ' Back to Africa.' " [34]

COMMUNIST policy towards the NAACP in the 1920s followed a pattern similar to that towards Garvey, with the sole exception that opposition to the NAACP began much sooner. At first the communists attempted to infiltrate the association, in line with the directives of the Comintern concerning Negro organizations. The NAACP was a reformist organization, rather than a revolutionary one, and it sought its support among " the talented tenth "—the educated middle-class Negroes.[35]

It soon became obvious to the communists that they would have little success in instilling a revolutionary spirit into this group and they began a campaign of opposition and condemnation.[36] The communists were much more successful in infiltrating the African Blood Brotherhood, an organization founded in New York in 1918 by Cyril V. Briggs. Some of the top leaders of the organization—including Briggs, Fort-Whiteman and Haywood—were all recruited into the Communist Party.[37] How-

[32] Padmore, *Pan-Africanism*, pp. 303–4.

[33] *Protokoll: Sechster Kongress*, Vol. VI, p. 93.

[34] Harry Haywood, " The Theoretical Defenders of White Chauvinism in the Labor Movement," *The Communist* (June 1935). Reprinted in *The Communist Position on the Negro Question* (New York: Workers' Library Publishers, n.d.), p. 36. One of the most vituperative attacks on Garvey was published in *The Negro Worker*, a communist journal published in Hamburg in the early 1930s. Cyril Briggs, " How Garvey Betrayed the Negroes," *The Negro Worker*, Vol. II, No. 8 (1932), p. 15. George Padmore, then an official of the Comintern, echoes this view in *The Life and Struggles of Negro Toilers* (London: RILU Magazine for the International Trade Union Committee of Negro Workers, 1931), pp. 125–26.

[35] See *Inprecorr*, Vol. III, No. 2 (1923), p. 15, for the application of this policy to the Negro question. For an interesting study of communist policy towards the NAACP, see Wilson Record, *Race and Radicalism: The NAACP and the Communist Party in Conflict* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1964).

[36] See Dunne's condemnation of the NAACP for not organizing the Negro workers. William F. Dunne, " The N.A.A.C.P. Takes a Step Backward," *The Workers Monthly*, Vol. V (1926), pp. 459–61.

[37] See Theodore Draper, *American Communism and Soviet Russia* (New York: Viking Press, 1960), pp. 325–26.

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ever, this small organization was unable to compete with the Garvey movement for the support of the most alienated black masses or with the other Negro organizations for the backing of the Negro middle class. In 1924 the communists failed to get a general race council, which had been convened in Chicago, to connect the struggle of the Negroes for equal rights with the social struggle against capitalism. The only consolation which they could draw from the conference was the fact that they "had succeeded in bringing up the social question among the negroes for the first time, and in getting it discussed in connection with the Workers Party in the entire Negro Press." [38]

After the failure of all attempts to infiltrate effectively the various Negro organizations, the communists turned to a new tactic—the formation of their own Negro front organization, the American Negro Labor Congress, which was to direct the work of local committees in bringing Negro workers into the union movement. This new Labor Congress took over the work of the Trade Union Educational League and the African Blood Brotherhood in carrying out the Negro programme in the labour field. The League had been given the task of "boring from within" the established unions, in order to capture union offices and place communists in positions of control. It was to work for the same social, political and industrial rights for the Negroes as those enjoyed by the white workers. Now these tasks were to be carried out by a strictly Negro organization, run by the Party.[39] In spite of a large build-up and great expectations, the first meeting of the Negro Labor Congress was a failure, for only 30 delegates arrived and most of these were from the few trade unions in which the communists were already influential. The brief history of the ANLC was also one of failure and by 1930 the communists set up a new League of Struggle for Negro Rights in an attempt to attract black supporters.[40]

[38] Communist International, *From the Fourth to the Fifth World Congress* (London: The Communist Party of Great Britain, 1924), p. 78. In most English-language Comintern publications "Negro" is spelled without a capital "N." All citations will reproduce the original spelling.

[39] Robert Minor, "The First Negro Workers Congress," *The Workers Monthly*, Vol. V (1925), pp. 71–72. See also, William Z. Foster, "Company Unionism and Trade Unionism," *The Workers Monthly*, Vol. V (1926), p. 133, and *The Labor Herald*, Vol. III (1924), p. 153; cited in Record, *The Negro and the Communist Party*, p. 25.

[40] Lovett Fort-Whitemann, "American Negro Labour Congress," *Inprecorr*, Vol. V, No. 67 (1925), p. 983. Fort-Whitemann outlined the purpose of the congress with complete honesty when he stated: "The fundamental aim in calling the American Negro Labor Congress is to establish in the life of the American Negro working class an organization which may serve as a medium through which the American Communist Party may reach and influence the Negro working class, and at the same time constitute something of a recruiting ground for the Party." The complete failure of the Negro Labor Congress was later admitted by James Ford, who remarked that the "ANLC was too narrow in its approach . . . [and] was almost completely isolated from the basic mass of the Negro people. . . ." The programme of the congress, "although correct, was, however, not carefully adapted to the feelings and moods of the Negro people. . . . In many cases sincere Negroes were driven away from the organization by bad methods of work." James W. Ford, *The Negro and the Democratic Front* (New York: International Publishers, 1938), p. 82.

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By the time the Communist International met in 1928, it was already evident that a new approach to the Negro question must be developed. According to the communists themselves, Negro membership in the US Party stood at less than 200.[41] The Party had failed in its attempt to reach the Negro masses, even after the collapse of Garvey's movement. One reason for this failure was the lack of effort, on the part of the communists, to win over black intellectuals and writers. The Party had also antagonized the Negro churches which played a very important role in the lives of American Negroes. James Ford, in his evaluation of communist activities among Negroes in the twenties, pointed out the fact that the failure of the Party to recognize the influence of the Negro clergy had helped to isolate it from the Negro working masses.[42] The major factor, however, was the failure of the communists to realize that the American Negro was basically not interested in overthrowing the American system, but rather of being accepted into it. The new line which the Comintern adopted in 1928 was no closer to reality than the old one had been, for it called for a Negro republic in the South of the United States—something which few Negroes desired.

The Communists in South Africa, 1921–27

The initial programme of the Comintern for dealing with blacks, both in the United States and in Africa, called for their integration into the white labour movement and the Negro question was viewed merely as an aspect of the class problem and the general colonial question. In 1924, the Red International of Labor Unions (Profintern), a subsidiary of the Comintern, called upon its adherents in America, South Africa, and in other countries where there are Negro workers to "commence work among the negro working masses, endeavoring to secure the fusion of parallel organizations of whites and negroes; wherever such exist."[43] It was the task of the newly formed Communist Party in South Africa to implement this policy. As in the United States, the communists in South Africa were unsuccessful in their attempt to win over the blacks, even though they were, in the words of George Padmore, "the only Europeans in South Africa who have taken an uncompromising stand on behalf of racial equality for non-Europeans," except for a small group of white Liberals and a number of Anglican clergymen.[44] The major cause for their failure, Padmore maintains, was the fact that the leaders of the South African Communist Party were "completely tied by the

41 Jack Stachel, "Organization Report of the Sixth Convention of the Communist Party of the U.S.A.," *The Communist*, Vol. VIII (1929), p. 184.

42 Ford, *The Negro and the Democratic Front*, pp. 74–75, 82–83. William Foster also referred to the communists' attempts "to waive aside religious sentiments among the masses" as a "very serious mistake." William Z. Foster, "Secondary Aspects of Mass Organization," *The Communist*, Vol. XVIII (1939), p. 703.

43 *Resolutions and Decisions, Third World Congress of the Red International of Labor Unions, Held in Moscow, July 1924* (Chicago, n.d.), p. 24.

44 Padmore, *Pan-Africanism*, p. 346.

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Russian umbilical cord" and "they were forced to follow all the zigzag manoeuvres of Soviet foreign policy." [45]

The Communist Party of South Africa was founded in 1921 by a small group of workers and intellectuals who had broken away from the South African Labour Party under the leadership of William H. Andrews. All of the original members of the Party were Europeans, most of them Eastern European Jewish immigrants. One of the original members, Sidney Bunting, became one of the major supporters of African equality in South Africa. During the early years of the Party's existence, when Andrews headed the Party, the overwhelming majority of the members were white. Andrews, who in 1911, as a member of the Labour Party, had protested against the "encroachment of coloured labour in the skilled industries of South Africa," [46] was hardly the man to initiate a policy based on an appeal for African membership in the Party. Not until the fourth Comintern congress did the Party receive any real directives concerning work among the Africans. This congress resolved that work among Negroes throughout the world must be begun immediately and, since this was a period when united front tactics were in vogue, the communists were told to support all revolutionary movements which might weaken the cause of world capitalism. In South Africa this meant working with the Industrial and Commercial Union, headed by Clements Kadalie, a very capable African who enjoyed a popularity in South Africa unmatched by any other African in the recent history of the country.[47] At the time of the congress, Sidney Bunting outlined the problems which faced the infant Communist Party in South Africa in its work among both Europeans and Africans. He noted that the Party had "to propagate solidarity, based on an understanding of the actual class struggle, among the workers. . . ." The most accessible of the workers were the Europeans, whom the Party reached through its weekly organ, *The International.* Work among the Africans was much more difficult even though they represented the most oppressed segment of the South African proletariat and, apparently, the only contact with the African workers at this time came through the Party paper—and only a very few Africans read it. The Party had to increase its influence within the white labour movement, Bunting argued, even though it was "backward and lacking in solidarity." [48]

Bunting then turned to the problem of work among the Africans and pointed out that the task of influencing the white workers "to abandon their prejudice against native labour organization and to cooperate with

[45] Ibid. Gwendolyn Carter echoes Padmore's contention and adds that this was especially true after the sixth congress of the Comintern. *The Politics of Inequality: South Africa Since 1948* (New York: Praeger, 1959), pp. 61–62.

[46] Edwin S. Munger, *Communist Activity in South Africa*, American Universities Field Staff, *Central and Southern Africa Series*, ESM-8-'58, Vol. VI (1958), p. 3.

[47] Padmore, *Pan-Africanism*, p. 349.

[48] Sidney P. Bunting, "The Labour Movement of South Africa," *Inprecorr*, Vol. II, No. 98 (1922), p. 787. In 1922, at the time of the fourth congress, the Party claimed 200 members. *Inprecorr*, Vol. IV, No. 57 (1924), p. 607.

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it" would be extremely difficult. Perhaps even more difficult would be the task of carrying on "propaganda directly among the native workers" and assisting them in developing their own industrial and political activities. This work aroused "fierce resentment among the Europeans, workers no less than bourgeoisie." In fact, many communists opposed work among the natives and argued that they should be left to develop "along their own lines." [49]

On his return to South Africa after the fourth Comintern congress, Bunting led a campaign to gain Negro membership for the Party which was relatively successful. But the Party remained predominantly European. The communist explanation for this was the failure of members to cast off old traditions and "to appreciate the necessity for the Party to develop into the vanguard of the native masses." [50] Besides the lack of interest in increasing African membership, which some Party members exhibited, there was another extremely important cause for the failure of the communists to gain the support of the African masses. As in the United States, the blacks had developed their own organizations which the communists were unable to take over.

IN 1919, Clements Kadalie, a native of Nyasaland, founded the Industrial and Commercial Union, which combined agitation in the political sphere with union activities. According to Padmore, the ICU organized the African workers, both in the cities and the countryside, in order to fight for the improvement of economic conditions among them. In 1928, nine years after its foundation, the ICU attained its widest influence among the blacks of South Africa and counted almost a quarter of a million members.[51] The communists saw the advantages they would reap by taking over the leadership of the movement and, in line with the directives of the fourth Comintern congress, the South African Communist Party, under the leadership of Sidney Bunting, began to expand

[49] Bunting, "The Labour Movement of South Africa," pp. 787–88.

[50] There is disagreement concerning the number of blacks in the Party. Padmore says that the Party gradually received a "black colouration," which seems to indicate that a majority of the members were Africans. However, Edward Roux, a South African communist, told the sixth congress that Africans in the party numbered 100 in 1926. He continued that the Party had pursued a much more vigorous recruitment policy during 1927–28 and that the "number of native Communists is growing rapidly today." This hardly agrees with the figure of 50 African members—one-eighth of the Party—in January 1927, given in a publication of the Comintern. See Padmore, *Pan-Africanism*, p. 348; Edward Roux's speech at the sixth congress, *Inprecorr*, Vol. VIII, No. 72 (1928), p. 1315; and The Communist International, *The Communist International between the Fifth and Sixth World Congresses, 1924–1928* (London: The Communist Party of Great Britain, 1928), p. 291. Another claim, which is nowhere near the others, places African and Coloured membership in the Party at 1,600 out of 1,750 members. On the basis of the other statements, this figure seems greatly exaggerated. "The South African Question (Resolution of the E.E.C.I.)," *The Communist International*, Vol. VI (1928), p. 53.

[51] Padmore, *Pan-Africanism*, pp. 348–50. Edward Roux deals with the ICU in *Time Longer Than Rope: A History of the Black Man's Struggle for Freedom in South Africa* (Madison, Wisc.: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1964), pp. 153–97.

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its work among the Africans.[52] This policy included infiltrating the ICU. The communists had considerable success and within two years managed to place three communists on the Executive Committee of the Industrial and Commercial Union, including the general secretary and the treasurer.[53] However, in late 1926 and early 1927, Kadalie, who still retained control of the Union, broke with the communists, whom he accused of "interfering more and more in the general affairs of the union."[54] The ICU joined the International Bureau of Social Democratic Labor Unions and began attacking the communists. The communists had lost their opportunity to take over Kadalie's organization, but not before they had caused dissension and division within the ICU. They immediately began a propaganda campaign against the Industrial and Commercial Union, which they accused of betraying the Africans and of retreating from the class struggle, and within a short time internal factionalism split the union into three separate groups and membership in the section remaining faithful to Kadalie fell to only one fourth the original total.[55] The communists immediately attempted to take advantage of the split within the African movement by setting up a new organization, called the League of African Rights, under the leadership of James T. Gumeda. Gumeda, who had been expelled from the ICU as a communist, headed a group of able young men, both European and African, who began in earnest the task of mobilizing the support of the Africans. The Communist Party, which had counted about 100 black members in 1926, began to seek new African members, organized African labour unions and conducted strikes.[56] However, new directives from Moscow destroyed the work which the Party had accomplished during the previous seven years. Most of the white Party members opposed an order to put forward a new slogan for an independent African republic, which led to a purge of the Party. However, the Africans themselves opposed the new policy, just as the American Negroes rejected the policy of a "Black Belt" republic in the South.

WHAT success could the Communist Party show for the seven years of relative independence from Comintern directives which had preceded the sixth Comintern congress?[57] We have seen that, after the

[52] *From the Fourth to the Fifth World Congress*, p. 68.

[53] *The Communist International between the Fifth and Sixth Congresses*, p. 490, and Victor Demar, "Amsterdam and the Proletariat of the Colonies and the East," *The Communist International*, Vol. IV (1927), p. 119.

[54] Ibid. For an account of the struggle within the ICU in order to push through the expulsion of the communists, see Roux, *Time Longer Than Rope*, pp. 163–67.

[55] See, for example, the articles in *Inprecorr* by James Shields, Vol. VII, No. 19 (1927), p. 381, and No. 41 (1927), pp. 907–8. See also Teobaldo Fielsi, "Kommunismus und Nationalismus in der Südafrikanischen Union," *Afrika* (Munich), Vol. II (1960), p. 100; *Inprecorr*, Vol. VIII, No. 72 (1928), p. 1316; and Roux, *Time Longer Than Rope*, pp. 175–97.

[56] *Inprecorr*, Vol. VIII, No. 72 (1928), p. 1316.

[57] Except for the recommendations of the fourth congress on work among the Africans, the South African C.P. was left virtually on its own until 1928. See Carter, *Politics of Inequality*, pp. 61–62.

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break with Kadalie's ICU, the communists were partially successful in attracting African members and supporters.[58] However, the Party admitted that it had no success in breaking down racial barriers which separated the white workers from the Africans. In 1927, James Shields complained that the white trade unions still refused to associate with the Africans and that the "reactionary outlook of the white workers gives little hope of anything tangible being secured from that direction to assist efforts of the down-trodden non-Europeans . . ." to improve their socio-economic conditions.[59] Instead of seeking an integrated labour movement and unified labour unions, the Party now worked to strengthen European and African unions independently from one another. In its work among the Africans, the Party was using the newly formed League of African Rights and was also attempting to infiltrate a rejuvenated African National Congress, in order to transform it into a "fighting nationalist revolutionary organization against the white bourgeoisie."[60] However, all this came to an end with the new Comintern resolution of 1928.

Communist Activity in Africa outside South Africa, 1921–27

Besides the work in South Africa, the communists had very few contacts with sub-Saharan Africa in the first nine years of Comintern history. An American delegate at the fifth Comintern congress in 1924 criticized the French Communist Party for "great laxness" on the colonial question. The French had "excused themselves for not carrying on direct propaganda against French imperialism on the ground that the French government had adopted a very liberal policy toward the colonies." The French Party had also refused to demand the liberation of French colonies and had ignored the use of African troops by the government.[61] In spite of some attempts to attract workers from the colonies who were living in France, little had been accomplished by the time of the sixth congress in 1928.[62]

After the formation of the League Against Imperialism in 1927, this communist front organization did interest itself with African affairs. At the first congress of the League in Brussels in 1927, a number of Negro

58 According to Roux, the communists were making progress throughout the country in winning over African support. *Time Longer Than Rope*, pp. 204–5, 214.

59 James Shields, "Trade Unionism and the Organisation of the Native Masses in South Africa," *Inprecorr*, Vol. VII, No. 41 (1927), p. 907. See, also, a later article by Shields entitled "Reaction at Work in South African Trade Unions," ibid. No. 68, pp. 1538–39.

60 Resolution of the ECCI, "The South African Question," *The Communist International*, Vol. VI (1928), p. 55.

61 *Inprecorr*, Vol. IV, No. 51 (1924), p. 527. A year later this complaint was repeated in the journal of the French Communist Party. E. Diazairi, "Le parti communiste et la question coloniale," *Cahiers du bolchévisme*, Vol. I (1925), p. 475. Partly in response to this criticism the French Party set up a Leninist school to train revolutionary leaders for France and for the colonies. Among the first 72 students were 12 from colonial areas. A. Bernard, "L'Ecole de Bobigny," ibid. pp. 1961–63.

62 P. Celor, "Les travailleurs coloniaux en France," ibid. Vol. II (1926), p. 183.

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organizations were represented, among which were the International Bureau for the Defense of Natives and the Committee for the Defense of the Black Race.[63] In its resolutions, the Brussels Congress included a number of points on Africa. After emphasizing the long history of "most brutal suppression" of the Negroes by Europeans, and the "terroristic rule over the blacks and exploitation of the Negro peoples," the Congress called upon all its supporters to fight for the liberation of the Negro race, and put forward a list of demands:

1. Complete freedom for the peoples of Africa and those of African origin.
2. The equality of the Negro race with all other races.
3. The seizure of African land and the administration of Africa by Africans.
4. The immediate abolition of forced labour and indirect taxes.
5. The abolition of all racial and class differences in respect to economic and political matters.
6. The abolition of compulsory military service.
7. Freedom of travel within Africa and along the coasts of Africa.
8. Freedom of speech, press and assembly.
9. Recognition of the right to instruction in all educational institutions.
10. Recognition of the right to organize labour.[64]

These demands, which from the vantage point of the 1970s seem most reasonable, were quite revolutionary for the Africa of 1927. It was only the communists, and a small group of liberals in Europe and the United States, who were willing to support the desire of Africans for independence. However, as we shall see, the communist concern for African independence did not remain strong when it no longer served to strengthen the interests of the Soviet Union. Within a few years, support for anti-colonial movements had to give way to the new requirements of Soviet defence policy against Nazi Germany.

The Comintern and the "Black Republics": The Negro and Self-Determination, 1927–34

The leaders of the Comintern had noted the success of Marcus Garvey, who had based his appeal to the Negro masses, both in the United States and in Africa, on a promise to establish a national home for blacks in Africa. The new communist programme on the Negro question called for the right of self-determination for Negroes in the areas of the United States where they constituted a majority of the population, as well as for the Africans in South Africa. This included

[63] Gustave Gautherot, *Le bolchévisme aux colonies et l'impérialisme rouge* (Paris: Librairie de la Revue Française, 1930), pp. 273–74.

[64] League Against Imperialism, *Das Flammenzeichen vom Palais Egmont. Offizielles Protokoll des Kongresses gegen koloniale Unterdrückung und Imperialismus. Brussels, 10–15 Februar 1927* (Berlin: Neuer Deutscher Verlag, 1927), pp. 129–30. See, also, Italiaander, *Schwarze Haut*, pp. 41–42.

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the right to secede and to establish independent Negro states in both countries.[65] According to Padmore, one of the purposes of this new policy was the hope that it would " satisfy the nationalist aspirations of those Negroes who still hankered after ' Black Zionism ' and turn them away from Garveyism to Communism." [66] The " Black Republic " idea was basically Stalin's, although the management of the operation was entrusted to the Finnish communist, Otto Kuusinen, who had not met more than a dozen Negroes in his whole life.[67] According to Kuusinen, the Negro problem in the US was a " national minority " one and not a racial problem, and the Leninist-Stalinist doctrine of self-determination, which had originally been developed to deal with minority nationalities in the Russian Empire, applied to the American Negroes. In the American South the Negroes supposedly met all the requirements of a nation which Stalin had outlined in 1913, since they represented an historically evolved, stable entity, which was defined by language, territory, economic life, and psychological makeup, and they manifested a community of culture.[68] Kuusinen's proposal met with opposition from the American communists. One American was an emphatic opponent of the measures and stated that he saw no tendency among Negroes to form a separate state. " The historical development of the American Negro," he argued, " has tended to create in him the desire to be considered a part of the American nation." The slogan which would gain the support of the Negro masses was that of " social equality " and not one for an independent Negro republic.[69] Another American communist argued that " it is impermissible simply to identify racial oppression and exploitation with national-colonial oppression, that it is impermissible to deal with the racial under a clause of the national question. . . ." He saw the oppression of the peoples of China and Africa as primarily the oppression of backward colonial nations and not as racial oppression. This type of exploitation clearly came under the category of the national-colonial question and the theses on the colonial question applied to it. But these theses were never meant to apply to the Jewish question or to the Negro question in the United States:

> For when we speak of the oppression of colonial or other subject nations, we have in mind not social groups, formed on the basis of

[65] A. Shiek, " The Comintern Programme and the Racial Problem," *The Communist International*, Vol. V, No. 16 (1928), p. 407. See, also, *Protokoll: Sechster Weltkongress*, Vol. IV, p. 197.

[66] Padmore, *Pan-Africanism*, p. 306.

[67] Draper, *American Communism and Soviet Russia*, pp. 349–50. See, also, Padmore, *Pan-Africanism*, p. 306, and George Padmore, *How Russia Transformed Her Colonial Empire* (London: Dobson, 1946), p. 85. According to Otto Hall, an American Negro communist, Stalin said to a small group of American Negroes in 1925 that the Negroes in the United States were " a national minority with some of the characteristics of a nation." Interview of Theodore Draper with Otto Hall. Cited in Draper, *American Communism and Soviet Russia*, p. 334.

[68] J. V. Stalin, *Marxism and the National and Colonial Question* (New York: International Publishers, n.d.), pp. 5–10.

[69] *Inprecorr*, Vol. VIII, No. 76 (1928), p. 1393.

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> general secondary physical peculiarities, having no practical importance [i.e. skin coloration and other physical differences], but groups consolidated by the real bonds of common territory, economic system, language and culture, and striving towards an independent national existence. There is no question of these factors existing among the American negroes. . . . John Reed's words, uttered at the Second Congress, to the effect that, "The negroes make no demands whatever for national independence," are absolutely true not only for 1920 but for to-day. . . . The negroes regard themselves as Americans, and feel quite at home in the United States.

He went on to say that the Negro bourgeoisie had invented legends of a special Negro culture in order to have a monopoly of the exploitation of their own race. "But Communists should not allow themselves to be caught in such snares. They should put forward demands on behalf of the oppressed American negroes not as a nation, but as a race . . . and they should not demand the right to national self-determination (self-determination has no meaning here!) but complete political and social equality." [70]

In spite of this opposition, the resolutions adopted were substantially the same as the original theses.[71] Benjamin Gitlow, a leading American communist in the late twenties, quotes the reply of John Pepper, the official US representative of the Comintern, to the opposition to the new line which existed within the CPUSA:

> Comrade Gitlow, there is much truth in what you say; but we could not help ourselves in Moscow. The Russians on the [Negro] Commission could only see the American Negro question in the light of the minorities question which existed in Russia before the Revolution. Had we not fallen in line, we would have been severely condemned as deviators and *khvostists* who neglect work among the Negro masses.[72]

A few weeks after the conclusion of the sixth congress the special Negro commission, which the congress had continued in existence, issued a more detailed pronouncement on the Negro question in the United States, which had the approval of ECCI. The commission stated that the Negro question in the US must be treated in relation to Negro struggles throughout the world. However, since the masses of Negroes who were concentrated in the "Black Belt" fulfilled the necessary conditions for a national revolutionary movement, "the Party must come out openly and unreservedly for the right of Negroes to self-determination in the southern states, where the Negroes form a majority of the population,"

[70] Shiek, "The Comintern Programme," p. 408.
[71] *Protokoll: Sechster Weltkongress*, Vol. VI, pp. 196–97.
[72] Benjamin Gitlow, *I Confess: The Truth About American Communism* (New York: Dutton, 1940), p. 481.

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while at the same time intensifying the struggle for full social and political equality for the Negroes in other sections of the country.[73]

The American Party was very slow in implementing the new Comintern directive and not until after the presidential election of 1928, in which the communists had entered a candidate, did the *Daily Worker* come out in favour of an "independent Negro republic not only for South Africa but also for the Solid South of the United States as well."[74] Gitlow describes, with some bitterness and obvious exaggeration, the effects which the new policy had on internal affairs within the Party, which

> made every effort to attract the Negro masses.... The campaign for a Negro republic was tied up with a campaign in the Party ranks against white chauvinism. Party members who failed to carry out the Negro policy or disagreed with it were accused of white chauvinism. . . . The Negroes were looked upon as the chosen people who were to be the vanguard of the Communist revolution. . . . Behind the Negro agitation and the stress on exploiting the Negro issue was the desire to comply with the orders from Moscow.

Communist leaders in Moscow still hoped to develop a world-wide Negro nationalist movement, led by black Americans and controlled by the Communist Party. Such a movement, it was hoped, would bring "millions of new supporters in defense of the Soviet Union."[75] Throughout 1929 and 1930, the official organ of the CPUSA was filled with articles on the Negro question. However, in July of 1930, the journal had to admit that "great confusion" concerning the meaning of self-determination for the Negroes in the United States continued to exist within the Party.[76] Finally, the ECCI sent new instructions in a final attempt to clarify the whole question. The new resolution, adopted in October 1930, stated that the Negro question must be viewed as "the question of an *oppressed nation*, which is in a peculiar and extraordinarily distressing situation of national oppression not only in view of the prominent *racial distinctions* . . . but above all because of considerable *social antagonism* (remnants of slavery)." While continuing to advance the slogan of equal rights for the Negro, the communist must also demand the right of "self-determination for the Negroes in the Black Belt," but not necessarily the establishment of a separate republic. As long as the US remained under the control of the capitalists, the Communist Party "cannot come out against governmental separation of the Negro zone from the United States." If a communist regime were to come to power, the Party would have to oppose such a separation,

[73] "Resolutions of the Communist International on the Negro Question in the United States, October 26, 1928," *The Communist Position on the Negro Question*, pp. 58–63.
[74] The *Daily Worker*, 12 Nov. 1928, p. 6.
[75] Gitlow, *I Confess*, pp. 382–83.
[76] "Notes of the Month," *The Communist*, Vol. IX (1930), p. 581.

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though it would still grant freedom of choice to the Negroes on the question.[77]

Most American Negroes outside the Party rejected the programme of self-determination. The opposition included all types of Negro groups "from middle-class to workers, from radicals to conservatives."[78] The NAACP later called the whole proposal "a plan of plain segregation," in spite of all communist protestations to the contrary.[79] The American communists stuck to their programme of a separate Negro republic until 1934, when the demands of an anti-fascist line led the communist leaders in Moscow to drop what had been called the "correct" approach to the Negro question.[80] In 1941, before the nazi attack on the Soviet Union, the communists opposed the proposal of a Howard University professor who stated that now, if ever, was the time for Negro self-determination, for the "white man's distress is the Negro's opportunity."[81]

Although the Communist Party focused its propaganda on the development of a Negro republic in the early thirties, its self-determination policy did not play a major part in its activities among the Negroes. The Party continued to support the cause of political and social equality and to develop its image as the only group in the United States that truly favoured complete equality for blacks.[82]

THE development of communist policy in South Africa followed a pattern very similar to that in the United States. Instead of agitating for racial equality and equal citizenship for the Africans, the Comintern decided that the slogan of a "Native Republic" would be more effective in gaining the support of the Africans. The ECCI outlined the new plans a few months before the sixth congress convened in Moscow. After noting the favourable position in which the Party stood in South Africa because of its support for the Africans, the ECCI pointed

77 "Resolution on the Negro Question in the United States, Final Text Confirmed by the Political Secretariat of the Executive Committee of the Communist International," *The Communist International*, Vol. VII (1931), pp. 65–74.

78 Padmore, *Pan-Africanism*, pp. 306–7.

79 "Editorials," *The Crisis*, Vol. XLII (1935), p. 305.

80 Padmore relates an interesting incident which helped to discredit the communists among some Negroes. In the early thirties the Soviet film agency planned to make a film depicting lynchings and racial oppression in the South. A cast of American Negro actors had been engaged and transported to Moscow, but before work on the film began, news leaked out that the engineer, Colonel Hugh L. Cooper, and other white American Southerners, who were directing work on the construction of the Dnieperstroi hydroelectric project, had protested to Stalin, who cancelled the film. The story was revealed in the press by two Negro journalists who had been hired as script writers and resulted in the loss of numerous Negro intellectuals who withdrew from the Party in disgust at the cynicism of the Soviet communists. Padmore, *Pan-Africanism*, pp. 307–8.

81 Henry Winston, "Professor Logan is Ready for a Third World War," *The Communist*, Vol. XX (1941), p. 611 ff.

82 The Scottsboro Case of the early 1930s afforded the communists an opportunity to dramatize the oppression of the Negro and to develop contacts and support within the Negro community. For an excellent study of the case, see Dan T. Carter, *Scottsboro: A Tragedy of the American South* (Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana State University Press, 1969).

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out that the South African Communist Party should "develop its influence among the workers and peasants, and it is among this section of the South African population that the chief field of activity of the Communist Party must continue to lie in the near future." The Comintern Executive Committee then outlined the chief tasks of the South African communists. First, the Party was to "reorganize itself on the shop and street nuclei basis" and develop a real programme of action. Secondly, the communists were to orientate themselves "chiefly upon the native toiling masses while continuing to work actively with the white workers." The third task of the Party was the use of the slogan of "an independent native South African republic as a stage towards a workers' and peasants' republic, with full, equal rights for all races, black, coloured and white." According to the Comintern leadership, the "national question in South Africa, which is based upon the agrarian question" lay "at the foundation of the revolution in South Africa." The black peasantry represented the primary revolutionary force of the coming revolution, "in alliance with and under the leadership of the working class." The Executive Committee condemned the South African Communist Party for failing to understand the "revolutionary importance of the mass movements of the native workers and peasants" in the past. The failure to use the slogan calling for an independent South African republic was a partial explanation of the "still insufficient growth of the political influence of our Party upon the negro masses despite the extremely favourable conditions." [83]

The Party leaders from South Africa did not agree. Sydney Bunting rose at the sixth congress to speak of conditions in South Africa. He noted the recent appearance in *Inprecorr* of an article on South Africa "which could only be called a fairy tale. It was full of the most crass misstatements about the conditions there." [84] This was apparently a preparation for the opposition which he and his colleagues were going to voice against the "crazy Stalinist policy," as Padmore called it.[85] A few months later *Inprecorr* published Bunting's remarks on the idea of an independent native South African republic. He pointed out that most of the Party members opposed the proposed policy, primarily on practical grounds. It would arouse the intense opposition of the white workers and make impossible all attempts at reconciliation of the two groups of workers in South Africa.[86] This opposition, just as that in the United States, did not find favourable response among the Russians on the Negro Commission. The final theses on the revolutionary movement in the colonies ignored the recommendations of the leaders of the South African Communist Party and called upon the South African Communists to advance "vigorously and consistently . . . the slogan of the

[83] "The South African Question (Resolution of the E.C.C.I.)," *The Communist International*, Vol. VI (1928), pp. 53–54.
[84] *Inprecorr*, Vol. VIII, No. 44 (1928), p. 780.
[85] Padmore, *Pan-Africanism*, p. 352.
[86] *Inprecorr*, Vol. VIII, No. 78 (1928), pp. 1451–53.

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creation of an independent Native Republic, with guarantees for the rights of the white minority, and translate this fight into action." [87] In his concluding speech at the congress, Otto Kuusinen, the head of the Colonial Commission, warned "the majority of the leadership of the South African Party that they must unconditionally correct their attitude, their opposition in the question of the slogan of the Native Republic must be given up." [88] The Party leaders did not give up their opposition, however, and Moscow carried out a purge of the Party. Sydney Bunting, Bill Andrews, Solly Sachs, and other Party leaders were expelled in 1931, and two years later Edward Roux was expelled for, in his own words, he "refused to carry out slavishly the instruction of Moscow" on the new line.[89]

But the expulsion of the white Party leaders who opposed Stalin's new Negro policy did not save it from rejection by the Africans. Most commentators on communism in South Africa agree with Filesi's assessment that the "main error of the Communist International was to require the South African Communist Party to apply to principles of Communist teaching as presented by Stalin." The great majority of Africans did not want a separate state, but rather full citizenship rights. Padmore maintains that they viewed the new communist slogan of a "Native Republic" as "an attempt to segregate them into some sort of Bantu state, for they knew that Europeans—even those calling themselves Communists—would resent being under an all-African Government." [90]

Throughout the next few years, the newly installed Party leaders attempted to gain support for the policy. According to an article in *Inprecorr*, only after the communists "got down to the organization of the natives under the slogan of an 'Independent South African Native Republic'" were they able to agitate for uprisings among the Africans. The unrest which struck South Africa was now headed, to a large extent, by the African workers under the leadership of the Communist Party.[91] These claims were exaggerated, but the Party did increase its work with African labour unions and its attempts to gain African supporters. However, the appeal of a native republic did not find supporters and by the mid-thirties it was dropped. At that stage the requirements of the "Popular Front" in Europe made a change in policy necessary.

THE really important thing about the change in Comintern policy on the Negro question, both in the United States and in South Africa, was that it meant that the Negro question was no longer to be treated as just another sub-category of the class problem. The communists showed

[87] *Protokoll: Sechster Weltkongress*, Vol. IV, p. 197.
[88] *Inprecorr*, Vol. VIII, No. 81 (1928), p. 1528.
[89] Quoted in Munger, *Communist Activity in South Africa*, pp. 6–7. See, also, Roux, *Time Longer Than Rope*, p. 256.
[90] Padmore, *Pan-Africanism*, p. 352. See, also, Filesi, "Kommunismus und Nationalismus," p. 100.
[91] Olive Budden, "Revolutionary Developments in South Africa," *Inprecorr*, Vol. IX, No. 68 (1929), pp. 1446–47. See, also, Roux, *Time Longer Than Rope*, p. 257 ff.

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a limited amount of flexibility in changing their doctrine, but the change was imposed from Moscow and ignored local conditions and the recommendations of the two Parties involved. Although Comintern leadership did show some flexibility in changing policy, it merely replaced the class doctrine, as developed in Europe, with the doctrine on nationalities, worked out in the context of Tsarist Russia. It ignored completely the warnings of American and South African communists that the Negroes did not want, and would not support, a policy which aimed at the formation of independent black republics.

The International Trade Union Committee of Negro Workers

We turn now to an examination of the Comintern's major effort to influence the Negroes outside the United States and South Africa. In 1922, the fourth Comintern congress called for a conference to be held in Moscow which could initiate contacts with Negro organizations and begin the work of influencing their leaders to more revolutionary activity.[92] At the next congress, an American delegate suggested that the Comintern begin publication of pamphlets which could be smuggled into colonial Africa by Negro seamen.[93] Three years later, in 1927, the first meeting of the League Against Imperialism called for the organization of a movement for the liberation of the Negro race.[94] Until the end of the decade, however, nothing was done about these recommendations and communist activity in sub-Saharan Africa outside South Africa was almost non-existent. However, the Red International of Labor Unions organized an International Trade Union Committee of Negro Workers in Hamburg, Germany, in 1930. This organization, along with its official journal, *The Negro Worker*, which had fairly widespread influence in the early 1930s, has today been almost forgotten. Rolf Italiaander, who gives the most complete account of the activities of this negro front organization, writes that few people in the Soviet Union have ever heard of the journal and that very few copies still exist. Neither the Lenin Library nor the Soviet Africa Institute have copies of it and only the late Soviet Africanist, Dr Ivan I. Potekhin, had anything resembling a complete set of it.[95]

In 1928, an inchoate committee, which bore the name International Trade Union Committee of Negro Workers, was established in Moscow under the direction of James Ford, the American Negro communist.[96] The committee published a mimeographed journal called *The Negro*

92 *Inprecorr*, Vol. III, No. 2 (1922), p. 16.

93 Ibid. Vol. IV, No. 51 (1924), p. 527.

94 Cited in Italiaander, *Schwarze Haut*, p. 42.

95 Ibid. pp. 53–55. Copies are scattered throughout the United States in various libraries. However, there is apparently no complete set anywhere.

96 James W. Ford, *Communism and the Struggle for Negro Liberation* (New York, 1936), pp. 21–28. Cited in Bert H. Cooper, Jr, "Soviet Penetration of Black Africa: An Historical Analysis of Soviet Relations with Africa South of the Sahara," unpublished master's thesis, George Washington University, 1961, p. 27.

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Worker in Moscow.[97] However, it was not until 1930 that the Negro International was officially founded in Hamburg. At the second congress of the League Against Imperialism, in Frankfurt in 1929, plans were made for the convocation of an international conference of Negro workers which would bring together black leaders from all over the world, as well as representatives of the RILU. After many problems of finding a meeting place, the conference finally met on 7 July 1930 in Hamburg.

The two major topics on the agenda of the conference dealt with the economic struggles and tasks of the Negro workers and the dangers of war and of the use of Negro troops to attack the Soviet Union. A delegate from Nigeria rose to inform the assemblage that it was "the task of all Negro toilers to struggle on the side of the Soviet Union against the imperialists," if there were a war between the USSR and the imperialist states. This statement set the tone for much of the discussion at the conference. One of the major advantages which the communists thought would result from the meeting was the effect made on the African workers by their contact with "the far more advanced Negro proletariat of America." This would help to break down "the mentality of the small farmer" which the delegates from Africa retained and replace it with the "completely proletarian psychology and outlook" of the Americans.[98] It is clear from this statement and from the composition of the executive committee of the Negro International that the Comintern still saw the American Negro as the leader of a future African revolutionary movement and that the communists' attitude towards the Africans was still quite patronizing.

THE conference set up a permanent secretariat, headed by George Padmore, in Hamburg.[99] From there communist activity among the Negroes was organized and directed. The committee published two journals, *The Negro Worker* and *Cri des Nègres*, as well as special pamphlets and brochures. In a personal interview, Professor Potekhin, the Soviet expert on African affairs, told Rolf Italiaander about the work of the editorial staff of the Committee: "Although others edited the paper, we determined its direction from Moscow. After all, we in the

[97] The first page of the December 1928 issue of the French edition is reproduced in Gautherot, *Le Bolchévisme aux Colonies*, p. 277. This issue is Vol. I, No. 4, of *L'Ouvrier nègre*, The Bulletin of the International Trade Union Committee of Negro Workers of the RILU, edited by J. W. Ford.

[98] V. Chattopadhyaya, "The First International Conference of Negro Workers," *Inprecorr*, Vol. X, No. 34 (1930), p. 636.

[99] George Padmore, who was born in the West Indies, entered the Communist Party in the United States after graduating from Fisk University. He was the first Negro trained at the Party "Worker's School" in New York and, in the late twenties, at the age of 27 he was brought to Moscow to found and head the "African Bureau" of the Comintern. See Richard Howe, "Africa Owes a Lot to 'The Major,'" *The Washington Post*, 11 Oct. 1959, p. E3. See, also, James R. Hooker, *Black Revolutionary: George Padmore's Path from Communism to Pan-Africanism* (New York: Praeger, 1967).

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[Comintern] Central had greater experience." [1] Hamburg was a good location for an organization which wanted to maintain contacts throughout the world. First of all, Weimar, Germany, which had no colonial interests and in which the Communist Party was very strong, did not place the restrictions upon an anti-colonial organization which one of the colonial powers would have. Secondly, Hamburg was a major port where sailors from all over the world called and the German communists had already organized an "International Seamen's Club" in Hamburg, from which the propaganda activities of the RILU for seamen were directed.[2]

It was there that the Red International, with the aid of the German communists, organized its operations for work among the Negroes. The former German communist Richard Krebs states that all "the agitational and organizational strivings of the *Negerkomittee* were directed towards inciting the colonials to strikes and rebellion, particularly in the British possessions." [3] Each issue of *The Negro Worker* outlined the purposes of the Negro Workers' Committee. After emphasizing the class, rather than racial, nature of the organization, the journal presented the following aims:

1. To carry on propaganda and agitation among Negro workers, organizing them around immediate demands, while at the same time positing revolutionary goals.
2. "To help the millions of Negro workers who are now unemployed organize councils in order to demand relief from the government, free rent and no[n]-payment of taxes."
3. To organize Negro workers against the "approaching imperialist war and intervention" in the Soviet Union, in which Negroes would be used as cannon-fodder as in the first world war.
4. To develop a spirit of international solidarity between workers of all colours and nationalities, calling upon them to support the Soviet Union "which fights for the freedom of the working class and all oppressed peoples, as well as the Chinese, South African and other revolutionary liberation movements of the colonial toilers."
5. To fight against white chauvinism, social reform movements, and the "reformist programmes of the Negro capitalist misleaders," like Marcus Garvey, Dubois, and Walter White of the NAACP in America, Kadalie in South Africa, and the missionaries, preachers and other agents of imperialism.[4]

[1] Italiaander, *Schwarze Haut*, p. 74.

[2] Jan Valtin (pseud. for Richard Krebs), *Out of the Night* (London: Heinemann, 1941), p, 39.

[3] Ibid. p. 309, A. Z. Zusmanovich, a Soviet Party functionary who worked as a member of the RILU in the early thirties, told Italiaander that the Soviet Party had organized the whole operation in Hamburg through the German Party, just as they had used the Germans to set up the League Against Imperialism. The Germans found a publisher for the Negro Trade Union International and aided in the distribution of its journal and pamphlets. Italiaander, *Schwarze Haut*, pp. 57–59.

[4] *The Negro Worker*, Vol. I, Nos. 10–11 (1931), p. 45.

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The Negro Workers' International also outlined a programme of immediate demands which included (1) the abolition of forced labour, (2) equal pay regardless of race, colour or sex, (3) government relief of the unemployed, (4) the freedom to organize unions and other committees, (5) the elimination of lynching, terrorism, and deportations, (6) full independence of the Negro toilers in Africa and the West Indies, and their right of self-determination in the Black Belt of the USA, (7) the elimination of racial barriers in trade unions, and (8) the elimination of the use of Negro workers to fight in imperialist wars.[5] These demands, as well as articles urging their implementation in various African countries, were published in *The Negro Worker* throughout the early thirties.

The first issue of the new organ of the Negro International appeared in the autumn of 1930, under the editorship of George Padmore. For the next two-and-a-half years, until Hitler's rise to power, the journal appeared regularly in Hamburg in editions of up to 100,000 copies. The problems of distribution were partially solved by selling bundles of copies to black seamen to smuggle out of Hamburg. By selling them, rather than giving them, to the sailors, the committee was assured that the sailors would make every effort to resell them at home in order to get back their investment, plus a small profit.[6] The periodical attained popularity very quickly, for it was the only international journal which dealt solely with Negro affairs and which supported the elimination of European rule in Africa. Besides the journal, which sold for five cents a copy, the Committee supplied free pamphlets on imperialism, capitalism, the international labour movement, the Negro movement and similar topics.[7] The journal and these pamphlets offered an excellent means for spreading communist propaganda in areas into which no Party member had been able to venture—although illiteracy obviously hindered its effectiveness. However, *The Negro Worker* soon attracted the attention of colonial officials who immediately banned it.[8]

Besides its widespread propaganda activity, the Negro International was also involved in other revolutionary affairs. In 1931, for example, the International of Seamen and Harbour Workers, a sister organization of the Negro International, met in Hamburg and decided to help the West African and West Indian seamen and dockworkers organize strong unions by developing seamen's clubs in "Dakar, French West Africa, Freetown, Sierra Leone, and Jamaica and Trinidad, in the West Indies."[9]

IN 1933, with Hitler's rise to power in Germany, the success of the Negro International ended. Padmore was arrested and the Committee was forced to flee from Hamburg to Copenhagen. Here, too,

[5] Ibid. pp. 45–46.
[6] Italiaander, *Schwarze Haut*, pp. 60–62.
[7] *The Negro Worker*, Vol. I. Nos. 10–11 (1930), p. 44.
[8] *The Negro Worker* was outlawed in Nigeria and in Trinidad by 1932. Ibid. p. 40 and ibid. Vol. II, No. 6 (1932), p. 14.
[9] *The Negro Worker*, Vol. I, Nos. 11–12 (1931), pp. 27–28.

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the police began a crackdown and the committee had to flee once again. In the next few years *The Negro Worker* was published in Brussels, New York and, finally, in Paris until its demise about 1939.[10] The most important editor during this period was James Ford, who took over after Padmore left the Communist Party.

Although *The Negro Worker* continued to appear and the International Committee functioned after Padmore's arrest by the Nazis and subsequent dismissal from the Committee, the tenor of the activity changed. After Hitler's rise to power in Germany and the faint beginnings of a Soviet *rapprochement* with anti-fascist elements in Western Europe, articles on colonial matters virtually disappeared from the Comintern press.[11] By the time of the seventh Comintern congress, in 1935, the International Negro Committee, as well as other organizations like the Anti-Imperialist League, were either disbanded or transformed into organs of anti-fascism.

In 1935, in an open letter to the head of the American Communist Party, Padmore accused the Comintern of liquidating the International Trade Union Committee of Negro Workers in August 1933, while he was still the secretary.[12] The committee was dissolved without a word of explanation, he claimed, "simply in order not to offend the British Foreign Office which has been bringing pressure to bear on Soviet diplomacy because of the tremendous indignation which our work has aroused among the Negro masses in Africa . . . against British imperialism." It was for this reason, according to Padmore, that he had resigned from the committee and the Comintern. Richard Wright states that Padmore finally realized that the Kremlin was merely using black men as political pawns to be "manoeuvred in Russian interests alone." This realization led to his break with Moscow, even though there was much in the Soviet system which he still admired.[13] Padmore's statement that the Negro International was liquidated in 1933 is obviously incorrect, for it continued to exist for at least five more years. However, his basic contention was correct. The Comintern was ready to sacrifice the revolutionary aspects of the organization in the interests of Soviet foreign policy. The new "popular front" demanded less revolutionary agitation and, therefore, the Negro International lost its importance and gradually faded into oblivion.

[10] In an attempt to elude the police in Copenhagen the committee published some issues with the cover of a missionary magazine. For example, the June 1934 issue appeared in Copenhagen as *The Missionary Voice*, Mouthpiece of the AME Missionary Society, London, England. Italiaander reproduces this title page in *Schwarze Haut*, p. 62. See Cooper, "Soviet Penetration of Black Africa," p. 27; and Italiaander, who refers to an article written by Paul Robeson which appeared in a 1938 issue of the journal. *Schwarze Haut*, pp. 72–73.

[11] The Comintern publication *International Press Correspondence* lists only two articles on colonial questions in its 1933 index. For 1934 the index includes only nine articles under the topic "Against Colonial Suppression."

[12] George Padmore, "An Open Letter to Earl Browder," *The Crisis*, Vol. XLII (1935), p. 302.

[13] Richard Wright, "Foreward," in Padmore, *Pan-Africanism*, pp. 13–14.

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WHAT lasting effects, if any, did the Negro Committee have? First of all, many of the later African leaders were influenced by the propaganda of the Committee. Italiaander points to the similarity between the arguments and statements used in *The Negro Worker* in the early thirties and those of the more radical leaders of contemporary Africa.[14] In his section on the Negro International, Italiaander concludes with the following statement:

> The paper, *The Negro Worker*, attempted, as does every paper, to be very versatile in appealing to a large audience. Moreover, *The Negro Worker* proved that the problems of the Negro are the same almost everywhere in the world; and this was supposed to strengthen the Negroes' feeling of solidarity. However, *The Negro Worker* was thought of primarily as the organ of struggle against capitalism, colonialism and imperialism.[15]

In spite of its moderate successes and the rather favourable outlook for its future, the International Negro Committee had to be sacrificed to the requirements of the new Comintern line. Revolutionary agitation among the Negroes was stopped, although the Comintern did attempt to retain its contacts with the Negro leaders, primarily through the communist parties of the colonial powers. After the second world war, when the danger of fascism had passed and the "imperialists" were no longer essential allies, revolutionary agitation in the colonies would resume, but for the present, revolution must wait.[16]

"The Popular Front," Anti-Fascism, and the Negro Question, 1935–39

The rise of an expansionist Nazi Germany, as we have seen, led to yet another reorientation of Soviet foreign policy in the mid-thirties. In an attempt to establish an effective alliance against Germany the Soviets turned to Western Europe—to the colonial powers themselves—for support. The requirements of this Soviet *rapprochement* with the West made certain new demands on the Comintern. When the seventh world congress met in Moscow in the summer of 1935, its main goal was the transformation of the programme of world communism from revolution to cooperation with Western capitalism against the menace of nazi

[14] For example, *The Voice of Africa*, edited by President Nkrumah of Ghana until 1965, featured a drawing of an athletic Negro breaking the chains of slavery. This is almost a copy of a similar drawing published in *The Negro Worker*. See Italiaander, *Schwarze Haut*, opposite p. 337.

[15] Ibid. p. 73.

[16] Kurt Müller outlines three reasons for the failure of the Negro International to win more influence in Africa. First of all, the communist emphasis on class struggle did not apply to conditions in Africa, and, even in the 1960s, the more radical African leaders, like Sékou Touré, did not accept the idea of class conflict. Secondly, opposition to Pan-Africanism alienated some Africans. Finally, reliance on American Negroes, who did not understand African conditions, did not help the communist cause. Kurt Müller, *Über Kalkuta nach Paris? Strategie und Aktivität des Ostblocks in den Entwickluntländern* (Hanover: Verlag für Literatur und Zeitgeschehen, 1964), pp. 16–17.

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Germany. The congress resolved to work for the unity of the trade union movement in the industrial countries and to unite all workers against the danger of fascism.[17] This meant a renunciation of the leftist policy of opposition to the socialists that had characterized the past seven years. According to the resolutions of the congress, the Comintern was still to support wars of national liberation; however, the question of national liberation played a secondary role in the proceedings.[18]

During 1935, the impending Italian invasion of Ethiopia gave the communists an excellent propaganda theme in which they could unite an anti-colonial and an anti-fascist appeal. On the other hand, Soviet Russia was tied to Italy by a non-aggression pact of 1933 and the Soviet leaders did not wish to drive Italy into an alliance with Hitler. In addition, Soviet trade with Italy had reached a level of some importance.[19]

The new "popular front" strategy also had a far-reaching impact on the treatment of the Negro question by the Comintern and by those sections of the international communist movement which had direct contact with Negroes. The change from a general programme of "world proletarian revolution" to one of a "united front against fascism" altered the relations of the communists with various Negro organizations in both the United States and in South Africa. Already in 1934, the American communists outlined the possibility of some type of cooperation with the NAACP and other Negro organizations, but the communists continued to criticize the Negro leaders. After the seventh congress, which met in July 1935, the American communists began a campaign for the support of all segments of the Negro community.[20] All attacks against the Negro middle class were dropped and the radical League for the Struggle of Negro Rights, a bitter opponent of the NAACP, which had replaced the American Negro Labor Congress in 1930, was disbanded. Earl Browder reflected the new attitude toward the NAACP and the National Urban League, as well as other reformist Negro organizations:

> We know that the past struggles between us (NAACP, NUL and the Communist Party) have also had one bad effect upon our own

[17] Communist International, *VII Congress of the Communist International, Abridged Stenographic Report* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1939), pp. 579–82.

[18] Ibid. pp. 583, 593.

[19] Although the Soviets favoured sanctions against Italy, they were not willing to go any further than the other major powers in applying them. On 14 Sept. 1935, for example, the Soviet Comintern representative Manuilsky remarked that only the USSR would lose if it applied sanctions against Italy, while the other powers abstained. Dmitrii Manuilsky, *The Work of the Seventh Congress of the Communist International* (Moscow-Leningrad: Cooperative Publishing Society of Foreign Workers, 1935), pp. 30–31.

[20] James W. Ford, "The United Front in the Field of Negro Work," *The Communist*, Vol. XIV (1935), p. 158 ff. At the same time, the communists were seeking the support of all "moderate" and "progressive" forces, including the clergy. See Record, *The Negro and the Communist Party*, pp. 134–36.

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> forces, of making them too suspicious, too inclined to see enemies everywhere, sometimes even where they do not exist, and where they are potential friends. We ourselves must break loose from these self-appointed limitations, we must have greater confidence in this broad circle, not hitherto associated with us, who are taking up the struggle for Negro rights.[21]

During the summer of 1935, the communists attempted to use the Ethiopian crisis as a means to gain black supporters in the United States. They assumed that this issue would appeal to all strata of the American Negro population and they called for the mobilization of all black groups, along with trade unions and liberal organizations, in order to pressure the American government to impose economic sanctions on Italy.[22] However, the communist claims that the Soviet Union was the one true friend of Ethiopia did not go unanswered, and Herman Mackawain, the acting secretary of the still-functioning League for the Struggle of Negro Rights, charged the Soviets with equipping the Italian army that was now threatening Ethiopia.[23] The *New York Times* also published information which severely damaged the prestige of the Soviet Union among the Negroes in an article that revealed that, while Litvinov had been opposing Italian aggression before the League of Nations in Geneva, the Soviet government had been selling large supplies of oil, coal tar and wheat to Italy. Some of it had gone directly to the Italian troops in Africa.[24] These disclosures resulted in a serious propaganda embarrassment to the communists and a loss in Negro membership in the Party. In addition, the Negro press condemned the Soviet Union for its duplicity.[25]

In spite of the setback suffered by the communists after the exposure of Soviet dealings with Italy, the Party continued its work among the American Negroes. In the spring of 1935, a number of representatives of Negro organizations had met at Howard University to discuss the possibility of establishing an agency which would unify all the various black organizations in the country. At the meeting, a sponsoring committee, to prepare the first conference of a united Negro Congress, was

[21] Earl Browder, "New Steps in the United Front," *The Communist*, Vol. XIV (1935), p. 1005. Even the remaining Garveyites and other Negro nationalist groups were approached in a "friendly manner." Ford, *The Negro and the Democratic Front*, pp. 33–34.

[22] *The Daily Worker*, 9 July 1935, p. 6. Throughout the summer *The Daily Worker* carried on its campaign and constantly maintained that the Soviet Union was the only great power which had taken a firm stand against Italy and had refused to supply the Italians with vital materials.

[23] Ibid. 26 Aug. 1935, p. 2.

[24] *New York Times*, 8 Sept. 1935, p. 1. Later issues of the *Times* continued to bring information concerning subsequent Soviet shipments to Italy. 10 Sept. 1935, p. 20; 17 Jan. 1936, p. 4; 24 April 1936, p. 13.

[25] Padmore, *Pan-Africanism*, p. 307n. *The Crisis* carried an editorial in Oct. 1935, in which the "high idealism preached by the Kremlin" was compared with the "hard-boiled opportunism" which the Soviet government practices. *The Crisis*, Vol. XLII (1935), p. 305. For a brief discussion of membership losses, see Record, *The Negro and the Communist Party*, pp. 138–41.

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established. This committee, which included the communist James Ford, had the support of numerous Negro leaders including A. Philip Randolf, President of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, and Ralph Bunche, then chairman of the Division of Social Sciences at Howard University. The committee directed its appeal "to all Negroes, native and foreign born. To all Negro organizations, churches, labour unions, farm and share croppers' organizations. To all fraternal, civil, professional and political groups. To all organizations and persons of whatever race, who are willing to fight for economic and social justice for Negroes."[26] This wide appeal brought many non-communists into the new organization and 817 delegates, representing 585 organizations, attended the initial conference in Chicago in 1936.[27] In spite of the hard work of the communists, the NNC showed very little success after one year of activity and Negro leaders in the South charged the organization with ignoring the interests of Southern Negroes.[28] At the second meeting of the Congress in Philadelphia in 1937, the list of important persons who attended was even longer than the year before, and President Roosevelt sent his greetings to the delegates.[29] The presence of such notables as the president of the Tuskegee Institute, the executive secretary of the NAACP and the secretary of the Harlem Labor Committee gave the appearance of a developing sense of unity among Negro groups. The Congress continued its activity throughout 1937 and 1938 and was quite successful in undertaking large-scale political organization among the Negroes, which the small Negro groups had not been able to do.[30] However, the communists doomed the Congress when, on the directive of Moscow, they opposed Roosevelt and his foreign policy after the Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 1939 and the beginning of World War II.

During the period of the popular front the communists had made substantial gains in black membership, even though they were far from controlling the Negro movement. By 1939, the Party claimed 5,005 Negro members, more than double the figure for 1935, when the united front was initiated.[31] But the new turn in Soviet policy, represented by the non-aggression pact with Hitler, dictated a change in communist strategy and the popular front was abandoned. The CPUSA dropped

[26] Cited in Padmore, *Pan-Africanism*, p. 309. See the pamphlet by John P. Davis, *Let Us Build a National Negro Congress* (Washington: Sponsoring Committee for a National Negro Congress, 1935).

[27] *The Official Proceedings of the National Negro Congress, Feb. 14, 15, 16, 1936* (Washington, 1936), p. 41. Cited in Record, *The Negro and the Communist Party*, p. 155. A Party journal had indicated communist intentions a year earlier, when it wrote about the "possibility of setting up a National Negro Congress on a broad united front basis." This congress could be used to penetrate the various Negro organizations. *The Party Organizer*, Vol. VIII (March 1935), p. 21.

[28] See Horace P. Cayton and George S. Mitchell, *Black Workers and the New Unions* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: The University of North Carolina Press, 1939), p. 419.

[29] Ibid. pp. 422–23.

[30] See Record, *The Negro and the Communist Party*, p. 160 ff.

[31] *The Party Builder*, July 1939, p. 12 and Jack Stachel, "Organizational problems of the Party," *The Communist*, Vol. XV (1936), p. 647.

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all its efforts to cooperate with "liberal" groups, including the moderate Negroes, whom it now called "betrayers of the Negro people" and "traitors to the race," because of their support for Roosevelt's policy of aid to France and Great Britain against Germany.[32]

THE situation in South Africa was similar to that in the United States. In the 11 January 1936 issue of *Umsebanzi*, the organ of the South African Communist Party, the shift to a united front policy was explained to the Party members. For the past few years, the Party had eschewed all cooperation with other organizations, but now the communists were called to participate in mass organizations, which the Party was to "reorganize, support and endeavour to lead." The Party could not take all workers into its ranks, because it "consists only of the most fearless, energetic and advanced fighters of the toiling masses." But it could and should influence the workers who remain outside the Party through participation in such organizations as the National Liberty League Against Fascism and War.[33]

Throughout the next few years information on communist activities in Africa is extremely sparse. The Party journals carried very little information about the colonies and colonial revolution after 1933 and those articles which did appear placed more emphasis on fighting fascism than on liberating the colonies. The few articles in *Inprecorr* which dealt with South Africa made little reference to African rights, but did speak of the necessity of concentrating "all democratic efforts . . . on the task of bringing together progressive opinion in an effort to stem the further development of the pro-Nazi tendencies which have already shown themselves in the majority party, the United Party, and the openly fascist party."[34]

Except for some minor contacts, such as the development of communist committees during the period in the French Soudan and the work of the communists among the African students in Paris and London, communist activity in Africa almost ceased during the period of the popular front.[35] In fact, in 1937, the French communists abandoned the Algerian nationalists with whom they had had close contacts, when the Algerians came under attack from the French colonialists. At this time, the communists were the main allies of the French socialists in the Popular Front Government. The requirements of the new line and

[32] Record, *The Negro and the Communist Party*, p. 186.

[33] Cited in Martin Ebon, *World Communism Today* (New York-Toronto: Whittlesey House, 1948), pp. 427–28.

[34] "South Africa Prepares for Elections," *Inprecorr*, Vol. XVIII, No. 25 (1938), p. 617. The only other article on South Africa which appeared in *Inprecorr*—now renamed *World News and Views*—in 1938, dealt with fascism in South Africa. Ben Bradley, "Africa and the Fascist Menace," Vol. XVIII, No. 55 (1938), pp. 1263–64.

[35] William J. Holtz, *From French West Africa to the Mali Federation* (New Haven-London: Yale University Press, 1965), p. 21n. and Donald K. Emmerson, "African Student Organizations," *Africa Report*, Vol. X, No. 5 (1965), p. 6.

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of Soviet policy won out over the needs of colonial revolution.[36] The popular front lasted four years and then, once again, changes in Soviet foreign policy demanded a new line.

The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the Negro Question, 1939–41

In August 1939, Molotov and Ribbentrop reached an agreement on a non-aggression pact and on the division of Europe into areas of Soviet and German control. The new friendship between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany demanded the discontinuation of the anti-fascist propaganda that had characterized the past four or five years, and once again Comintern policy made a complete about-face. From cooperation with moderate groups in a struggle against fascism, the communists turned to an anti-war policy. In both the United States and in South Africa, the communists began campaigns against support of the Allies in the war, which was now called an imperialist war on both sides.[37] The new directives which reached the American party leaders required them to drop their support for a policy of collective security, which they had supported since 1935, and overnight Roosevelt became a war-monger and a spokesman for Wall Street. The new slogan was "Keep America out of the Imperialist War," and Paul Robeson and Richard Wright began to promote the idea in the United States that "Negroes have no stake in this war."[38]

The campaign to undermine Negro support for any war effort included the exposure of discrimination and segregation within the armed forces and of discrimination against Negroes in defence industries.[39] One of the principal anti-war propagandists among the Negroes was Dr Max Yergan, a former YMCA missionary in South Africa, who replaced A. Philip Randolph as the President of the National Negro Congress in 1940. At the third meeting of the Congress the communists controlled the key positions, although they had not yet been able to

[36] On the Algerian nationalist movement, see Padmore, *Pan-Africanism*, pp. 332–34.

[37] It is interesting to note the abrupt change in the positions taken by the same individual. For example, Bell Keats published an article in *World News and Views*, 23 Sept., 1939, in which she attacked Dr Daniel Malan for his support of Hitler, which she called a "base betrayal of the true ideals of the Afrikaaners, whose whole tradition is one of democracy and the struggle for national independence." Apparently Keats had not yet received the new line on the war, for she spoke only of the danger of fascism and supported the war against Germany. However, two months later, she argued that the war was one between two rival imperialisms and that neither side could be supported by the communists. Ibid. Vol. XIX, No. 45 (1939), p. 992 and No. 56, p. 1122.

[38] "Declaration of the National Committee, September 19, 1939," *The Communist*, Vol. XVIII (1939), p. 899 and *The Daily Worker*, 26 Oct., 1939, p. 6; *The Sunday Worker*, 11 Feb., 1940, Sect. II, p. 7.

[39] See the numerous Communist pamphlets published in New York in 1940; John H. Williams, *A Negro Looks at the War*, p. 31; Claudia Jones, *Jim Crow in Uniform*, p. 22; Henry Winston, *Old Jim Crow Has Got To Go*, p. 15. Cited in William A. Nolan, *Communism versus the Negro* (Chicago: Regnery, 1951), p. 145. In South Africa the Communists also carried out a campaign against the recruitment of non-Europeans into the military. See Roux, *Time Longer Than Rope*, p. 308.

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impose their views on the membership of the Congress. They packed the meeting in Washington with their own supporters, including a great number of white delegates.[40] Their main purpose was to secure Negro opposition to the defence and foreign aid policies of the American government and the NNC was to help in the building of "anti-war organizations of the Negro people."[41] In other words, the Congress was to act as a tool for the realization of the new Communist Party line. At the meeting Randolph stood up to oppose any Negro entanglement with the policies of a foreign power, but was shouted down by the communists and their supporters. He then resigned from his position as president because, as he later explained: "The American Negroes will not long follow any organization which accepts dictation and control from any white organization. . . . I consider the communists a definite menace and a danger to the Negro people and labour, because of their rule-or-ruin and disruptive tactics in the interest of the totalitarian Soviet Union."[42] After Randolph's resignation, the communists were able to push through their own resolutions which declared that the "Negro people have everything to lose and nothing to gain by American involvement in the imperialist war and . . . that the battle for democracy lies at home in the war against hunger and misery. . . ."[43]

Randolph's resignation and the election of Max Yergan as president of the NNC was viewed by the communists with great satisfaction. Yergan was described as a "man of sterling qualities" whose championship of Negro rights was indefatigable.[44] But the efforts of the NNC and Yergan could not shake the support of most black Americans for Roosevelt's policy of aid to Great Britain. Membership in the Congress dropped radically, for many Negro organizations which had supported it were now not willing to affiliate with an openly communist front.

After his resignation from the presidency of the NNC, Randolph and a group of Negro leaders, which included Walter White of the NAACP and Adam Clayton Powell, planned a protest march on Washington to demand the end of discrimination against Negroes in defence industries. After the Negroes had refused the President's request to call off the march, set for late June 1941, Roosevelt issued an executive order banning all discrimination on the basis of race, religion or colour in any industry holding a government contract for war work or for training workers for war jobs.[45] The communists con-

40 A. Philip Randolph, "Why I would Not Stand for Re-election as President of the National Negro Congress," *American Federationist*, Vol. XLVIII No. 1 (1940), p. 25.

41 Pat Toohey, "Greater Attention to the Problems of the Negro Masses," *The Communist*, Vol. XIX (1940), p. 280.

42 Randolph, "Why I Would Not Stand for Re-election," p. 24.

43 Resolution of the Third Negro Congress, Washington, D.C., April, 1941. Cited in *Jim Crow in National Defense* (Los Angeles: Los Angeles Council, National Negro Congress, 1940), pp. 4–5.

44 Theodore R. Basset, "The Third National Negro Congress," *The Communist*, Vol. XIX (1940), p. 549.

45 Adam Clayton Powell, *Marching Blacks* (New York: Dial Press, 1945), pp. 149–50.

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demned Randolph's March on Washington Movement because its supporters no longer backed the NNC and because the movement did not oppose Roosevelt's foreign policy. The movement and its leaders were called "agents of Wall-Street imperialism." [46]

MATERIAL on communist activity in Africa during the two-year German-Soviet honeymoon is extremely scarce. In a number of articles in which he defined the basic character of the period, the Comintern head, Georgi Dimitrov, condemned the war on both sides, although he authorized the continuation of a people's front "from above" in those colonial countries in which the colonial bourgeoisie maintained the proper attitude toward the imperialist mother country. But in those colonies, such as India, where the communists accused the All-Indian National Congress of not sufficiently opposing Indian involvement in the war, communists were told to turn to a united front "from below." [47] It was during the period of the Soviet-German pact that the hypocrisy of Soviet calls for liberation of colonial peoples became evident, when in November 1940, Molotov, who represented the USSR, met with von Ribbentrop. In the course of their discussions, von Ribbentrop agreed to recognize Soviet "territorial aspirations . . . in the direction of the Indian Ocean. . . ." In return, the "anti-colonial" Soviet leaders were prepared to accede to Hitler's seizure of central Africa and to Mussolini's rule over north and north eastern African territories.[48]

THE Nazi attack of 22 June 1941 made the policy line of the past two years obsolete overnight. The communists throughout the world changed from obstructors of the war effort to "nationalistic" defenders of their homelands and of the Soviet Union against the surge of Nazism. In line with the changes, the Party doctrine on the Negro question also changed. One slogan which the communists had always used in their appeals to blacks, both in Africa and in the United States, was that the white imperialists had used Negro workers for cannon fodder in the first world war and that they would do so in any future war.[49] Throughout the brief period of German-Soviet friendship, the communists had called upon the Negroes to oppose the war and not to fight for the imperialists. The German attack, however, turned the imperialist war into a struggle for Soviet national survival and every effort had to be expended to help the Soviet Union in its struggle against the fascist

[46] See *The Sunday Worker*, 11 May, 1941, Sect. I, p. 5.

[47] See, for example, Georgi Dimitrov's article on "The Tasks of the Working Class in the Present War," *World News and Views*, Vol. XIX, No. 53 (1939), p. 1081.

[48] US, Department of State, *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939–1941*, edited by Raymond J. Sontag and James S. Biddie (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1948), p. 257.

[49] See, for example, the article by George Padmore, then still a member of the Comintern. "The War is Here," *The Negro Worker*, Vol. II, Nos. 1–2 (1932), pp. 5–6.

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invaders.[50] Far from dissuading Negro participation in the war, they now praised the actions of those troops which were fighting. In South Africa, for example, propaganda against non-European military recruitment was replaced with the slogan, "Arm the non-European soldiers."[51]

During the summer and fall of 1941, the American communists called for the unity of all groups within the country, in order to aid the winning of the war against the Axis. It now supported lend-lease shipments to Great Britain, stopped opposing the draft, supported the existing mode of production as it was, and told the workers to subordinate everything else to the defence of the United States from the fascist threat of enslavement. Workers in defence industries in particular were told to avoid strikes and settle any disputes by arbitration.[52] James Ford called upon Negroes to support the military effort, for "the struggle for the rights of the Negro people is an inseparable part of the struggle against fascism and reaction, for democracy and equality."[53] This war, which a few weeks earlier was "not the Negro's war," had suddenly become a matter of very great concern for the Negro.

Throughout the war the NAACP and other moderate Negro groups were once more in the good graces of the communists, although Randolph's March on Washington Movement was condemned, not for betraying the Negro people by collaborating in the war effort, as it had been in 1941, but for being too belligerent in its demands for equal rights for Negroes. Ford accused the movement of "creating confusion and dangerous moods in the ranks of the Negro people and utilizing their justified grievances as a weapon of opposition to the administration's war program. . . ."[54] The communists revived the National Negro Congress, which had collapsed in 1940, in an effort to gain Negro support by associating with anti-discrimination movements—but not to the jeopardy of national unity. Throughout the war, the communists denounced any

[50] One of the most absurd indications of the abrupt change in policy is the juxtaposition of the first two articles in the July 1941 issue of *The Communist*. The second article, obviously written before 22 June, followed the pacifist line of the past two years and insisted that the United States "get out and stay out of the war." William Z. Foster, "Yankee Imperialism Grabs for the Western Hemisphere," *The Communist*, Vol. XX (1941), p. 597. The first article, however, was the declaration of the CPUSA, made on the day of Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union, demanding immediate American military support for the British and the Soviets. "Support the USSR in Its Fight Against Nazi War! (Statement Made by CPUSA) June 22, 1941," Ibid. pp. 579–80.

[51] In 1942, *World News and Views* reprinted a speech of Lord Cranborne in the British House of Lords, in which he explained British policy in the colonies. Far from criticizing the general colonial policy or the use of African troops, the communist journal lauded the actions of the African troops which were engaged in the war. Vol. XXII, No. 50 (1942), p. 477. See, also, Roux, *Time Longer Than Rope*, p. 309.

[52] "The Battle of Production," *The Communist*, Vol. XX (1941), pp. 863, 866; William Z. Foster, "The Soviet Union and the Cause of the War," ibid. p. 971.

[53] James W. Ford, *The Negro People and the New World Situation* (New York: Workers' Library Publishers, 1941) p. 11.

[54] James W. Ford, "The Negro People Unite for Victory," *The Communist*, Vol. XXII (1943), p. 643.

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group or campaign which might possibly have hindered the war effort by dividing American society. For example, they urged Negroes to forget the "so-called race riots" in Detroit in June 1943, and to get back to work immediately. The riots, according to the communists, were not race riots, but were obviously inspired by the fascists. The NAACP came in for criticism, since it had appealed to President Roosevelt to intervene in Detroit.[55]

I HAVE traced the vagaries of Comintern policy on the Negro question in an attempt to show the relationship of Soviet policy on both the colonial question and the Negro question to the overall interests of Soviet foreign policy. As we have seen, Soviet interests in Europe were largely responsible for many of the shifts in policy toward blacks in both Africa and the United States. In addition we have seen that little distinction was made between a policy toward blacks in Africa and in the United States. In fact, policy toward the two groups ran almost exactly parallel for most of the 20 years preceding the outbreak of the Second World War. Little concern was given to local conditions—in particular in the case of the policy of "black republics" in the late twenties. In many respects, failures of the communists to achieve significant successes among blacks in the United States and Africa were a result of directives from Moscow. In both the United States and Africa, the communists' greatest successes came when they fought for equal rights and economic advances for blacks; when the dictates of Soviet foreign policy interests changed the focus, their successes waned.

[55] *The People's Voice*, 3 July, 1943, p. 1a. See, also, Max Weiss, "Fifth Column Diversion in Detroit," *The Communist*, Vol. XXII (1943), pp. 699-701 and James W. Ford, "The Negro People Unite for Victory," p. 646.

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The Cold War Revisionists and What They Omit

Philip J. Jaffe

HUNDREDS of books and thousands of articles have been written about the Cold War. Two main questions have occupied analysts and critics for more than a quarter of a century. Which of the two countries, the Soviet Union or the United States, was primarily responsible for the inception of the Cold War and which is responsible for its continuance? Those who support the prevailing American view of the Cold War accept the conclusion that it developed as a response to Stalin's aggressive expansionist territorial designs and never-ceasing pursuit of his "sacred duty" to weaken, and, if possible, destroy Western capitalism. But, riding the crest of the wave of New Left radicalism, a school of Cold War revisionists has arisen which, taking a backward look at the forties, accuses the United States of having discarded the Roosevelt war-time policy of collaboration with the Soviet Union for the anti-communism of the pre-war period.

The leading figures in this revisionist school are William Appleman Williams, D. F. Fleming, Gabriel Kolko and Gar Alperovitz. They, and several lesser figures like David Horowitz and Ronald Steel, do not follow identical analyses nor do they use the same facts the same way, but all, without exception, conclude that the United States is alone responsible not only for beginning the Cold War but also for continuing it. Some revisionists even argue that although the Cold War is ostensibly a product of events that occurred during and following the second world war, it is in fact the logical continuation of America's global foreign policy dating back to 1898. They all, directly or by implication, even confuse American foreign investments with old-style British, French and Dutch colonialism and imperialism.

There also remains the question of when the Cold War began? Was it in 1919 when, with the organization of the Communist International, capitalism became the number one enemy as Lenin stated, when he wrote: "As long as capitalism and socialism exist, we cannot live in peace, in the end one or the other will triumph"? Was it in 1928 when the sixth congress of the Communist International pronounced the "end of capitalist stabilization" and issued a call for the "bolshevization" of all communist parties of the world? Was it in 1939–41, during the Hitler-Stalin Pact, when both the Western powers and the Soviet Union had reason to suspect each other's plans and manoeuvres? Was it the year 1947, the year of the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan and the formation of the Cominform? Was it with the communist coup in Czechoslovakia in February 1948? Or was it, as Earl

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Browder put it in 1959: "I would judge that in Stalin's inscrutable mind, it began the day it became clear that Hitler's armies would be defeated"?

The Cold War revisionist "historians" go to great lengths to delve deeply into the nature of the American socio-economic structure, and yet barely if ever dig as deeply into the fifty-year history of the Soviet Union. They analyse and criticize every facet of American capitalism, from its foreign policy, its military adventures, and "Pentagon control," to its approach to the "third world." But almost nothing is written about Soviet foreign policy, military adventures, etc. etc. Regardless of whether one does or does not agree with the conclusions of the revisionists, they are omitting material that does not suit their purposes.

Not one of these revisionists discusses the texts and meanings of the seven congresses of the Communist International, or the first twenty congresses of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, or the large number of Plenums, or the large number of histories of the Soviet Union which are continuously revised in accordance with the latest purges, or the vast outpourings of communist political literature emanating from Moscow. Nor do they analyse or indicate an awareness of Stalin's infallibility and dogmatism as described in Khrushchev's February 1956 speech and in Djilas' book, *Conversations with Stalin.* Had they examined this easily accessible material, they would have found much to disturb their one-sided conclusions. They would at least have learned that military and economic aggression are not unilateral, that there is a "Pentagon" in the Soviet Union, that Cold War strategy is not an American monopoly, and that for some 30 years the Stalin that Khrushchev and Djilas describe was the sole source of Soviet foreign policy. Williams might even have modified his criticism of the "literature which treated Stalin as no more than a psychotic."

In the sixties, when the revisionists did most of their writing, Stalin's paranoid past was an open book. Did they ever look into that book? What were Stalin's views of the Western world and on coexistence at the end of the war? And particularly, what were his post-war views on America? What did the Varga dispute in Moscow in 1947–48 tell us about Stalin's conclusions regarding the nature of capitalism? Why did he kill one of his most important economic analysts, Voznesensky? What are the facts omitted by the revisionists concerning the Hitler-Stalin Pact? What are the hidden facts behind the Duclos article of 1945 that caused a revolution in the American Communist Party and the entire communist world? Why was the Cominform established and what is the real story of its first organizational meeting in September 1947? What lay behind Stalin's calling Anna Louise Strong a "notorious American spy" in 1949 and what relation did it have to Stalin's Cold War against China? And what is the real story of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan?

These are some of the questions that the revisionists handle falsely or

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not at all. In fact, the school of Cold War revisionists might well be renamed the school of omissionists, or, to paraphrase a remark made by George Lukacs in an interview in 1968, a school that invents facts and theories to fit a desired conclusion.

The only one of the leading revisionists who gives some space to an analysis of Soviet society is William Appleman Williams. The lengthy Cold War section in his 309-page book, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, is perhaps the most important part of the book, but a mere 15 pages is allotted to a study of the socio-economic structure of the Soviet Union. In it, Williams explains " Russia's economic and political imbalance " with the following declaration, typical of the entire chapter:

> . . . the sources of Russian conduct are the drives to conquer poverty and achieve basic security in the world of nation states. From these efforts developed, on the one hand, the practices and traditions of centralized power to force savings, allocate investment, and maintain security, . . . and the ambivalence of a foreign policy at once militarily and suspiciously defensive, yet characterized by a missionary desire to help other men save themselves.

Does Williams really believe his explanation for the rise of " centralized power " in the Soviet Union? Has the phrase " to help other men save themselves " any meaning whatsoever? What do countries like Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia and even East Germany make of the phrase " militarily and suspiciously defensive " ?

There is no interpretation, whether of national or international events that cannot be convincingly supported if one assumes the right to pick and choose only those facts and events that support one's thesis, or invents formulations that contain its conclusion in their very language. It is my contention that the school of Cold War revisionists makes its points largely by disregarding, either deliberately or through careless research, important historical facts that are readily accessible to them. In the present article, I will examine the major historical facts that the revisionists, in order to " prove " a preconceived conclusion, have omitted or distorted in their analyses.

The Duclos Affair

At Teheran (November–December, 1943), Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill met and made many momentous decisions, the chief one being the decision for the Allied armies to invade Western Europe to strike at Hitler's armies during May 1944. The Conference ended on 6 December, 1943, with a moving declaration, the last sentence of which was: " We came here with hope and determination. We leave here friends in fact, in spirit, and in purpose."

The Teheran Declaration was a stirring document and when Allied forces landed on the beaches of Normandy on 6 June, 1944, and it became clear that Hitler would be defeated, the Declaration became a clarion call for a new world perspective of Allied unity and peace.

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On 6 November, 1944, in a long speech in Moscow on the 27th Anniversary of the October Revolution, Stalin said:

> The Teheran Conference was not held for nothing.... There can be no doubt that without unity of opinion and co-ordination of actions between the three great powers, the Teheran decision could not have been put into effect so fully and with such precision. Nor, on the other hand, can there be any doubt that the successful realization of the Teheran decision was bound to serve for the consolidation of the United Nations effort.

And only the year before, on 6 November, 1943, in a speech in Moscow on the 26th Anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, Stalin said:

> The victory of the Allied countries over Hitlerite Germany will put on the agenda the important question of the organizing and rebuilding of the state, economic and cultural life of the European peoples. The policy of our government on these questions remains unchanging. Together with our Allies we shall have to: Liberate the people of Europe from the fascist invaders... grant the liberated peoples of Europe the full right and freedom to decide for themselves the question of their form of government....[1]

IT is no wonder that Earl Browder, then General Secretary of the American Communist Party, took the Teheran Declaration and Stalin's speeches seriously and proceeded to change the character of his party to accord with what he believed the Declaration meant. Unfortunately for both Browder and the world, the Teheran Declaration proved to be the high-water mark of Soviet-Western cooperation. It never again reached that level. For at the very time that Stalin was making his 6 November 1944 Teheran patriotic speech, Moscow was preparing an article devastatingly criticizing Browder for his belief that the Teheran Declaration meant what it said. That article, under the signature of Jacques Duclos, was printed in Paris in the April 1945 issue of *Cahiers du Communisme*, the theoretical organ of the French Communist Party, less than five months after Stalin made his November tribute to the unity achieved at Teheran.

Because the Communist International was ostensibly "dissolved" on 10 June 1943, the article could not be published in Moscow. It was therefore sent to Paris to be signed by Jacques Duclos, a leading and obedient functionary of the French Communist Party. It is important to note that on 10 June 1943, Stalin said. "That it [the dissolution of the Comintern] exposed the lie that Moscow allegedly intends to intervene in the life of other nations and to Bolshevize them." But Moscow, through the Duclos article, did intervene in the affairs of the American Communist Party. And it is now known that after the "dissolution," Dimitrov and Manuilsky together were assigned to head the section of

[1] Both quotations appear in *The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union*, Speeches by Joseph Stalin (International Publishers: New York, 1945).

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the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union that had to deal with foreign communist parties. Therefore, the 1943 " dissolution " was but a pretext to promote and improve Allied unity at a time when Stalin was still uncertain of the exact timing of the " second front."

The Duclos article accused Browder of proposing collaboration between communists and capitalists and of toning down the class struggle by promoting harmony between capital and labour, but, for the purposes of this chapter, we will concentrate on the sharp criticisms levelled against Browder for accepting the " self-determination " of European countries, including those in Eastern Europe, and for recognizing along with Varga and Voznesensky that the United States was not facing a post-war economic crisis. On the latter issue, the following excerpt from the Duclos article is pertinent:

> Browder does not admit the possibility of a new economic crisis in the US after the war. On the contrary, . . . that the US national economy after the war can preserve and maintain the same level of production as during the war.

And in response to Browder's belief that European countries will be " conditioned by the principle of complete democratic self-determination of each nation," the Duclos article stated that:

> The Teheran agreements mean to Earl Browder that the greatest part of Europe, west of the Soviet Union, will probably be reconstituted on a bourgeois democratic basis and not on a fascist-capitalist or Soviet basis.

This continued concentration on the future of the countries west of the Soviet Union became almost a fixation with Stalin. Even before the Duclos article appeared in print, Stalin remarked in a conversation with Djilas in the spring of 1945: " This war is not as in the past; whoever occupies territory, imposes on it his own social system. Everyone imposes his own system as far as his army can reach. It cannot be otherwise."

SINCE the Duclos article was written late in 1944, before Roosevelt died, before the testing by the United States of the atomic bomb, and well before not only the Yalta Conference but both the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, it could only have meant that Stalin, certain of Hilter's defeat, was already preparing a strategy that differed radically from that stated by him when he still was not absolutely certain of an Allied victory.

His " dialectical " mind now convinced him that after the end of the war, the United States was bound to suffer a severe economic crisis which might even lead to fascism. In such an event, the United States would be economically weakened and through isolation unable to participate actively in world affairs, thus giving Stalin a free hand in Europe.

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President Truman had more than enough facts to support him when in his *Memoirs* he said that following the 1945 Potsdam Conference, "It was clear that the Russian foreign policy was based on the conclusion that we were heading for a major depression, and that they were already planning to take advantage of our setback."

Stalin continued his analysis of capitalism and economic crises on 9 February 1946, in a speech to the "voters" of his district during the elections to the Supreme Soviet, when he said that "Marxists have declared more than once that the capitalist system of world economy harbours elements of general crises and armed conflicts... and that therefore so long as capitalism existed, the world would not be free from the threat of war." And this speech was made more than a month before Churchill's Fulton speech, which the revisionists consider so vital to their conclusions. Stalin's continued misjudgment of America may be noted even as late as 1947 when in an interview with Harold Stassen, he replied that "Nazi Germany and the United States had essentially the same economic system."

In light of such judgments and analyses, the Duclos article was without any doubt a signal and directive not only to the American Communist Party but to all communist parties to prepare for the new Soviet post-war foreign policy strategy. Browder's expulsion and the reconversion of the American Communist Party to its pre-war leftist line were only minor incidents in the post-war strategy of Stalin. It was only the beginning of a strategy that fully developed in both Europe and the Far East in the following three years. The Duclos article with its immediate consequences was simply the first shot fired in the Cold War.

Why do the revisionist historians not mention the Duclos affair nor its significance?

The Aleksandrov and Varga Disputes

It was then time to straighten out the Soviet intellectuals at home who, like Browder in America, took Stalin's wartime pronouncements to be serious and meaningful. Thus, in the second half of 1946, there began a full-blown campaign against cultural and intellectual "cosmopolitanism," a term used to describe those who tended to glorify Western ideas and ideologies. One of the victims of this attack upon Western culture and parliamentary democracies was Georgi F. Aleksandrov, the leading Soviet philosopher, a member of the prestigious Academy of Sciences, recipient in 1942 of the Stalin prize for the numerous scholarly books he had written, and who under Zhdanov's direction had become head of the Agitation and Propaganda Directorate of the CPSU (Agitprop). Aleksandrov's chief work was his *History of Western European Philosophy*, which in 1946 was adopted as a textbook.

But by the end of 1946, even before the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, Stalin had made up his mind on exactly what he was aiming to achieve in the post-war world. And for this he needed to

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restore the mentality of Soviet intellectuals to the pre-war level of obedience to totalitarian dictatorship. Thus, in June 1947, Andrei Zhdanov, Cultural Commissar and Stalin's faithful henchman, on specific instructions from Stalin, organized a conference consisting of 83 Soviet philosophers for the sole purpose of attacking Aleksandrov's *History of Western European Philosophy* for showing too great a respect for bourgeois theories and for failure to glorify all things Soviet. The conference against Aleksandrov was staged in customary inquisition style and gave Zhdanov the opportunity to make such remarks in his speech as "all science is Party science . . . its teaching cannot be divorced from the policy of the Party . . ." and that intellectuals have the duty to arm the "new democracies" with the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism and to abhor the "corrupt and abominable bourgeois ideology." It is important to note Stalin's continued preoccupation with the "new peoples' democracies" which meant of course Eastern Europe. Only one revisionist mentions the Aleksandrov dispute. The exception is William Appleman Williams, who in his book, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, has just one misleading sentence on Aleksandrov: "And the philosopher Aleksandrov, who had good things to say about Western capitalist thinkers, was in high favour as late as the first month of 1947." Williams omits any mention of the attacks against him and their significance.

At the conclusion of the conference, Aleksandrov was removed as Agitprop director and replaced by Mikhail Suslov. After a servile recantation, Aleksandrov was ordered to rewrite his book in harmony with the new line that spelled a return to totalitarian control of all Soviet thought. But the criticism levelled against Aleksandrov was only beginning. As with previous virulent attacks against lack of orthodoxy as Stalin defined it, this one was also followed by a widespread purge of Party and military figures as well as intellectuals.

ONE of these intellectuals was Eugene Varga. He first arrived in Moscow from his native Hungary in 1920. From then to 1947, the year of the first official attack on him, he was the leading Soviet economist. For two decades, as chief of the "Institute of World Economy and World Politics," he wrote many books and innumerable reports and articles, chiefly on world capitalism. Varga's prestige was very great and Stalin's trust in him gave him supreme power in his Institute.

Varga's major book, *Changes in the Economics of Capitalism as a Result of the Second World War*, was begun in 1939 and not completed until 1945. Although many chapters of this book were published during those years in his journal, the book as a whole was not published until September 1946. The first and only printing of 25,000 copies was sold out the same day it was released.

But like Aleksandrov, Varga too became a victim of the campaign

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against " cosmopolitanism." Although some mild criticism of Varga's book occurred as early as January 1945 within the confines of the Institute itself, it was not until May 1947 that it was criticized officially before a joint conference of the Economics Institute and the Political Economy faculty of the Moscow University. However, because of Varga's long-standing pre-eminence in his field, this first attack was relatively mild. And yet because Varga refused to the end to modify his position to any degree, his Institute disappeared in a merger and his journal was discontinued. An English translation of Varga's book had been prepared and Earl Browder, as literary agent for Soviet non-fiction books, was notified that he would receive it for American publication. But it never arrived in New York because it was never sent.

The question inevitably arises as to why Stalin waited until 1947 to attack Varga and his book written years before. Revisionists like William Appleman Williams make much of this " tolerance " as indicating " the ambivalent, undecided and cautious nature of Soviet thinking at the end of the war." But it should be quite clear that Stalin tolerated both Aleksandrov and Varga and other intellectuals during the war years in order to allay suspicion among his Western allies. By 1946, with most of America's military machine demobilized and therefore with reasonable certainty that Soviet Russia was safe from attack, and with the Red Army in every East European country, Stalin could restore his pre-war control over every phase of Soviet life. And although preparations for such a restoration had been made in the latter part of 1946, the actual attack on " cosmopolitanism " began on a grand scale in 1947 and continued until Stalin's death early in 1953.

A renewed and more virulent attack on Varga took place in October 1948 before an augmented session of the Learned Council of the Economics Institute of the Academy of Sciences. Unlike Aleksandrov in 1947, Varga did not repent. But following the 1948 attack, and only after Ostrovityanov had threatened him with the warning that " you should know to what sad consequences stubborn insistence on one's errors leads " did Varga repent. In an article in March 1949 he criticized himself as well as his entire Institute for " reformism " and " cosmopolitanism."

The 1948 criticisms of Varga were led by K. V. Ostrovityanov and V. E. Motylyov, two leading Soviet economists. In addition to their criticism of Varga's views on the post-war economic crisis in the capitalist world and his failure to deal with the continuing class struggle in these countries, Varga was severely criticized for his belief that the state in countries like the United States and Great Britain, in the process of conducting the war, had acquired power over the big bourgeoisie in important areas. Moreover, Varga was accused of maintaining that the state in order to conduct the war successfully had begun economic planning, a process that he argued would continue after the war, and moreover, that economic planning would not remain a Soviet monopoly.

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Thus Varga was accused of holding an erroneous perspective for capitalism and not understanding that the second world war was a stage in the general crisis of capitalism and that the war further deepened this crisis. It was maintained that the present epoch of imperialism represented "decaying, dying capitalism."

On the question of the "new democracies" in Eastern and Central Europe, Varga was criticized for declaring that in these countries "state capitalism" still prevailed and that he still considered these countries to be part of the capitalist economy. He was further criticized for his belief that, in any case, these countries were small and unimportant and that their changed status would not significantly alter the general perspective of capitalism in the West. Varga's chief critic, Motylyov, on the contrary, considered the "new democracies" as part of an "advanced Europe" as against a "backward America." He even contended that Poland would surpass the pre-war economy of France within three years and that other "new democracies" would perform similar wonders.

IT is very important to note here that the criticisms levelled at Varga were on almost all questions quite similar to those levelled against Earl Browder in the Duclos article that had been composed in Moscow four years earlier. Therefore, although the attacks against Varga were not made until 1947 and 1948, Stalin's views on these questions were already formed while the war was still in progress. For example, there is ample evidence that the future of Eastern Europe was constantly on Stalin's mind even during 1939–41, the years of the Hitler-Stalin Pact. The lands he acquired in the secret agreement of this Pact were just appetizers for a planned vaster aggrandizement.

Now how do the revisionist historians deal with the Varga dispute? Only William Appleman Williams, in *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, looks at this dispute. He writes: "the [Varga] discussion had been going on at least since 1944, a consideration which underscores the ambivalent, undecided, and cautious nature of Soviet thinking at the end of the war." Williams also writes, though in a weak and truncated form, that "Varga's central point was that capitalism in general, and in the United States in particular, was capable of stabilizing itself in the postwar era . . . that the role of the government could be positive and creative under capitalism. . . ." But not a word about what Varga's critics said about this thesis. Williams does note that: "Varga himself was not attacked in any serious way, for example, until after Winston Churchill's Iron Curtain speech in March 1946." But the 1947 attack on Varga's 1946 book came before the Marshall Plan, the only plan or speech that dealt with economics, the area of the debate with Varga.

Why even in Williams' book is there nothing about the attack on Varga concerning the question of the "new democracies"? Nor a word about other topics for which he was attacked? Historical analysis by omission makes the writings of even the best and the earliest of the

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revisionists distorted and useless as guides to a better understanding of the problems facing the world.

The Hitler-Stalin Pact

Who was the great dialectician who thought so little of Hitler that he was chiefly responsible for bringing him to power? It was Stalin, who in the belief that Hitler was just another over-ambitious house-painter whose reign would last only a few months, refused to allow the German Communist Party to unite with the Social Democratic Party in the 1932 election against Hitler's National Socialist Party. This was done on the "theory" that Social Fascists, the name given to all varieties of Socialists, were the most reactionary forces in society, much more dangerous than Nazism or Fascism, indeed "the main enemy." And it was because of this fallacious theory that Hitler came to power on 30 January 1933.

It took more than a year for Stalin to realize his mistake sufficiently to organize a world anti-Fascist movement through the Commintern's Seventh Congress in 1935. But Stalin's conviction and fear that the Western powers' chief aim was to declare war on the USSR at an opportune moment, never left him. This conviction was strengthened following the Munich fiasco in 1938 and its aftermath. To counteract this pretended danger, Stalin signed his ten-year friendship and non-aggression Pact with Hitler on 23 August 1939, with all its Secret Protocols for collaboration.

A week later, on 1 September, Hitler's armies invaded Western Poland. On 17 September Soviet troops moved into Eastern Poland to take by force Stalin's share in the divisions of spoils concluded in the Secret Protocols of the Hitler-Stalin Pact. These protocols gave the USSR the eastern part of Poland, all of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, and parts of Finland and Rumania. But once the war between Great Britain and Germany began, Stalin became convinced that such a war of mutual destruction would at the very least spell the beginning of the end of capitalism in Western Europe. This view of Stalin's was made crystal clear in two secret coded messages that Dimitroff sent to Earl Browder in New York in September and October 1939, just a month following the signing of the Hitler-Stalin Pact. The only fear Stalin had at this time was that the United States might join Great Britain to defeat Germany and thus spoil Stalin's dreams.

In an effort to correct this danger in the event of a German defeat, to give greater "protection" to the USSR, Molotov, in November 1940, made new demands on Hitler that included a freer hand in Finland, primary Soviet influence in Bulgaria and Rumania, and even naval bases in the Dardanelles. Another move for the same purpose was the signing of a Neutrality Pact with Japan on 13 April 1941, to keep the Far Eastern part of the USSR from sudden invasion. All of this came to

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naught, however, because Hitler was already preparing for an invasion of the USSR, which actually began on 22 June 1941.

Much to Stalin's *surprise* and relief, Great Britain came to the aid of the USSR the day following Hitler's invasion of Soviet soil. Similar aid came a few weeks later from the United States. It is ironic that the territory Stalin failed to obtain from his secret deals with Hitler, he obtained and much, much more, from the Allied victory.

In light of the foregoing brief description of the Hitler-Stalin Pact and its relation to the second world war, what is the meaning of the revisionist historians' contention that Stalin signed the 1939 Pact with Hitler to "buy time"? What would have happened to the "buying time" theory if Great Britain and the United States had followed Stalin's theory of war between capitalist nations and had not come to Stalin's aid? It may have been wiser for the Soviet Union to have been better prepared militarily than it was, and not to depend on a false estimate of Hitler. And it would have helped too, if Stalin had had a better understanding of the differences between a Nazi Germany and the United States, and if he had not destroyed so many of his most able military and civilian leaders in the endless purges.

The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan

The revisionists, with almost no exceptions, consider the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan as key events that forced the Cold War into an irreversible direction. In coming to this conclusion, they omit the very important and pertinent historical facts we have examined above, and also some others that I shall now discuss.

SOME of the bogus "coalition" governments in Eastern Europe were formed early in 1947. Others had already been consolidated as Soviet satellites as early as 1945 and 1946. And Stalin in these latter two years had designs even on Germany and France. Only Czechoslovakia fell to the communists as late as February 1948. These events alone would have been enough to have made a proclamation like the Truman Doctrine understandable. But, in fact, these events did not lead directly to the Truman Proclamation. These takeovers by Moscow, except for Czechoslovakia, occurred well before both the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. In addition Stalin, from 1945 on, was encouraging separatist movements in Manchuria and Sinkiang in China—areas that had absolutely no connection with the Truman Doctrine.

But what was the origin of the Truman Doctrine? In February 1947, the British Embassy in Washington advised the Department of State that Great Britain, exhausted militarily and economically from almost six years' participation in the war against Hitler, could no longer continue its support of the governments of Greece and Turkey and therefore was unable to prevent the fall of the Greek government

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in its struggle with the communist guerrilla army. In response to this announcement made by a war-weary ally, President Truman, on 12 March 1947, expounded the doctrine that the United States ought "to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressure." As a result, the United States replaced Great Britain in the struggle against the communist forces in Greece.

The revisionist historians, writing in the sixties, must certainly have been aware of Stalin's role in the Greek Civil War. They should not have missed the fact that in October 1944, Churchill, recognizing that it was hopeless to halt the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe, met Stalin in Moscow and made a most peculiar personal agreement in which spheres of influence were divided on a percentage basis. As a result of this agreement, Stalin placed Greece unconditionally within the British sphere of influence. When at Yalta, in February 1945, Stalin asked Churchill "what was going on in Greece," he was quick to add that "he was not criticizing the British in Greece but merely seeking information." Again, on 10 February 1948, in Moscow, Stalin said to Djilas and other Yugoslavs present that "the uprising in Greece must be stopped, and as quickly as possible." On another occasion, Stalin said "we should not hesitate, but let us put an end to the Greek uprising." Therefore, for Stalin, the Truman Doctrine was in essence a support of Stalin's own position on the Greek Civil War. It is of some interest that Stalin's deal with Churchill on Greece was kept a secret even from responsible Soviet officials. Vyshinsky, for example, in a speech before the United Nations Assembly on 18 September 1947, severely attacked the United States for its imperialistic interference in the internal affairs of Greece.

THE Marshall Plan, that so exercises the revisionist historians, was a proposal outlined by Secretary of State George Marshall in a speech at Harvard University on 5 June 1947. In it he said:

> It is logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health in the world without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace. Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos.... It would be neither fitting nor efficacious for this government to draw up unilaterally a programme designed to place Europe on its feet economically. That is the business of the Europeans. The initiative, I think, must come from Europe....

W. Averell Harriman, in his 1971 book, *America and Russia in a Changing World*, wrote that "It was not until the Foreign Ministers' Conference in Moscow in March 1947 that General Marshall, then Secretary of State, finally concluded that the cooperation we had envisioned with the Soviets was impossible. Even then, he included the

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Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in his offer of the Marshall Plan for European recovery."

The only two countries that opposed the Marshall Plan almost from its inception were Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. (It is important to note here that until Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform in 1948, Tito and Zhdanov were the two extreme leftists in the communist world.) However, a Conference of Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom and the USSR was held in Paris from 27 June to 3 July 1947 to discuss the proposals made in the Marshall Plan.

V. M. Molotov, as leader of the Soviet delegation, made two speeches, and offered one proposal at this conference. The key to Molotov's position on the Marshall Plan can be found in the following statement which he made on 28 June 1948: "We are also aware, at the same time, that it is to the interest to the United States, for their part, to make use of the possibilities of their credit to enlarge their foreign markets, *especially in view of the approaching crisis.*" [1] An echo of the Varga dispute on the "forthcoming" economic crisis in the United States, an event that they were absolutely certain would occur.

On 2 July 1947, in another statement, Molotov rejected the Marshall Plan when he said that "... when it is said, as in the French proposal, that in the work of restoration of the economic life of European countries a decisive place should go to the USA, and not to the European countries, since it could lead to the renunciation of economic independence...." By European countries Molotov meant in particular Moscow's East European satellites.

What the revisionists omit in a discussion of the Marshall Plan is that when the invitation to join the Paris conference arrived in Moscow, Molotov recommended, according to Djilas, that the Soviet delegation should arrive in Paris and at the very first meeting just walk out en masse in protest. But Stalin rejected this suggestion. This would indicate that the speeches and recommendations made by Molotov in Paris were based on a pre-determined conclusion and that therefore they were not prepared to discuss the offer seriously and honestly.

Soon after the Paris Conference, 16 nations accepted the Marshall Plan and on 22 September 1947, an organization was set up to administer the European Recovery Programme. The Soviet Union and her satellites, of course, were not a part of the 16, even though Poland wanted to accept but was not permitted to, and Czechoslovakia did accept but was forced by Stalin to cancel its acceptance. It is not unlikely that Moscow *alone* would have accepted the fruits of the Marshall Plan, to judge by more than one request for American financial credits, but only if these were made on a bilateral basis. To have allowed the East European countries to participate in the Marshall Plan would have threatened Moscow's hegemony over her satellites and besides such

[1] Author's italics.

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participation would have helped the United States to overcome the imminent depression which their dialectical mystique convinced them was certain to come no later than 1948.

The results of the functioning of the Marshall Plan are very clear. Even if the United States has certainly profited economically from its vast continued aid to the 16 European countries, it is an undeniable fact that the standard of living in these countries has risen to extraordinary heights, while that of the communist countries, including the USSR, has remained at a relatively low level. The one exception is Yugoslavia, which, although it did not participate in the Marshall Plan, did receive vast economic aid after it was expelled from the Cominform; and still Yugoslavia did not become an American satellite. The revisionist historians fail entirely to understand that the East European countries have suffered infinitely more from being economic colonies of the Soviet Union than they would have, had they been free to accept Marshall Plan aid.

The First Cominform Meeting

As early as the spring of 1946, more than a year before the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, Stalin, Tito and Dimitrov, according to Djilas, had discussed the need for the creation of an agency that would presumably coordinate the views and problems of the various European communist parties. But it was decided to wait for a more propitious moment in which to carry out such a project. That moment came with the proclamation of the Marshall Plan in June 1947.

Gabriel Kolko, perhaps the leading revisionist historian, in his book *The Politics of War*, argues that the Allies were unduly apprehensive that the Soviet Union would use the influence of the West European communist parties to aid the Soviet Union in its expansionist ambitions. But Kolko reached this conclusion without examining what really went on at the organizational meeting of the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) in September 1947.

THE first organizational meeting of the Cominform was held at Szklarska-Poreba (Poland) from 22 to 27 September 1947. Stalin considered this meeting so important that he sent Zhdanov and Malenkov as delegates to it. The countries represented at this meeting, in addition to the Soviet Union, were Czechoslovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, France and Italy.

The main political report of the meeting was made by A. Zhdanov and published officially in a pamphlet under the title: "The International Situation." The key thesis in the report—the division of the world "into two major camps"—is clearly stated in the following excerpt:

> The more the war recedes into the past, the more distinct become two major trends in post-war international policy, corresponding to

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> the division of the political forces operating in the international arena into two major camps: the imperialist and anti-democratic camp, on the one hand, and the anti-imperialist and democratic camp, on the other. The principal driving force of the imperialist camp is the U.S.A. . . . The anti-imperialist and anti-fascist forces comprise the second camp. This camp is based on the USSR and the new democracies.

In general, the revisionists pay little attention to the Cominform meeting even as described in official reports. Most do not touch the subject at all. One who did quote Zhdanov chose two sentences that are not only false to the spirit of the entire report, but even a travesty of it:

> Soviet foreign policy proceeds from the premise that the two systems—capitalism and socialism—will exist side by side for a long time. From this it follows that cooperation between the USSR and countries with other systems is possible, provided that the principle of reciprocity is observed and that obligations once assumed are honored.

The official reports of this first meeting of the Cominform fail to mention the most significant discussions that took place among the various delegations. Fortunately, of the two Italian delegates present, Luigi Longo and Eugenio Realé, the latter kept detailed notes of all the sessions but one. It was from these notes that he made his official report to the Italian Party leadership. Having broken with the Italian Party following the Hungarian upheaval in 1956, Realé then published the notes in book form in Milan in 1958, without changing a word. In the same year, a French edition was published in Paris: *Avec Jacques Duclos* (*With Jacques Duclos in the Defendant's Dock at the Cominform Constitutive Meeting at Szklarska-Poreba, 22–27 September 1947*). Both the Italian and the French editions are available to the revisionists. In fact, Isaac Deutscher, in one of his essays, quotes a sentence or two from the French edition. But the revisionists have paid absolutely no attention to the significance of this first Cominform meeting as described by Realé.

SOME of the material that was never published officially and that appears only in Realé's book is our concern here. It is important to note at once that, as expected, the Cominform meeting was called, in the words of Realé, both to "consolidate communist power in Eastern Europe" and to organize "propaganda and struggle, by all means available, against American assistance to Europe," which, of course, meant the Marshall Plan.

The revisionists maintain that control of Eastern Europe was necessary to satisfy the Soviet Union's need for security. But France and Italy are not part of Eastern Europe. How then would these historians explain the attack at this Cominform meeting against both the French and Italian Parties for "having lost their revolutionary character, for

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having not known how or having not wanted to seize power and having thereafter been ignominiously evicted by the governments in which they had participated" immediately after the war.

Duclos was criticized mercilessly for the French Party's failure to seize power in 1946. The criticism was begun by Kardelj and Djilas of Yugoslavia and the final and official Moscow attacks were made by Zhdanov and Malenkov. Averell Harriman reported in his book, *America and Russia in a Changing World*, that when at Potsdam in June 1945, he congratulated Stalin on the Red Army's reaching Berlin, Stalin replied: "But Czar Alexander reached Paris." Such a seemingly flippant remark takes on a more sinister meaning when coupled with the attack on the French Communist Party in September 1947, and with the fact that France and Italy were the only countries represented at this Cominform meeting in addition to those from Eastern Europe. Moreover, even if control of Eastern Europe and even France was necessary for security reasons in the West, how do the revisionists explain Stalin's penetration of Sinkiang and Manchuria in China.[2] There is sufficient evidence that Stalin's plans for the extension of the communist world were not limited by the need for security.

FOLLOWING this first Cominform meeting and the widespread reporting of the Zhdanov speech, as well as the directive to form united fronts from below, which meant for the "masses" to discard their leaders and go it alone against all "reaction," the communist world was shaken up. In France there followed a series of political strikes against the Marshall Plan. Communists went on the offensive in China, Burma, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia; and guerrilla warfare was intensified in Indochina and Greece. Even in the United States, William Z. Foster took heart and moved even further to the left. Then came the coup in Czechoslovakia in February 1948 and a short while later Stalin's attempt to isolate Berlin that brought about the airlift. This widespread and unified offensive by the communist parties all over the world may well be termed the first fully organized onslaught of the Cold War.

At the final session of the Cominform, Belgrade was chosen as its capital to give Stalin a lever for controlling Tito's independent spirit. As Djilas reports, Stalin said: "I will shake my little finger—there will be no more Tito—Tito will fall." But Tito did not fall. The story of the Stalin-Tito quarrel is well known and need not be repeated here. Tito was expelled from the Cominform in June 1948 and the Cominform was moved from Belgrade to Bucharest.

What Stalin found intolerable in the Yugoslav regime was not its

[2] Beginning with 1945, Stalin made extraordinary efforts to encourage separatist movements in Manchuria and Sinkiang provinces in China, even at the risk of jeopardizing the success of the Chinese communists. Stalin's persistent effort to gain a foothold on Chinese soil is a subject to which the revisionists pay almost no attention.

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ideology, but its independence. The existence of such independence might infect the " people's democracies " and weaken their allegiance to Moscow. But Yugoslavia's own army and the absence of the Red Army on Yugoslav soil preserved its independence and it remains today the only East European country that did not become a full Soviet satellite.

Who was Stalin?

To write about Stalin in the 1960s as a man with whom Roosevelt and Churchill could negotiate in a rational manner, as the revisionists do, is to disregard the revelations in Khrushchev's speech in February 1956 before the twentieth congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, to disregard the assessment of Stalin in the fiftieth volume of the 1958 Soviet encyclopaedia, and to disregard Stalin's own spoken words on a number of vital matters in Djilas' *Conversations with Stalin*, published in 1962.

Khrushchev's 30,000 word speech described the Stalin regime as a personal dictatorship, enforced by a terrorism that kept his closest associates in hourly fear of their lives. Once Stalin took full power he tolerated no opposition either individually or collectively. In fact, one might say that there was no Party, but only Stalin. In the words of Khrushchev, Stalin was transformed " into a superman possessing supernatural characteristics akin to those of a god. Such a man supposedly knows everything, sees everything, thinks for everyone, can do anything, is infallible in his behaviour."

> Stalin acted not through persuasion, explanation, and patient cooperation with people, but by imposing his concepts and demanding absolute submission.
>
> Everyone can err, but Stalin considered that he never erred, that he was always right.
>
> Stalin acts for everybody; he does not reckon with anyone; he asks no one's advice. Everything is shown to the nation in this false light.
>
> We must state that after the war . . . Stalin became even more capricious, irritable and brutal . . . the wilfulness of Stalin showed itself . . . also in international relations of the Soviet Union.

These are just five brief excerpts from Khrushchev's speech. Khrushchev cited incident after incident in which Stalin refused advice and suggestions from both military and civilian leaders.

The following are two excerpts from the 6,000-word section on " Stalin and his Work " in the 1958 *Soviet Encyclopedia*:

> He [Stalin] showed certain intolerance with regard to everything that went against his personal opinion . . . Stalin, in fact, began to consider himself above criticism. . . .
>
> . . . after the 17th Party Congress (1934), he grossly over-estimated his personal merits and considered himself infallible. . . . One can find expression of this in the *History of the CPSU* (1938), and in the

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second edition of *Joseph Stalin—A Short Biography* (1946), drawn up by Stalin himself.

Why do the revisionist historians insist that it was the American diplomats who were arbitrary and unyielding when in reality they were facing an inflexible, fanatical and "infallible" Stalin? How could American diplomats have succeeded in negotiations with Stalin when his own comrades and associates could not discuss matters with him? The revisionists treat Stalin in the 1960s as he might have legitimately been treated before the publication of Khrushchev's speech, the entry in the *Soviet Encyclopedia* and in Djilas' book, but such treatment was no longer legitimate when the revisionists were writing.

Stalin's View of the World

The *Selected Works* of Stalin published in Moscow in 16 volumes after his death totalled more than two million words. Much is included in these volumes, but many important and significant words were omitted. Perhaps the most significant omission may be traced to a short paragraph that appeared in *The Law of the Soviet State*, edited by Andrei Y. Vyshinsky.

Although this book was published in Moscow in 1938, an English translation of it did not appear until 1951. Vyshinsky is only too well known as the hanging judge in the Shakhty trial of 1928, as the government prosecutor in August 1936 in the first "show (purge) trial" of Zinoviev and Kamenev and in the trials of Bukharin, Rykov, Yagoda and others two years later. These two years take on a special importance because it was in 1936, to replace the old 1924 Soviet Constitution, that the new "Stalin Constitution" was drawn up. It is perhaps the most democratic constitution ever put on paper, but unfortunately for the people of the Soviet Union, it has remained to this day only a paper constitution. It is ironic that at the very time when this new Stalin Constitution was supposed to go into effect, giving the Russian people every advanced political right and freedom, Stalin was imprisoning or killing hundreds of thousands of his countrymen. He exiled even the Jewish wife (née Karp) of Molotov, his faithful Man Friday.

> State organization of the USSR—treated in Chapter II of the Stalin Constitution—embraces a number of questions associated with the voluntary unification of peoples into one union socialist state. In the struggle of two mutually opposed worlds and systems, this system represents "a Union of Soviet Republics of developed lands and colonies that have fallen, and are falling, away from the imperialist system of economy, opposing itself to the world capitalist system in its struggle for world socialism.[3]

[3] Andrei Y. Vyshinsky (ed.), *The Law of the Soviet State* (Moscow, 1938), p. 210. Vyshinsky's footnote gives the source of the quotation within the quotation cited above as "Stalin: *Question of Leninism*, 9th Russian edition, 1932, p. 338."

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That this statement by Stalin in 1932 was not simply rhetoric became evident as late as 11 July 1972, when Cuba became the ninth full official member of the Soviet Economic Bloc, known as the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon), established by the Kremlin in 1949.

THERE is nothing new in the fact that the Soviet Union has always considered itself the centre of the world socialist system. The Soviet Union has carried on a cold war against both China and Yugoslavia because these two countries refused and still refuse to be amenable to control by Moscow. What is new in this concept of a world-wide "Union of Soviet Republics" is that for the first time a state in the Western hemisphere has become at least an economic member of it.

Further evidence of the Moscow view of its pre-eminence in and leadership of the socialist world appeared when S. Kovalev, in *Pravda* of 26 September 1968, in connexion with the Czechoslovak affair of that year, said that "the weakening of any link in the world socialist system" affects the entire system of world socialism and that every communist party is responsible for all countries within that system. This view was made even more binding when Brezhnev said in Warsaw just two months later that "imperialism is trying to undermine socialism's solidarity precisely as a world system," and drew the conclusion from this statement that has come to be known as the "Brezhnev Doctrine."

It asserts that every communist party, and more specially the CPSU, is responsible for every other communist party anywhere in the world. In spite of Brezhnev's recent attempt to solve some of his increasingly troublesome domestic problems by a seemingly new foreign policy, and in spite of Brezhnev's and Nixon's apparent avoidance of a discussion of the Brezhnev Doctrine in Moscow in May 1972, the fact that only two months later Cuba officially joined the communist world as an integral economic part of it under Moscow's hegemony indicates that what Stalin wrote in 1932 remains as doctrine, even though the exact wording was not included in the new constitution.

Stalin's planning for the future did not end with his immediate post-war plans. In April 1945, he said to Djilas, "The war shall soon be over. We shall recover in 15 or 20 years, and we'll have another go at it." With whom would Stalin have "another go at it"? Would it be Germany alone? Djilas reports that in the spring of 1946, Stalin said "all of Germany must be ours. . . ." But in a visit with Djilas in 1948, Stalin, modifying his 1946 statement, said: "The West will make Western Germany their own and we shall make East Germany into our own state." This remark would indicate that it would not be against Germany alone that he would have "another go at it," but against the entire West which had taken West Germany away from him.

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THE revisionist historians write about Stalin's respect and consideration for the problems that Roosevelt and Churchill faced in their respective countries, and of his readiness to compromise with them. But they have failed to note that Stalin said to Djilas as early as June 1944, after the Allied landing in Normandy: "Churchill is the kind who, if you don't watch him, will slip a kopek out of your pocket... And Roosevelt is not like that. He dips in his hand only for bigger coins." This kind of comment could only be made by one who had no respect for his allies and who would pay anything but attention to their problems. This personal disrespect for his allies became evident even at the Teheran Conference. Stalin pressed the second front matter so stridently and embarrassingly at the Conference that both Roosevelt and Churchill, in order to avoid any further delay in reaching some meaningful agreements other than on the second front, made concessions to Stalin that they would not have made under less strained circumstances.

How did Stalin describe the significance of the second front after the war? In the 1945 edition of the official *History of the USSR*, Stalin is quoted as saying that the Normandy landing was: "A brilliant achievement.... The history of war knows no other enterprise like it for breadth of purpose, grandiose skill, and masterful execution." However, in the 1951 edition of the *History*, the following description of the Normandy landing is given:

> England and the United States, in the course of three years of war, dragged out in every way the opening of a second front.... But when, after the gigantic victories of the Soviet Army, it became clear that the Soviet Union might alone defeat the enemy, occupy the territory of Germany and liberate all Western Europe, including France... in June 1944, the English and American armies left England and landed on the coast of Northern France.

Again, at the Yalta Conference in February 1945, playing upon Roosevelt's intoxication with the need for a successful United Nations, Stalin made unimportant concessions in order to gain more vital concessions in his own areas, such as the questions of Poland's future, German reparations and the war against Japan. The concessions that Stalin extracted at this conference are to this day a subject of dispute—how much was Roosevelt taken in, if at all, by Stalin's wiles?

Stalin was perpetually suspicious of Western motives. One of Stalin's reasons for signing the Hitler-Stalin Pact was his belief that this would prevent the West from egging Hitler on to a war against the Soviet Union, thus forcing the two of them to fight one another to a mutually destructive finish. But once the Pact was in force, Stalin became alarmed that the United States might join Great Britain in the war and by defeating Hitler would leave the Soviet Union exposed and would consequently prevent Stalin from retaining the territory he had acquired in the Secret Protocols. However, Churchill came to his aid the day following Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941,

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to be followed a few weeks later by similar support from the United States.

In Stalin's dialectical mind, Great Britain and the United States should have been happy not only to let Germany and Soviet Russia fight it out to a finish but even to help Hitler to be the victor. Thus, once again, Stalin's estimate of what the "capitalist world" would do proved to be wrong. Both Lenin's and Stalin's conclusions about what causes wars in the capitalist world proved to be erroneous. And so far as the revisionist historians are concerned, they have failed once again to use available evidence that would describe Stalin as the perfidious man he really was and not the victim of Allied "perfidy."

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America's Non-Policy in Eastern Europe and the Origins of the Cold War

Hugh B. Hammett

THE question of the origins of the Cold War has been the most reviewed and revised historical controversy among American diplomatists since the debate over United States entry into World War I. Although studies that analyse the Cold War have now run into dozens, eager scholars hover over their typewriters, pounding out articles and monographs that attempt to explain the origins of the protracted struggle.

In the United States, the historiographical debate has tended to divide into three schools. Traditionalist scholars have generally upheld the popular and official view that Soviet aggressiveness and bad faith precipitated the controversy. According to this view, President Truman had little choice but to "get tough" with the Soviets in reaction to the creeping spread of communism over Eastern Europe. Perhaps the most widely read and influential of the traditionalist accounts has been John W. Spanier's *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, which is now thriving in its fourth edition. Spanier writes: "The cold war grew out of the interactions between traditional power politics and the nature of the Soviet regime. The power vacuum created by Germany's defeat provided the opening for Soviet power to fill, and Communist ideology made a clash inevitable." [1] Although he is highly critical of the overreaction of the Truman Doctrine, in his recent large synthesis, *From Trust to Terror*, Herbert Feis also tends toward the orthodox interpretation of the origins of the protracted struggle.[2] Memoirs of participants have also reinforced traditionalist assumptions, such as Dean Acheson's magistral *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* [3] and Charles E. Bohlen's engaging *Witness to History*.[4]

TWO other large schools of thought among historians in the United States have arisen in response to the traditionalist interpretation. Particularly effective criticism has been offered by the writers who have been characterized as "realists." Notable among these accounts have been George F. Kennan, *American Diplomacy, 1900–1950*, Norman A. Graebner, *Cold War Diplomacy, 1945–1960*, and Martin F. Herz, *Beginnings of the Cold War*. Although the realists generally agree that some kind of American reaction was necessary to contain possible Soviet

[1] (New York: Praeger, 1971; originally published 1960), p. 28.
[2] (New York: Norton, 1970), pp. 23–26; 197.
[3] (New York: Norton, 1969.)
[4] (New York: Norton, 1973.)

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expansionist ambitions, they argue that America's misplaced moralism in relation to Eastern Europe only exacerbated Cold War tensions. The idealistic chiding, moral posturing, and badgering that characterized the United States approach to the Russians gained only hostility and ill-feelings and did not liberate any territory. In the words of Professor Graebner: "The tendency to pursue abstractions rather than concrete interests continued to dominate American diplomacy in the post-war era. The central fact in the country's response to the Soviet challenge was the absence of any clearly defined body of objectives that had some relationship to American capability or even genuine intention." [5]

THE third group of writers, a diverse coterie indeed, may (for want of a better term) be lumped together as "revisionists." One may argue that the realists are in a sense revisionists; nevertheless, the realists are distinguished from the larger group of scholars by their preoccupation with means and ends. Revisionists have fallen out with the orthodox approach for one reason or another. In fact, revisionists may be distinguished as much by their diversity as by conformity. On one side of the revisionist school stand men like Louis B. Halle and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., who see the Cold War as virtually inevitable and who, if they assess blame at all, tend to divide it between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Halle's intriguing simile is that America and Russia resembled a scorpion and a tarantula in a bottle. Although Russia was more aggressive, both Americans and Russians tragically perceived themselves in the "absolute predicament" of an inevitable struggle for self-preservation.[6] Some scholars will undoubtedly want to quibble with the characterization of Professor Schlesinger as a "revisionist," primarily because his letter to the *New York Review of Books* of 20 October 1966 attempted to "blow the whistle" on revisionism. Schlesinger's point, it appears to this writer, was merely that revisionism was going *too far* rather than that it was completely unjustified or inappropriate as a scholarly endeavour. In fact in his impressive article in *Foreign Affairs* the following year, Schlesinger called his earlier letter intemperate and proceeded to catalogue systematically a number of the most damning revisionist criticisms of United States war-time policy: the rejection of significant Soviet participation to the Italian question, the rejection of the Russian request for a loan for postwar reconstruction, the abrupt termination of lend-lease, and the German reparations imbroglio. Although Schlesinger did place

[5] Graebner, *Cold War Diplomacy* (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1962), p. 9. The Kennan volume, the pioneering realist critique, did not directly assault orthodox interpretations; but it became basic reading for those who would issue later challenges. For a contrast to the Acheson reminiscence and for the evolution of Kennan's disillusionment with traditionalist views, see his *Memoirs* (Boston: Little Brown, 1967). Kennan's *American Diplomacy* was published in 1952 in New York by Mentor Books, and the Herz volume appeared in 1966 from the Indiana University Press in Bloomington.

[6] Halle, *The Cold War as History* (New York: Harper, 1967), p. xiii.

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primary emphasis on the totalitarianism and the "all-consuming ideology" of the Soviets as the cause of the Cold War, he admitted that "American postwar policy created genuine difficulties for the Russians and even assumed a threatening aspect for them." [7]

Well to the left are such early revisionist scholars as D. F. Fleming, *The Cold War and Its Origins, 1917–1950*, 2 volumes (New York: Doubleday, 1961), David Horowitz, *The Free World Colossus* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1965), and William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (revised edition, New York: Delta, 1962). The interpretations of the left revisionists are by no means monolithic. Fleming emphasized the sustained hostility of American anti-communism that greeted the Soviet Union at every turn from its inception as a nation. Horowitz, whose book follows Fleming closely but remains a useful syntheses of this type of revisionism for the period since 1945, viewed Cold War hostility as chiefly accountable to America's persistent "counter-revolutionary" policy aimed at stifling meaningful (radical) change throughout the world.[8] Williams, whose book has been the most influential of the three (and continues to find eager readers on college campuses in spite of its age), placed the Cold War in the context of the aggressiveness of American liberal capitalism, reaching out in the elusive but everlasting quest for the "open door."

Recent writers have continued and enlarged left revisionism. *Sui generis* is Gar Alperowitz whose book *Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam* appeared in 1965. Alperowitz argues that the Cold War began in the autumn of 1945 when the Truman administration abandoned Franklin Roosevelt's conciliatory policies and inaugurated a new anti-Soviet policy designed to free Eastern Europe from Russian influence. The instrument of (and in part the motivation for) this policy was the atomic bomb which, Alperowitz argues, was *not* used as an essential military weapon but rather as a political tool to intimidate the Russians and force a rollback in Eastern Europe. The Alperowitz thesis has received wide attention, but so far most professional historians (including many staunch revisionists) are awaiting additional evidence before concluding that political motivations were *paramount* in the tragic episode. Also different in approach is a fascinating volume entitled *Cold War Critics: Alternatives to American Foreign Policy in the Truman Years* (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1971). The editor Thomas G. Paterson has collected a series of original studies on such diverse critics of Truman policies as Robert A. Taft, Walter Lippmann and Henry A. Wallace. These men and other critics were not "fuzzy-minded idealists," Paterson

[7] Schlesinger, "Origins of the Cold War," *Foreign Affairs*, XLVI (October, 1967), pp. 31–32, 40–47.

[8] For an excellent evaluation of the Fleming and Horowitz volumes, see Lloyd C. Gardner, *Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy, 1941–1949* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970), pp. 302–305. See also Gaddis Smith's comments on Fleming in "Visions and Revisions of the Cold War," *New York Times Magazine* (29 April 1973), p. 51.

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argues, and in view of the failure of Truman policies to resolve Cold War tensions the untried alternatives of these dissenters appear quite attractive in retrospect.[9] Barton J. Bernstein, ed., *Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration* (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1970), examines different Truman policies rather than the people who opposed them. Bernstein places major responsibility for increased conflict on President Truman for his reversal of Franklin Roosevelt's "tactics of accommodation."[10]

Carrying on the increasingly influential left revisionist tradition are Walter LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945–1966* (New York: Wiley, 1967), Lloyd C. Gardner, *Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy, 1941–1949* (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1970), and Gabriel Kolko, *The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943–1945* (New York: Vintage, 1968). The three volumes are similar in that each is the result of extensive scholarly investigation and each is heavily oriented towards economics (in the tradition of William Appleman Williams). LaFeber argues that Cold War friction was exacerbated by America's attempt to maintain an open door/open world for her enormous economic capacity regardless of the abrasiveness of this approach to the security-conscious Soviet Union.[11] LaFeber's book is probably the best available synthesis of this type of revisionism; its influence has been diminished, however, by the frequently shifting chronological approach that often bewilders the average undergraduate. Gardner's book, comprised of unconnected essays, focuses on such key figures as Roosevelt, Truman, James F. Byrnes, and Dean Acheson. The author's investigation of America's "illusion-makers" leads to the conclusion (or, perhaps, begins with the assumption) that in contrast to Soviet responsibility "the United States was more responsible for the *way* in which the cold war developed. . . ."[12] By far the most comprehensive of the newer revisionist accounts is Kolko's massive study. A monumental scholarly achievement, the book is one of the most useful volumes on the origins of the Cold War to appear in many years and should be useful as a reference even to scholars who reject the author's Marxist predilections and his characterization of United States wartime diplomacy as a frantic crusade to bolster and save a faltering world capitalism.[13]

There is disagreement even among the left revisionists as to exactly when the Cold War started. Gardner initiates his study in 1941 while Kolko begins with the growing tensions over the second front in 1943. Fleming, Horowitz, Bernstein, and Paterson indict Harry Truman in

[9] pp. 10–13.
[10] pp. 5–6, 16–17.
[11] pp. 1–14.
[12] p. x.
[13] Kolko's assumptions about America's economic objectives are most explicit on pp. 242–79 and 618–26. A massive sequel by Joyce and Gabriel Kolko is *The Limits of Power, The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945–1954*; beyond the scope of this paper, this Marxist analysis is concerned more with the development rather than the origins of the Cold War.

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1945 as the culprit chiefly responsible. Nevertheless, implicit in all of the accounts is the idea that, if any nation wielded power in a ruthless and aggressive way, it was the United States rather than the Soviet Union. Consequently, the left revisionists would unanimously place the major part of the burden for originating the Cold War on American leaders.[14]

RECENT months have seen the development of a fascinating imbroglio as traditionalist scholars have staged a vigorous rally to forestall a complete revisionist triumph. Orthodoxy is clearly alive as the aging patriarchs of the profession take up their pens to silence brash young challengers. Leading the counter-revisionists is Robert James Maddox, whose volume *The New Left and the Origins of the Cold War* systematically attacks recent revisionist writing as intellectually dishonest (i.e. holding a double-standard of behaviour that justifies Russia's security needs but not America's) and professionally discreditable (i.e. employing highly selective and manipulative techniques to historical evidence).[15] A briefer caustic analysis in *Alternative* by Professor Robert Ferrell slams the left revisionists for their monocausal economic interpretation, their dubious research techniques, and their nepotism (they "love to cite the works of each other"). Ferrell is a particularly eminent critic and his barbs wound, but his essay sometimes assumes the tone of one resentful of the success and influence of youth.[16] Also joining the orthodox assault on the New Left historians is the influential and proudly unreconstructed cold warrior Eugene Rostow in *Peace in the Balance* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1973).

Rising above the gaggle of voices is one recent volume which, in this writer's view, is the most important study to appear in several years and is hopefully an indication of the shape of future historical investigation. John Lewis Gaddis in *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972) avoids the traditionalist-revisionist debate, synthesizing from both schools relevant

[14] For useful review articles on Cold War historiography, see Christopher Lasch, "The Cold War, Revisited and Re-Visioned," *New York Times Magazine* (14 Jan. 1968), pp. 26–59 and Norman A. Graebner, "Cold War Origins and the Continuing Debate: A Review of Recent Literature," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, XIII (March 1969), 123–32. The Lasch article is essentially a brief on behalf of left revisionism; Graebner's essay is more impartial. A superb critique of some of the more radical historians, both sympathetic and discriminating, may be found in Ronald Steel, "Did Anyone Start the Cold War," *New York Review of Books*, XVII (2 Sept. 1971), 23–28.

[15] (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973). Interested readers may conveniently find a revealing illustration of the rhetorical level to which the debate has been raised (or perhaps lowered) in Francis Loewenheim's review of the Maddox volume along with the responses of seven revisionist historians in the *New York Times Book Review* (17 June 1973), pp. 6–10. Critical studies ranging over a broader set of issues are Robert W. Tucker, *The Radical Left and American Foreign Policy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1971) and Joseph M. Siracusa, *New Left Diplomatic Histories and Historians: The American Revisionists* (Port Washington: Kennikat, 1973).

[16] Ferrell, "Truman Foreign Policy: A Traditionalist View," *Alternative*, VI (April 1973), 9–14, 28–29; part two VI (May 1973), 9–13, 31.

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factual and interpretative material. To use Ronald Steel's term, Gaddis will surely become the leading exponent of a fourth school, the "post-revisionists," who will "accept the main contention of the revisionists—that the United States bears a heavy share of blame for the Cold War—but deny that it was deliberately created for either political or economic reasons." [17]

FROM the jumble of interpretations briefly elaborated above, one must conclude that American historiography on the origins of the Cold War is at best in a state of flux and at worst in hopeless confusion. What accounts for the disarray among scholars over how the Cold War was born? Two suggestions are obvious. All of our history is to some degree or another in transition as each generation undertakes re-examination of the past from its own perspectives. In particular, the apparent bankruptcy of America's Vietnam policies raised doubts for historians which could only extend backwards into earlier periods and challenge previous assumptions about diplomacy. Additionally, the problem of historical understanding of the Cold War is complicated because large numbers of important documents, the primary resources that provide the meat upon which historians subsist, remain locked away in classified government archives. As long as documents are withheld, the tendency of scholars to speculate and to dissent is heightened.

There is another important and as yet unexamined reason that the Cold War debate continues to rage. It is because scholars have never been able to determine with any precision the nature and the motivation of the policy of Franklin Roosevelt's administration towards Eastern Europe. Few authorities would deny that the Cold War as we have known it for the past quarter century had its inception in the territory of Eastern Europe. It is difficult to see how the Cold War could have developed in the way it did had the Grand Alliance not been bogged down in the marshes of the Pripet.

IT is apparent that the issues which split East and West were not based simply on conflicting ideological interpretations of history. The Marxist conception of history had been rehashed countless times as had the democratic-capitalist critique. Since 1917, Russians and Americans had been at distant ideological poles; and although rhetoric was often discordant and bitter, the two peoples could hardly have been said to be locked in a "Cold War" during the interwar years. It was not until the middle 1940s, when Soviet and American power clashed specifically over Eastern Europe, that the fierce competition of the Cold War was joined. It would, of course, be simplistic and inaccurate to contend now that the protracted conflict is only about Eastern Europe; obviously, since 1945, the Cold War has spread to many geographic areas and has taken many forms of expression—military, economic, political, psychological,

[17] Steel, "The Good Old Days," *New York Review of Books*, XX (14 June 1973), 35.

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and intellectual. Nevertheless, the point is quite valid that the origins of the struggle lay in that buffer zone between East and West (to be even more precise: between Germany and the Soviet Union). It was because both Soviet and American leaders, in intense and uncompromising ways, came to identify important interests at stake in that area of the world that the Cold War began.

Stalin's paramount concern with assuring Soviet security from any future attack from the West (as opposed to expansion merely for the sake of spreading Bolshevism in Eastern Europe) is a constantly recurring theme throughout the wartime correspondence of the Big Three.[18] Although there is not space in this essay to review the extensive literature, except for the most ardent traditionalists, American writers have reached a rare unanimity in accepting Soviet security concerns as legitimate.[19]

Best expressing Stalin's intentions was the famous exchange at Yalta between the Soviet leader and Prime Minister Churchill:

> The Prime Minister has said that for Great Britain the question of Poland is a question of honour. For Russia it is not only a question of honour but also of security . . . not only because we are on Poland's frontier but also because throughout history Poland has always been a corridor for attack on Russia. It is sufficient that during the last thirty years our German enemy has passed through this corridor twice. This is because Poland was weak. It is in the Russian interest as well as that of Poland that Poland be strong and powerful and in a position in her own and in our interests to shut the corridor by her own forces. The corridor cannot be mechanically shut from outside by Russia. It could be shut from inside only by Poland. It is necessary that Poland be free, independent and powerful. It is not only a question of honour but of life and death for the Soviet State.[20]

Poland's future was both a real and symbolic issue. Policies that Marshal Stalin formulated throughout the war for Poland were in some degree or another eventually applied to Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia—the other states that dominated the geographic approaches to the Soviet Union. It is difficult to determine exactly when Stalin decided to extend the Polish solution to other Eastern European states. Gabriel Kolko's persuasive narrative on the Eastern European problem suggests that, as late as 1944, Stalin was following a "pluralistic policy" toward the region and had not embarked on any "final course." Until more records are available, however, it is impossible to dismiss the suggestions of revisionist historians that Stalin may

[18] For key passages, see *Foreign Relations: Cairo and Tehran, 1943*, pp. 533, 598; *Malta and Yalta, 1945*, pp. 679–80. See also *Stalin's Correspondence with Roosevelt and Truman, 1941–1945* (New York: Capricorn Books, 1965; originally published 1958), pp. 60–61, 180–81, 211–13, 218–20.

[19] For examples, see Kolko, *Politics of War*, pp. 99–122, 139: Graebner, *Cold War Diplomacy*, p. 13; Halle, *Cold War As History*, pp. 48–49; Schlesinger, "Origins," p. 45.

[20] *Foreign Relations: Malta and Yalta*, pp. 679–80.

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have been driven toward more pervasive control over all of Eastern Europe by the marked hostility he undoubtedly felt from British and American leaders on the issue of Poland.[21]

Of course, Soviet thinking about Eastern Europe evolved throughout the war; but as the diplomatic records show, there was never a time that Stalin and his advisers did not have a clear conception that vital Soviet security interests were involved in the region. Nor did Soviet leaders ever deny throughout the war that, whatever statements of principles they accepted on account of wartime extremity, their policies in the end would be firmly grounded in their stated conception of Russian interest. However repugnant a scholar may personally find the Soviet system in general and Stalin's regime in particular, one must at least admit that Soviet policy in relation to Eastern Europe was clear and precise. It was also limited; Stalin did not lay claim to anything the Red Army would not be sitting on once the war ended. Moreover, however reprehensible it was for the repressed peoples of the region, Stalin's security policy for Eastern Europe (when viewed from a historic Russian perspective) appears understandable and even realistic.

Had Stalin alone of the Big Three been committed to hegemony in Eastern Europe, tension between the wartime allies would have been greatly reduced. Unfortunately, the United States also evidenced a determination to manage East European affairs.

TO say that the Roosevelt administration developed an attitude of possessiveness concerning Eastern Europe is not to contend that the President and his advisers ever developed a clear, consistent, feasible policy for that region. An objective analysis of the public diplomatic papers, the wartime correspondence, and the meetings between President Roosevelt and Joseph Stalin reveals that the President had no conception at all of America's historic relationship to Eastern Europe or of vital American interests at stake there; nor did the State Department or other administration officials ever attempt a comprehensive analysis of what the nature and extent of America's commitment should be. It is the thesis of this essay that the Roosevelt administration did not know what it was doing in Eastern Europe, and one lasting result (although hardly the most tragic) has been that historians since that time have been bewildered, confused, and argumentative about the origins of the Cold War.

So confused and indefinite was the attitude of American leaders about our interests in Eastern Europe that even the use of the word "policy" unduly dignifies American thinking. (*Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary* defines "policy" as: 3. Management or procedures based primarily on material interest, rather than on higher principles; hence,

[21] Kolko, *Politics of War*, p. 139; for agreement from a realist scholar, see Norman A. Graebner, *Cold War Diplomacy*, pp. 19–20 and *Ideas and Diplomacy* (New York: Oxford, 1964), p. 638.

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worldly wisdom. 4. A settled course adopted and followed by a government. . . .)

America's non-policy towards Eastern Europe confused high American officials throughout the war, it thoroughly perplexed our Soviet allies, and it has bewildered historians ever since.

As the war progressed, the possessive attitude of the Roosevelt administration towards Eastern Europe increased, and this feeling of responsibility toward the region manifested itself in the rejection of the legitimacy of Stalin's security goals. Nevertheless, the thinking of the President and his chief advisers continued to be hazy and superficial. Undoubtedly, the problem was complicated for American officials because there was little historical precedent to substantiate the new attitude. As early as 1850, President Millard Fillmore rejected intervention to save an ill-fated Hungarian revolution and set down American policy: "Although we may sympathize with the unfortunate or oppressed everywhere in these struggles for freedom, our principles forbid us from taking part in any such foreign contests." [22] Nor had any later national leader perceived that important American interests were at stake in Slavic Europe. As Professor Norman A. Graebner has pointed out, even Franklin Roosevelt and his advisers (with a fine sense of history) were content to sit by without lifting a finger throughout the late 1930s while Hitler's hordes overran the region.[23]

Throughout the war years, when the Roosevelt administration did think about Eastern Europe (which was evidently as infrequently as possible), two principal considerations recurred—one very specific and the other abstract. The President repeatedly expressed the fear that the "loss" of Eastern Europe to the Soviet Union might cost him the support of six million Polish-Americans and result in an electoral defeat in 1944. Second, the administration had committed itself by the Atlantic Charter to the principle of self-determination in liberated territories. In the thinking of administration officials, application of self-determination in Eastern Europe was a symbolic issue on which might depend the future willingness of the American public to participate responsibly in international organizations. On this particular issue Rooseveltian practical domestic politics combined with Wilsonian internationalist democratic idealism.

AN examination of Soviet-American wartime dispatches and the records of the principal wartime conferences also substantiates the criticism that the President and his assistants failed to formulate a concrete, realistic policy for Eastern Europe. The first high policy meeting between Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin came at Teheran in November

[22] James D. Richardson, ed., *Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789–1897* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1897), V, 78.
[23] Graebner, "Cold War Origins," p. 131.

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and December, 1943. If there was ever a time that Roosevelt should have defined for Stalin any substantial American interests at stake in Eastern Europe, it was at Teheran—before the conduct of the war carried the Red Army into that region. It cannot be said that the President was unaware of the developing tension. Early in November, Ambassador Averell Harriman had presented his chief with a blunt appraisal of Stalin's determination to forestall the re-creation of a *cordon sanitaire* of hostile East European regimes.[24] Unfortunately, the staff documents written before the conference, the "substantive preparatory papers" that now appear in *Foreign Relations*, reveal that no one bothered to emulate Harriman and prepare for the President a penetrating analysis of the American position on the issue.

Even more surprising is President Roosevelt's conduct during the meeting. On the first occasion that the question of Poland was broached, the President sat strangely silent while Prime Minister Churchill pressed Stalin concerning Soviet intentions. (Indeed, it was to become a disconcerting pattern in these meetings that the normally dynamic Roosevelt would sit passively while Winston Churchill, representing the weakest of the three allies, advocated Western concerns about Eastern Europe to Stalin.) The second time that inference was made to Eastern Europe, Roosevelt confined himself to a strong assertion of the necessity for Soviet security from future German attack.[25] It was not until the fourth day of the conference that the President invited Marshal Stalin to his quarters to discuss the policy issue. The brief minutes of the meeting best tell the story:

> The President said he had asked Marshal Stalin to come to see him as he wished to discuss a matter briefly and frankly. He said it referred to internal American politics.
>
> He said that we had an election in 1944 and that while personally he did not wish to run again, if the war was still in progress, he might have to.
>
> He added that there were in the United States six to seven million Americans of Polish extraction, and as a practical man, he did not wish to lose their vote. He said personally he agreed with the views of Marshal Stalin as to the necessity of the restoration of a Polish state but would like to see the eastern border moved further to the west and the western border moved even to the River Oder. He hoped, however, that the Marshal would understand that, for political reasons outlined above, he could not participate in any decision here in Teheran or even next winter on this subject and that he could not publicly take part in any such arrangement at the present time.
>
> Marshal Stalin replied that now the President explained, he had understood.[26]

[24] Harriman to Roosevelt, 4 Nov. 1943, *Foreign Relations: Cairo and Tehran*, pp. 154–55.
[25] *Foreign Relations: Cairo and Tehran*, pp. 512, 532.
[26] Ibid. p. 594.

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It appears then that in this crucial one-to-one exchange, often glossed over by historians, the President communicated the impression to Stalin that Eastern Europe was important to the United States only in the context of the Presidential election of 1944. Personal political survival was certainly an idea that Stalin could understand, but the idea was also fatefully limited in time. Once Roosevelt's fourth term was assured (surely his last), would Eastern Europe then cease to be important? Because Roosevelt did not outline to Stalin any vital long-range interests, it is easy to see how the Soviet leader could conclude that no such interests existed. If either party at Teheran acted deceptively, it was more likely the American President than Premier Stalin. When the Polish question arose at the last tripartite meeting of the conference, Roosevelt sat impassively again while Prime Minister Churchill attempted to impress on Stalin an Anglo-American interest in Eastern Europe.[27]

THROUGHOUT 1944, the administration's attitude remained indefinite. In January when the Soviets renewed their correspondence about the Polish boundary issue, it was clearly understood within the State Department that Stalin was quite prepared to act unilaterally on the matter.[28] Nevertheless, Secretary Cordell Hull's only response was a vague, highflung declaration affirming America's support of the "settlement of disputes by peaceful accord," coupled with a warning that future "international cooperation" would be jeopardized if the boundary dispute was not resolved with "respect for the rights of nations."[29] When President Roosevelt wrote to Stalin personally early in February, he recalled the spirit of Teheran, admitted that vital Soviet security interests were involved in Eastern Europe, and spoke only in the most general phrases about Poland as a symbolic issue of international cooperation.[30] In June, when Roosevelt saw the Polish leader Stanislaw Mikolajczyk in Washington, the President conveniently ignored his earlier implicit acceptance of the Curzon Line at Teheran and promised Mikolajczyk moral support for Polish boundary aspirations.[31] During the year, however, it was Churchill who carried the burden of East European policy; in October the Prime Minister journeyed to Moscow and unsuccessfully attempted to reconcile Polish-Russian differences.[32] Late in 1944, when President Roosevelt (now victorious at the polls for a fourth time) issued a strong statement on behalf of Polish self-determination, he took care to inform Stalin that the declaration did not signal a

[27] Ibid. pp. 596–604; Winston Churchill, *The Second World War: Closing the Ring* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1951), V, 394–97; Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins* (rev. ed., New York: Harper, 1950), pp. 796–99.
[28] *Foreign Relations, 1944*, III, 1243–45.
[29] Hull to Harriman, 15 Jan. 1944, ibid. 1228–29.
[30] *Foreign Relations, 1944*, III, 1243–45.
[31] Kolko, *Politics of War*, pp. 114–15.
[32] Herbert Feis, *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought* (Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 453–60; Churchill, *Closing the Ring*, pp. 226–43.

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new attitude on his part.[33] Roosevelt's position on Poland, to use Gabriel Kolko's polite phrase, continued to be "complexly inconsistent." When Churchill spoke to the House of Commons in December, he barely disguised his own pique at Washington's vacillation remarking that "I find great difficulty in discussing these matters, because the attitude of the United States has not been defined with the precision which His Majesty's Government have thought it wise to use." [34]

Nor was Churchill the only one concerned about the inconsistencies of Roosevelt policy. An eloquent storm warning came from Ambassador Averell Harriman in Moscow, who was painfully aware of Soviet seriousness about hegemony in Eastern Europe. It could be argued, Harriman stated, that the United States had no important interests in Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, the Ambassador feared the operation of a kind of domino theory by which the Russians might insatiably attempt to penetrate other countries once they had accomplished subjugation of close neighbours for security purposes.[35] There was no doubt, Harriman wrote, that the Soviets were "realists" and had formulated "a pretty clear idea of what they want." It was time for the United States, in his view, to develop a clearer idea of American interests. In effect, the Ambassador argued, the United States should specifically define for the Russians the nature and scope of American interests in Eastern Europe. Compromises should be made where possible; vital interests should be stoutly defended.[36]

What was the response from the State Department to Churchill's complaint and to Harriman's blunt assessment of Soviet intentions and the lack of American policy? The published documents reveal that there was no response at all, save for a memorandum prepared by Under Secretary Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. This amazing document, a model of obtuseness and generality, ran in length approximately one printed page and attempted in that space to define American interests in "Eastern and Southeastern Europe and the Near East, *as elsewhere*"! Stettinius called for political self-determination, the open door for trade and philanthropic enterprise, free flow of information, and postponement of territorial claims until the conclusion of the war.[37] Nothing was wrong, of course, with the Stettinius shopping list for the best of all possible worlds; but it was simply not the workable, concrete policy that American representatives needed to bargain in any meaningful way with the Soviets. Such an abstract declaration of principles would surely appear to the Russians as fodder ground out routinely for the public herd.

[33] Roosevelt to Stalin, 16 Dec. 1944, *Foreign Relations, 1944*, III, 1345–47.

[34] Louise W. Holborn, ed., *War and Peace Aims of the United Nations* (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1948), II, 538–39; Kolko, *Politics of War*, pp. 109–15, 150. For other comments on Roosevelt's style of diplomacy, see Diane S. Clemens, *Yalta* (New York: Oxford, 1970), pp. 98–99.

[35] *Foreign Relations, 1944*, IV, 992–99.

[36] Ibid.

[37] Ibid. pp. 1025–26.

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FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT had one last chance before his death to attempt to formulate a policy which was both workable and realistic for the United States and at the same time understandable to the Soviet Union when he met early in 1945 at the Yalta Conference with Churchill and Stalin. At Yalta, Roosevelt might have corrected the impression he had earlier given Stalin that the United States had no substantial interest in Eastern Europe, except as a matter of public opinion related specifically to the presidential election of 1944. Yet, Roosevelt carried to Yalta no briefing papers that spelled out the specific ways that vital American security interests were at stake in the region. Expressions of general economic interest along with the principles of the earlier Stettinius memorandum comprised the substance of the staff papers prepared for the President's guidance. State Department planners did recommend formal acceptance of the Curzon Line as Poland's eastern boundary. The briefing paper on Poland and the Balkans stated that "politically, while this Government probably would not oppose Soviet influence in the area, neither would it wish American influence to be completely nullified." [38]

One State Department official, John D. Hickerson, in a separate memorandum bluntly urged the President to accept the reality that Eastern Europe would be a Soviet sphere-of-influence after the war and, short of employing force, the United States could not expect to alter that fact. It was Hickerson's hope that frank recognition of Soviet hegemony in an area where the United States had no vital interests might be traded for Russian cooperation in the final defeat of Germany and Japan and for aid in organizing the post-war peace. The arrangements were not a matter of what the United States liked, Hickerson wrote, but rather of what this nation had the power to effect.[39]

At Yalta, therefore, President Roosevelt had two realistic alternatives: one, as suggested by Ambassador Harriman, was to define and defend the specific American interests involved in Eastern Europe; the other, as suggested by Deputy Director Hickerson, was to admit that no vital interests were actually at stake and to recognize the Soviet sphere-of-influence there. Judging by his conduct at Yalta, Franklin Roosevelt was oblivious to both suggestions.

When the Polish question came up at the third plenary meeting, President Roosevelt's approach was mild and cautious. At the outset he admitted that he spoke with the perspective of one who was "farther away from Poland than anyone else here" and he expressed agreement that "one thing must be made certain and that was that Poland should maintain the most friendly and cooperative relation with the Soviet Union." Nevertheless, Roosevelt appealed to Marshal Stalin to deal generously with Poland on boundary issues. Neglecting to mention any other American interest, Roosevelt then clouded the issue by again referring

[38] *Foreign Relations: Malta and Yalta*, pp. 230–50.
[39] Ibid. pp. 93–96.

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to the six million Polish voters in the United States. Stalin appeared to be unmoved; obviously, where security considerations were vital, he would not be persuaded by emotions or magnanimity.[40]

Just after the third plenary session, Roosevelt sent a letter to Marshal Stalin deploring the inability of the Allies to reach a settlement on the Polish issue and expressing his fear that the breach would place all three powers in a "bad light throughout the world." The President admitted that Stalin had strong security claims but added that the American people were watching developments with a "critical eye." Concluding with a bit of wishful thinking (or, perhaps, "whistling in the dark"), Roosevelt said that he knew that Stalin, like himself, desired to see "a new free and democratic Poland emerge from the welter of the war."[41] At the fourth plenary session, the President emphasized that the nature of the Polish government gave him far greater concern than boundary issues; but when Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov introduced specific proposals agreeing in principle to enlarge the present Provisional Government by including Polish emigres from abroad, the President asked to defer discussion until a later time.[42]

At the next session of the Big Three, the bargaining over Poland became particularly bitter. Nevertheless, President Roosevelt remained strangely passive as Winston Churchill assailed the Soviet refusal to accept a new government for Poland rather than merely enlarging the Lublin regime. It was, in Churchill's words at the time, "the crucial point of this great conference." Unfortunately, throughout the exchange the leader of the world's most powerful nation made only a few comments; and finally tiring of the issue, Roosevelt proposed that the foreign ministers settle it.[43] It would appear, therefore, that throughout the plenary sessions the President of the United States (to borrow the inglorious phrase of John Quincy Adams) came in "as a cock-boat in the wake of the British man-of-war."

In later sessions, although American officials tried to combat Soviet assertions on the ministerial level and below, President Roosevelt continued to hold back. At the sixth plenary meeting, with characteristic optimism and superficiality Roosevelt remarked that the differences between the West and the Soviets were "only a matter of words." Then, inexplicably, the President muddled the question of American interests still further when he again brought up the issue of six million Polish voters in the United States. Such an argument at this time could have made little impression on Stalin, however, since the Soviet leader was

[40] Ibid. pp. 667–71, 677–83. For an analysis of the Western position on Poland,. see Clemens, *Yalta*, pp. 176–86. The Clemens volume is especially useful for the Soviet source material incorporated into the narrative.

[41] Roosevelt to Stalin, 6 Feb. 1945, *Foreign Relations: Malta and Yalta*, pp. 727–28.

[42] *Foreign Relations: Malta and Yalta*, pp. 709–17; Clemens, *Yalta*, pp. 186–94.

[43] *Foreign Relations: Malta and Yalta*, pp. 776–82; Clemens, *Yalta*, pp. 194–99. In both versions of the minutes of the session reprinted in *Foreign Relations*, President Roosevelt is limited to four brief comments, none of which run over three printed sentences.

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completely aware that elections had been completed in the United States and that Roosevelt's fourth term was assured.[44]

The results of the Yalta Conference are well known. While Roosevelt did concede the Curzon Line as the boundary between Poland and the Soviet Union, he could get only a vague agreement from Stalin on the exact composition of a new Polish government; for his part Roosevelt insisted on only the most indefinite statement on other boundary issues. Unable to sway Stalin from his stated objectives, Roosevelt and Churchill persuaded the Soviet leader to sign more declarations of principle, the Declaration on Liberated Europe and a Declaration on Poland.[45] Out of obvious wartime necessity Stalin accepted the documents; but whatever absolute definitions his Allies tried later to place on the words, he had no intention to cede to his Allies control of territory in Eastern Europe that the Red Army would occupy after the war. Yalta was Franklin Roosevelt's last chance in face-to-face diplomacy to effect a reasonable policy for Eastern Europe. Within two months, the President was dead. A new leader, surveying the Roosevelt legacy, concluded that the Soviets had been deceitful and faithless. When Harry Truman "got tough" with the Russians, the Soviets toughened their own position; and there was no turning back from the Cold War.

THE record of Roosevelt diplomacy during the war is puzzling indeed. At no time did the President explain to his Soviet counterpart any concrete, vital interests dictating that Eastern Europe be preserved for liberal, democratic governmental forms. The suggestion that realistic examinations of the American position in Eastern Europe were made and may exist in documents still classified seems unlikely; certainly had vital security interests existed in the region, it would have been to the advantage of the Roosevelt administration to define them clearly and publicly.

To be completely fair to President Roosevelt, the historian must acknowledge that implementation of an East European policy would have been difficult. For one thing, on the best military advice, Roosevelt still considered Soviet participation in the war in Asia and the use of Siberian bases for an attack on Japan's home islands to be essential. This consideration, however, should not have precluded a clear formulation and articulation of America's East European interests—even if the Commander-in-chief chose for military reasons to defer action on the policy.

Roosevelt's other big problem was public opinion. It was not just the Polish vote (although Roosevelt greatly overemphasized this consideration in discussions with Stalin). The administration feared that the failure of the ideals of the Atlantic Charter would ignite within the expectant public pervasive disillusionment, resulting in a reversion to

[44] *Foreign Relations: Malta and Yalta*, pp. 842–57; Clemens, *Yalta*, pp. 203–7.
[45] *Foreign Relations: Yalta and Malta*, pp. 935–38; Clemens, *Yalta*, pp. 212–15.

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isolationism and possibly even rejection of the new United Nations organization. For this reason, the historian John L. Gaddis maintains that Roosevelt's options were severely limited and that Stalin, who did not have to contend with democratic diplomacy, could have afforded to make greater concessions.[46]

In retrospect, however, it appears dubious that the public was so uncontrollable a beast that Franklin Roosevelt had no flexibility. A *Fortune* poll of March 1944 revealed that less than 20 per cent of the respondents still held isolationist sentiments (even in the Middle West). By an overwhelming majority, Americans expected to participate in the international organization; and in the specific listing of other nations that the respondents wanted included, the Soviet Union followed only Great Britain and China.[47] Late the following year, Elmo Roper conducted an extensive poll of public attitudes on Russia. Forty-two per cent of the respondents still expected improved relations with the Soviets in the future. On the question of whether Russia was a "peace-loving nation," the public was almost equally divided. More than half of those who answered believed that the Russian people were "pretty friendly" to the United States. Most revealing was the following:

Which one of these do you think is the most important reason behind Russia's interest in the countries along her borders?

She wants to spread communism	25·6%
She needs things they can produce	16·4%
She wants to be able to count on them in case of attack	29·4%
She wants to improve conditions for people in those countries	8·7%
Don't know	19·9%

The public attitude, then, even as late as September 1945, was (to use *Fortune's* phrase) "friendly but tough"—with emphasis on the former term.[48]

No serious student of the history of the forties would argue that it would have been easy for Franklin Roosevelt to puncture the balloon of public expectation inflated by the idealism of the Atlantic Charter and other wartime rhetoric. Yet, the President apparently knew as early as 1943 that democratic idealism would not dictate the post-war settlement in Eastern Europe.[49] At Teheran, Stalin warned the President that he should undertake extensive public relations work to prepare the public.[50] From within the State Department, John D. Hickerson pleaded with Roosevelt to begin preparing the press, Congress, and

46 Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War*, pp. 360–61.
47 "Fortune Survey," *Fortune*, XXIX (March 1944), 94. See also ibid. pp. 46, 157–65.
48 "U.S. Opinion on Russia," *Fortune*, XXXII (Sept. 1945), pp. 233–43.
49 Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War*, p. 17.
50 *Foreign Relations: Cairo and Tehran*, p. 594.

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public to accept a Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe as unfortunate but inevitable.[51]

But Franklin Roosevelt did not act in an attempt to bridge the gap between public idealism and private reality. Perhaps it was too painful for the President to adopt a realistic policy because the task of deflating the public's expectation would have also required abandoning his own deeply felt commitment to democratic idealism. As Harry Hopkins once said of the President's idealistic intensity:

> He wants to make the boys [reporters at press conferences] think he's hard-boiled. Maybe he fools some of them now and then—but don't ever let him fool you, or you won't be of any use to him. You can see the real Roosevelt when he comes out with something like the Four Freedoms. And don't get the idea that those are only catch phrases. *He believes them. . . .*[52]

It was, tragically, this well-intentioned idealism that was the ruin of the President's diplomacy. Increasingly, as the war progressed, Roosevelt was able to articulate his vague feelings of possessiveness towards Eastern Europe only in terms of ideology. In carrying the issue repeatedly to that level of abstraction, he only insured the inevitability of cold war. The problem was, of course, that in Joseph Stalin the President faced an opponent whose ideological convictions were as deep and insistent as Roosevelt's own. Stalin's communism was simply not compatible with Roosevelt's democratic capitalism. The only hope of avoiding confrontation was to place the struggle over Eastern Europe on the plane of concrete, limited, demonstrable national interests. Only the recognition of the legitimacy of one another's vital security interests might have brought a reasonable formula for settlement.

It is clear that Stalin tried this approach almost until the end of the war. It is also clear that Roosevelt never succeeded in explaining what specific American interests were at stake in Eastern Europe. The President's general hostility to Soviet goals coupled with his non-policy (or non-explanation of policy) continued to confuse, bewilder, and antagonize his Russian allies. Indeed, Roosevelt's failure to formulate a definition and defence of America's vital interests in Eastern Europe causes the historian to suspect (as it made the Soviets think at the time) that the United States *had no significant interests* in the region. In that case, the President should have accepted a Soviet sphere of influence and assured Stalin that he faced no threat from the West. Who can say that, in the absence of overt Western hostility, Stalin might not have refrained from such rigid and pervasive control over the Eastern European satellites as he later instituted? Even though a sphere-of-influence settlement would not have been without tension, it is hard to imagine how

[51] *Foreign Relations: Malta and Yalta*, pp. 93–96.

[52] Quoted in James MacGregor Burns, *Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom* (New York: Harvourt Brace Javanovich, 1970), p. 608. See also Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War*, p. 15.

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a realistic recognition of what was essentially a *fait accompli* anyhow could have created a worse situation than that which arose eventually.

NEVERTHELESS, historical debate over the origins of the Cold War will continue to rage. Whatever the form of the arguments, however, the basic question at issue will be the meaning of Franklin Roosevelt's diplomacy. The record, as interpreted above, offers several insights. If Franklin Roosevelt "lost" Eastern Europe, it was not, as many right-wing writers have contended, an act of deliberate betrayal. Neither was Roosevelt's policy one of realism, as former Secretary of State Stettinius has argued.[53] If one accepts the arguments of this paper, there appears at the same time little justification for the left revisionist condemnation of Harry Truman as the villain who reversed Roosevelt's "conciliatory" policies and thus sparked the Cold War. It was Roosevelt who originally made the bargain with the devil and then refused the devil's price. Gladly accepting Stalin as an ally in battle, President Roosevelt then consistently refused to acknowledge the security interests in Eastern Europe that the Soviet leader candidly set forth. Roosevelt merely vacillated and delayed, hoping to avoid the hard decision that the American attitude made inevitable for his unfortunate successor. Truman did not change the substance of the American attitude towards Soviet objectives; he simply stated it (as was his style) more directly and boldly.[54] Nor is there much in the published diplomatic documents to support the monocausal economic interpretation so appealing to many left revisionists. There is no indication that President Roosevelt had any clear conception of an economic "open door" or even of any important trade or investment interests in Eastern Europe. American economic activity in that area had always been slight. Gabriel Kolko himself admits that the United States had only "miniscule" property holdings there. Because they can show no substantial direct economic links (either past or potential) between the United States and Eastern Europe, the left revisionists are forced to fall back on the dubious idea that United States leaders perceived the world economy as indivisible, i.e. the collapse of capitalism in Eastern Europe would have a domino effect, eventually destroying the economic systems of Western Europe and then the United States.[55]

To conclude, President Franklin Roosevelt did nourish vague idealistic sentiments about Eastern Europe, and he developed an attitude

[53] For contrasting views, see Felix Wittner, *The Yalta Betrayal* (Caldwell, Idaho: Caxton Printers, 1953), and Stettinius, *Roosevelt and the Russians: The Yalta Conference*, ed. by Walter Johnson (New York: Crowell-Collier, Macmillan, 1949).

[54] Indeed, Professor Francis L. Lowenheim has recently published a dispatch from Roosevelt to Churchill, dated 6 April 1945, which indicates that the President himself was keenly aware that his attitudes towards Eastern Europe were leading him towards a "tougher" stance in opposing the Russians. See the *New York Times*, 27 March 1972, p. 33. For agreement on Truman's lack of options, see Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War*, pp. 172–73.

[55] *The Politics of War*, pp. 424–27.

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of responsibility towards the region. He never developed a policy, however; if Roosevelt lost Eastern Europe, it was by default. Machiavelli wrote that a wise prince must have the boldness of a lion and the elusiveness of a fox. In his political biography of Franklin Roosevelt, James MacGregor Burns skilfully ascribed both qualities to the President.[56] In wartime diplomacy, however, especially concerning Eastern Europe, Roosevelt's resiliency failed. The President confined himself to one role only—he was the fox. His elusiveness baffled opponents at the time and has perplexed historians since; even worse, it contributed to tragic misunderstandings. In East European policy, Roosevelt should have played the lion (if the stakes were high enough to justify the role), or he should not have played at all.

[56] *Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1956).

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An Interview with Alexander Solzhenitsyn*

Q. Is it true that you receive letters with threats and demands from gangsters?

A. I have received letters with threats rather than demands, threats to make short work of me and my family. This summer such threats have come to me through the mail. Not to mention the psychological mistakes, the many technical mistakes by the authors have convinced me that these letters were sent by KGB agents. For example, the incredible speed of delivery of these bandits' letters—less than 24 hours. Only letters from the most important government organs go that fast. Letters mailed to me in Moscow usually take three to five days, but letters of any importance, urgency and usefulness are never delivered to me at all. Another example of technical mistakes they have made is that the KGB officials were in such a hurry the envelopes were sealed only after the post office had stamped them. A third example are the terminological errors. For example, a quote from the last letter of 30 July: "Well, bitch, you never came! Now you can blame yourself. We will make a correction. Just you wait!"

The authors have tried to use thieves' jargon, but were not sufficiently familiar with it and used the word "correction," which means trial and punishment by the thieves against their own guilty or turncoats, but never means punishment of a "freier," that is, a free man from the despicable, outside world—these people are not worthy of a "correction" in the opinion of thieves, they are just done away with.

This kind of bandits' masquerade is not particularly new for KGB collaborators. There are cases of hooligans going unpunished, hooligans who have beaten up undesirable dissidents in the streets, who have snatched briefcases from Western correspondents, who have broken windows of foreign cars. After the failure of the campaign to slander me behind my back, it was quite natural to expect a bandits' masquerade.

And then there was the case of the respected Michael Scammell, editor of the journal *Index*, who told me of the following episode after he had left the Soviet Union. At Sheremetyevo Airport he was subjected to a three-hour search, and on him they found notes relating to his trip. To make such notes is considered natural by all human standards, but by Soviet standards it is considered criminal. When they made this discovery, the so-called "customs officers" put pressure on him and proposed that he buy a manuscript about Solzhenitsyn (without mentioning the writer directly and without showing the manuscript) and thereby settle the incident. Mr Scammell refused.

* Alexander Solzhenitsyn gave this interview on 23 August 1973 to Frank Crepeau of the Associated Press and Alain Jacob of *Le Monde*.

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This may have been a provocation aimed at Mr Scammell or preparation for a routine provocation against me. But judge for yourself what a wide range the KGB has: from "gangsters" and street hooligans to "customs officers" and brokers in literature. And the question arises: if our committee for state security—the KGB—protects the world's most advanced state order, which according to the world's only true philosophy of life is guaranteed universal historical victory anyway, then why such fuss and such low methods?

During the winter of 1971–72, I was warned through several channels (within the KGB apparatus there are also people who are tormented by their fate) that they were preparing to kill me in a "car accident." I gave a hint of this in my last interview.

But here is the peculiarity, or, I might almost say, the advantage of our social structure: not a single hair falls or will fall from my head or from the heads of members of my family without the knowledge and approval of the KGB, such is the extent we are observed, shadowed, spied upon and listened to. And if, for example, today's letter-writing gangsters had turned out to be real ones, then after the very first letter they would have come under the full control of the KGB. If, for example, a letter that reaches me by post blows up, it will be impossible to explain why it didn't explode before that in the hands of the censors.

And since for a long time I have not suffered from serious diseases, and since I don't drive a car, and since because of my convictions under no circumstances will I commit suicide, then if I am declared killed or suddenly mysteriously dead, you can infallibly conclude, with 100 per cent certainty, that I have been killed with the approval of the KGB or by it.

But I must say that my death will not gratify those people who count on it to stop my literary activities. Immediately after my death or immediately after I have disappeared or have been deprived of my liberty, my literary last will and testament will irrevocably come into force (even if there should appear in my name a false and contradictory declaration, like the letter by Traiko Kostov from the death-chamber), and then the main part of my works will start being published, works I have refrained from publishing all these years.

If the officers of the KGB track down and confiscate copies of the harmless *Cancer Ward* in all provincial cities (and fire the holders of these copies from their jobs or drive them from higher educational institutes), what will they do when my principal and posthumous books stream out all over Russia?

Q. In your last interview one and a half years ago you told of restrictions and persecutions in connection with your literary activity, in the gathering of material, and in your daily life. Has anything changed for the better?

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A. Vaganov, the head of the regional archives in Tambov, refused to let me have a look even at newspapers 55 years old; the whole of the history of Tambov will perish there on the floor of a damp, ruined cathedral and will be gnawed to pieces by mice. In the Central Military-Historical Archives a rigorous investigation was recently made in order to find out who—in 1963!—made available to me material about the first world war, and how this happened. A young literary specialist, Mr Gabriel Superfin, who has helped me a lot and who has a remarkable talent for appreciating the significance of archive material, was arrested on 3 July [1973] on the basis of confessions of Yakir and Krasin and taken to the town of Oryol, and in order to give him a harsher and longer sentence he has been accused under article 72 [of the Penal Code] which provides for a sentence of up to 15 years. With his fragile health, this means murder in prison. Of course, he has not been openly accused of helping me but that help will make his fate a heavier one.

Alexander Gorlov, who in 1971 would not agree to KGB demands that he keep silent about the burglary of my country cottage, has since been deprived of every possibility to defend his Doctoral thesis which he had already submitted at that time. And they also threatened him. The thesis has won 25 positive reviews, including all the official opponents, and not a single negative review. It would be impossible to reject it on scientific grounds. But all the same, his defence will not take place because "lack of political confidence" has been expressed regarding Gorlov. Preliminary steps have been taken to dismiss Gorlov from his work.

[Cellist] Mstislav Rostropovich has been persecuted all these years with the tireless and ingenious pettiness which is so typical of the great power apparatus. A long succession of trivial objections, pinpricks, obstacles and humiliations has been flung at him at every step of his daily life in order to force him to stop being hospitable to me. Madame Furtseva [the Minister of Culture] and her deputies even made this demand openly, with no inhibitions. For some time they even refused him and Galina Vishnevskaya [Rostropovich's opera-singer wife] access to radio and television, and newspaper reports about them were distorted. Quite a number of his concerts in the Soviet Union were cancelled for no apparent reason, even when he was already on the way to the town where the concert was to be held.

They have methodically deprived him of professional contact with the greatest musicians of the world. And because of this—just one example—the first performance of Lutoslawski's Cello Concerto in Poland, the composer's homeland, has been postponed for several years —they won't let Rostropovich go there.

And the first performance of the Concerto by Britten dedicated to Rostropovich has also been postponed for several years for the same reason. Finally, they forbade him to work as a conductor at the Bolshoi Theatre, which for him was extremely important and interesting work. Last spring, I considered it my duty to move from his *dacha*

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in order to deliver him from persecution. But the persecutions continue vindictively to this very day. They just cannot forgive him for the [open] letter he wrote [in October 1970] about the state of the arts in the Soviet Union.

For several years now not one single telephone call or indoor conversation involving me or members of my family, not even on matters of everyday life, takes place without being bugged and (there are signs) without being analyzed. We have already got used to the situation that day and night we permanently talk in the presence of the KGB. When their tapes run out they unceremoniously break the telephone conversation to reload the tape while we dial again. The same is happening to Rostropovich, Sakharov, Shafarevich, the Chukovsky family and many other families known to me, and even more unknown.

It's strange to hear that in some places arguments take place about whether the President has the right to order the installation of electronic bugging equipment for the defence of his country's military secrets. And a man who has leaked such secrets is even vindicated in court. But in our country a person has only once to voice an opinion opposite to the official one and he is considered guilty even without a trial. And electronic bugging equipment is installed at his place not by the leader of the country but by an ordinary officer of the KGB.

Such electronic bugging, not to mention all the other kinds of surveillance, enmeshes thousands upon thousands of intellectuals and responsible civil servants in the major cities of the Soviet Union. And a vast number of parasites in uniform sit and analyze the tapes. And this is not even kept very secret. A Minister thinks himself permitted to announce to one of his underlings: "I happened to listen to one of your telephone conversations the other day"—and then a rebuke because of it. And the surveillance reaches the point that even for the people who come into contact with me from the Fifth Bureau of the KGB (Major-General Nikishkin) and its First Department (Shironin) written instructions are given: "Find out what addresses they visit." That is a twist of the second order.

In our courtyard stands the shabby Moskvich car belonging to our family. Incomparably better cars are parked alongside it during the night, but there are some strange "thieves" who every time attack only our car. Twice they were unsuccessful, but one time they damaged it purposely and on a third occasion it was sent off to Georgia. And though the police found the car and the so-called hijackers, they were never brought to trial.

Not only I, but also my friends, are deluged with offensive anonymous letters. Before the recent Municipal Elections, an agitator ("from the coalition of communists and non-party people") stated quite unashamedly regarding my wife: "Such people have to be silenced!" The editor of the [hard-line literary-cum-political] magazine *Oktyabr* [October], Zverev, has stated in public lectures at the Institutes of Virology and Immunology of the Academy of Sciences that I am "a

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member of the Zionist Executive Committee." Someone naively pointed out to him: "But in the paper they said Solzhenitsyn is of landowners' origin." The resourceful gentleman from *Oktyabr* replied for all to hear: "At that time we had to write like that. But now we have to consider Solzhenitsyn a Jew."

Postal censorship has not let through a single newspaper review published in the West about my book *August 1914*, not a single one of the many, many which my lawyer, Mr [Fritz] Heeb has sent me. Therefore I have no opportunity of knowing how my book is received in the West. The Minister of Foreign Trade, Patolichev, has refused to recognize my right to receive instalments of the Nobel Prize money, and they force me to discriminate against this money by recognizing it as "a gift from a private individual" (which, by the way, gives the state the right to confiscate one third of the so angrily condemned prize). The KGB now and then sends its agents to me in the guise of "young authors" who bring along their literary efforts.

A prominent KGB general delivered to me through a third person a direct ultimatum: that I leave the country, otherwise they will drive me into a camp, more specifically, to Kolyma—in other words, according to the Amalrik model, by using an "everyday paragraph" [of the Penal Code]. If necessary, this third person will today or tomorrow divulge more details of this episode.

Q. You have been refused a permit to live in Moscow with your family. Where do you live now?

A. I don't live anywhere any more. When the winter comes I will have no other place to live than in the apartment of my family, a natural place for any human being. And I'm going to live here regardless of whether they give me a permit or not. Let them shamelessly come and evict me. That will be a deserved advertisement for our advanced social structure.

Q. How do you evaluate your own position, and the situation of other writers now the Soviet Union has joined the World Copyright Convention? There have been some semi-official reports that from now on the export abroad of literary works, in itself—even works not at all classified as "anti-Soviet"—will be viewed as a criminal act, a violation of the state monopoly on foreign trade.

A. Tsar Nicholas I never pronounced himself proprietor of Pushkin's poetry. Furthermore, during the reign of Tsar Alexander II, the novels of Tolstoy, Turgenev or Goncharov were never state property. Tsar Alexander III never told Chekhov where to get his works printed. No traders or financiers of so-called capitalism ever dared trade in works of the spirit or art until the author himself gave them such rights. And if, under the first socialist state, mean mercantile brains think that a product of spiritual creation, a product which is newly born of the soul

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or mind of its creator, will automatically become a piece of goods and the property of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, then such ventures cannot provoke anything but utter contempt.

As long as my possibilities to have my work printed in my own country are closed, I will go on printing my books with Western publishing houses, completely ignoring such financial-police ventures by mediocre persons. I declare incompetent in advance any court case involving Russian literature, or any of its books, or any Russian writer.

But I don't think it will go that far. On the other hand, I foresee that our country's joining the Convention even increases in a particular sense the freedom of our writers. For example, I have not given any of my works to *samizdat* recently because I feared that they would be reprinted in pirate editions [abroad]. But now, according to what they say, the rights of Soviet writers are firmly protected, and therefore they can give their works to *samizdat* without fear, and our readers can get to know works not yet rewarded by official publication.

Q. When do you plan to publish the second volume of your series [which began with *August 1914*]?

A. Probably I won't let out *October 1916* before the third volume *March 1917* is ready. These volumes are too closely knit and only together do they explain the course of events as I see it.

Q. Is it true that your Nobel Lecture, upon advice from your friends, was sharpened after its first, purely literary, version?

A. I don't know where the *New York Times* correspondent got that story. Not only does it not correspond to the truth, but it also goes against my temperament. On the contrary, the lecture was toned down and kept within a literary frame of reference. That was why its publication was delayed a year

Q. Would you like to comment on today's Soviet literature?

A. I can talk about today's Russian prose. There exists a very serious Russian prose. And if you take into consideration the incredible mincing machine of censorship through which writers have to pass their works, then you cannot but marvel at their growing skill. Through small, minute artistic details they preserve and pass on to us an enormous segment of life which it is forbidden to portray.

I will mention a few names, but it's difficult, and there will probably be some omissions. Some authors like Yury Kazakov suddenly and inexplicably abandon a large-scale work and deprive us of the chance to enjoy their prose. Towards others, like Zalygin, whose story about Stephan Chauzov is one of the finest works of Soviet literature, I may seem unobjective, I experience a feeling of alienation because of my different conception of the ways in which our contemporary literature can serve today's society.

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A third category undoubtedly has obvious talent but their creative works are superficial or not relevant enough to the main streams of our life. But with all these reservations I will give you the names who represent the core of contemporary Russian prose as I view it: Abramov, Astafyev, Belov, Vladimov, Voinovich, Maksimov, Mozhayev, Nosov, Okudzhava, Soloukhin, Tendryakov (Yury), Trifonov, Shukshin.

Q. What would you say about Vladimir Maksimov's expulsion from the Writer's Union?

A. I would not like to talk seriously about the Writer's Union: what kind of writer's union is it if it is led by KGB generals like Viktor Ilin?

But Vladimir Maksimov is an honest, courageous writer dedicated to truth in a disinterested and sacrificing manner and has already been very successful in his search for truth. So his expulsion from the lying Writer's Union is perfectly normal.

Q. How would you comment on the Zhores Medvedev case, the deprivation of his Soviet citizenship?

A. Citizenship in our country is not a natural inalienable right of every human being born on its soil, but a kind of coupon which is held by an exclusive clique of people who by no way and by nothing have proved that they have a greater right to the Russian soil. And this clique can, if it doesn't approve of some citizen's convictions, declare him deprived of his homeland. I leave it to you to find a word for such a social system.

You may have noticed also that in cases when it is impossible to get rid of a person with behind-the-scenes methods (used on the non-prominent), then they find it is least painful to fling him out into the West, and it is best if it can be arranged as a voluntary agreement, under the guise of a temporary trip abroad or an irreversible emigration.

And you have to admit, alas, that they are not mistaken in their calculations. The environment in our country is dense and sticky: it is incredibly difficult to make even the smallest movements here because these movements immediately take the environment with them. In the democratic West the atmosphere is like a rarified gas, or almost a vacuum: there it is easy to wave one's arms, jump, run, turn somersaults—but it all has no effect on anybody else, everyone else is doing exactly the same in a chaotic manner.

Q. What do you think about the expected trial of Yakir and Krasin?

A. Even if they admit Western correspondents to this trial it looks as though it will be just a doleful repetition of the clumsy farces of the Stalin-Vyshinsky period. By the way, in the 'thirties, these farces with all their crude theatrical effects, their smeared greasepaint and loudness of the prompter were still a great success with *thinking people* among

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Western intellectuals: so strong was their thirst to believe in the advanced social system. Such thinking people can also be found in today's generation.

But if no correspondents are admitted to the trial it means it has degenerated two classes lower.

Since, as far as I know, nobody has made the following clear to Yakir and Krasin in their face-to-face confrontations [with friends during their detention in Lefortovo Prison], then I, with the right of an old prison inmate, tell them here and now, that they have conducted themselves faint-heartedly, basely and even ludicrously, by repeating 40 years later, and in inappropriate circumstances, the infamous experience of the lost generation, of those who capitulated in the 'thirties, those inflated figures of history.

Q. What do you have to say about the latest attacks on Sakharov in the Soviet press?

A. While I discuss this I also want to talk about Sakharov's colleague on the Human Rights Committee, my friend Igor R. Shafarevich. Shafarevich, the President of Moscow's Mathematical Society, is well known in mathematical circles all over the world as a prominent algebraist. But by turning to public activities, he closed off to himself all scientific contacts with the world and relinquished the chance to become a full member of the Academy of Sciences. The oppression and surveillance was intensified around him after his report on religious persecution in our country and after he spoke out at psychiatric congresses on the inhuman use of psychiatry in our country. A congress of psychiatrists diplomatically preferred not to defend those who suffer. As for Shafarevich, not only is he now being forced out of Moscow University, where he has been teaching for 30 years, but also all of his post-graduate students are being barred from scientific activities.

Until recently the tireless public activties of Andrei D. Sakharov were ignored in our press. But now they are starting to slander them. For example, he is declared "a supplier of slander," "ignorant" (all the greatest scientific brains in our country have invariably been equated with ignorance as soon as they have refused to parrot the general line), a "naive purveyor of projects," but most important—"a malevolent critic who hates his own country and is unconstructive."

It is difficult to lie systematically in a less successful fashion than this; it's not an accusation, it is a blunder. Those who have followed Sakharov's articles for some years, his proposals concerning society, his efforts to find ways to save our planet, his letters to the government, his friendly persuasion, cannot fail to see his profound knowledge of the processes of Soviet life, his pain for his country, his torments because of mistakes made not by him, his good-hearted conciliatory point of view, acceptable to widely divergent groupings (in this respect he recalls Tvardovsky [the new deceased ex-Editor of *Novy Mir* who first recognized Solzhenitsyn's talent and published some of his stories].

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I myself do not adhere to much of what Sakharov proposes in concrete terms for our country, but the constructiveness of his proposals is indisputable. None of his proposals is a fragmentary daydream of the "this is what I would wish" type but to which the path is unknown. No, on the contrary, every proposal is relevant and inseparable from today's situation and offers a smooth, non-violent transition.

Tass in its reply to Sakharov says that "even the sharpest criticism in our country is regarded as something useful." This is a blatant lie. No serious criticism whatever, on any level whatever, however constructive it may be, is permitted in our country to ANYBODY, except a small circle of people who have reached their positions by obediently taking orders for years, which has little developed their critical faculties.

Sakharov, alas, is too well known, and therefore he has to be crushed publicly (the way *Novy Mir*, for example, was crushed, because it promoted the same constitutional conciliatory line). But unknown critics are crushed in great numbers in silence, in the countryside, in the hinterlands, and how many can there be of them, these people never mentioned to anybody, languishing and perishing in regional psychiatric clinics?

Check for yourselves: during the last ten, twenty or thirty years, have arguments ever been used against any dissident? No, not against one, because no arguments exist. They always reply with curses and slander. Such was the "answer" to Sakharov. And just as empty was the "answer" to Heinrich Böll. But most often there has been total silence, as in the cases of Sakharov's petitions and appeals, my open letters, Rostropovich's, Vladimov's and Maksimov's letters, with the heaps of collective petitions for an amnesty, petitions about saving innocent people, or about saving the Old Russian Cathedral in Moscow, or conserving Russian nature, or not closing any more churches. It's always like that: either administrative punishment in court, a curse, or silence —these are the three resorts for those who have nothing of substance to answer with.

And now against Sakharov they pick up again the worn-out and beslobbered trump card of the 'thirties—aid to foreign intelligence services! What an absurdity! Would a man who has armed them with the most terrible weapon, a weapon on which their power has rested for decades, and still rests, provide help to foreign intelligence services? That borders on utter shamelessness and utter ingratitude.

And yet there is a profound significance, a lofty symbol, and a personal logic of fate in the fact that the inventor of the most destructive weapon of our age has put himself at the service of the World Conscience movement and the primordial suffering Russian conscience, and, under the weight of the sins common to all and every one of us, has abandoned the abundantly good life he was assured of, and which destroys so many people in the world today, and has stepped out in front of the jaws of all-powerful violence.

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Q. How do you evaluate the social situation in the USSR today? Do the statements and attitudes of cultural personalities in the West have any influence on its development?

A. For a long time the true history of our country has not been recorded, has not been written, has not been exposed. And when, of a whole army of historians, young, average, venerable and those crowned with laurels, there turns up one (I'm thinking of Andrei Amalrik) who doesn't chew the common cud, who doesn't wrap himself in quotations from the fathers of advanced pedagogy, but who dares to give an independent analysis of today's social structure and predict the future, that is, what may in fact happen to our country, then instead of analyzing his works and taking from them what is true and practically useful, they simply put him in jail.

And when from the ranks of our glittering and decorated generals this lone Grigorenko turned up, bold enough to express his nonconformist view about the course of the last war and about today's Soviet society, a view which in fact was entirely Marxist-Leninist, this view was declared a psychiatric insanity.

For several years the self-sacrificing *Chronicle* [*of Current Events*] quenched a general and natural human thirst to know what was going on. It reported, though in a very incomplete manner, names, dates, places, prison terms, forms of persecution. It brought to the surface from the deep abyss of ignorance just a tiny, tiny part of our terrible history—and for that it has been destroyed and crushed with such thoroughness. We can take any Western example; not even in Greece do they persecute plotters against the state.

Now, without the *Chronicle,* we perhaps won't be informed of the latest victims of a prison-camp regime which kills by its very cruelty applied over a long period, the way it killed Yury Galanskov, the elderly [Boris] Talantov, and Yakov Odobesku (who went on a hunger strike against camp oppression). And maybe we won't be informed about people already sentenced who while in prison are sentenced for a second and third time: for example, Svyatoslav Karavansky and Stepan Soroka (who got 25 years because he read some nationalist brochures when he was a tenth grade pupil), the Latvian pastor Ionas Shtagers, Yury Shukhevich, who after being released got another 10 years because of the testimony of a man who had known him for 24 hours. And how, because of his faith, Boris Zdorovets was sentenced for a third time; how Pyotr Tokar got 25 years all at once (and is now serving his 24th year); or how Zinovy Krasivsky and Yury Belov, after serving their sentences in Vladimir prison, will be transferred to the Smolensk Psychiatric Hospital for an indefinite term.

And the fate that awaits the already sentenced Svitlychny, Sverstyuk, Ogurtsov, Boris Bykov (of the "Young Workers" group in Alma-Ata), Oleg Vorobyov (*samizdat* in Perm), Gershuni, Vyacheslav Platonov, Yevgeny Vagin, Nina Strokata, Stefaniya Shabatura, Irina Stasiv, and

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many, many others unknown even to their families, colleagues and neighbours, will be hidden from our eyes and our knowledge.

And thanks solely to the complete secrecy that surrounds practically everything that happens in our country, Marchenko's book *My Testimony* was thought to be exaggerated when it appeared in the West. Few would think, for example, that according to his testimony, the tsarist Vladimir Prison has become four times worse regarding light under Soviet power—there are only a quarter as many windows. And it has become four times colder and more brutal as well.

And the world, already accustomed to the fact that it won't find out anything about us anyway, disregards even the most obvious and open piece of information: that in this striking country with its most advanced socialist structure there hasn't been a single amnesty for political prisoners for half a century. When our prison terms were 25 years and 10 years, when 8 years in our country was seriously thought of as "a child's term," then we had the famous Stalin amnesty (7 July 1945), which released political prisoners sentenced to three years or less, that is, NOBODY. Those who had a bit more (up to five years) were released under the "Voroshilov" amnesty of March 1953, which simply flooded the country with criminals. In September 1955 Khrushchev, in releasing to Adenauer the Germans who were serving terms in the Soviet Union, also had to give amnesty to those who had collaborated with the Germans. But for *dissidents* there has never been a single amnesty in half a century. Who would be able to point to another example from our planet of a social structure or state system so convinced of its stability? Let those who like to indulge in comparisons with Greece compare to their heart's content.

When at the end of the 'forties we were choked with 25-year terms, we only read in the papers about the unprecedented reprisals in Greece. And today many of the statements from the Western press and Western personalities, even from those who are most aware of oppression and persecution in the past, always add the qualifier: "The same things happen in Greece, Spain, Turkey," in order to create an artificial balance for the sake of left-wing circles. And as long as this artificial phrase—"The same things happen . . ."—is added, sympathy for us loses its meaning, its depth, even offends us. But the sympathizers themselves don't realize, don't see the menacing warning.

I dare to declare that there is no such "The same things happen. . . ." I dare to make the observation that in all these countries violence does not reach the level of today's gas chambers, that is, the prison psychiatric clinics. I dare to observe that Greece is not surrounded by a concrete wall with electronic murderers at the border, and young Greeks don't pass in hundreds over the lethal line with faint hope of ever reaching freedom. And nowhere east of Greece is it possible for an exiled minister (Karamanlis) to have his anti-government programme printed in the papers. And in Turkey they cannot (as they did in Albania) execute a priest because he baptized children. And in Turkey a hundred people

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a day do not throw themselves into the sea (as the Chinese do around Hong Kong) in order to cast lots among the sharks for "freedom or death." And in Spain they do not jam radio broadcasts either from Cuba or from Chile. And Portugal lets in foreign correspondents to check reports. These correspondents would never have received such an invitation to the other end of Europe. They never will receive it and they will remain quite happy. They won't even dare to protest—that's the most typical thing.

The first unit on one scale may be ten, but the first unit on another scale may be ten to the sixth power, that is, one million. And can the conclusion of observers, that "both here and there the first unit has been reached" be explained only by their ignorance or by a hardening of the brain?

I tried in vain a year ago in my Nobel Prize Lecture to draw attention in a reserved way to these two non-comparable scales of evaluation of the volume and moral meaning of events. And to point out that it is impossible to accept as "internal affairs" events in countries that decide the fate of the world.

I pointed there, also in vain, to the fact that jamming of Western radio broadcasts in the East creates a situation comparable to that on the eve of a common catastrophe, the nullification of international agreements and guarantees because they thus don't exist in the conscience of half of mankind. Their superficial trace can easily be swept away in the course of a few days or a few hours. I then assumed also that the threatened situation of the author of the Lecture, which was given not from an armoured rostrum but from the cliffs where the glaciers of the world are born and flow down, would add somewhat to the attention the bemused world gave to his warnings.

I was wrong. It is as if what I said had never been said. And maybe it is as useless to repeat it now.

What jamming of radio broadcasts means is impossible to explain to those who haven't experienced it themselves, who haven't lived under it for years. It means daily spittle into your ears and eyes. It is an offence, and the degradation of man to a robot level, no matter whether they jam with the "total blackout" of the waveband, or with the "rusty saw," or with vulgar music. It means that grown persons are reduced to infants: swallow what your mother has already chewed for you. Even the most benevolent broadcasts during the most friendly visits are jammed just as systematically: there must not be the slightest deviation in the evaluation of events, in the nuances, in the accents. Everybody has to be informed of and remember an event in 100 per cent the same way. And many facts about the world must not be made known to our people at all.

Moscow and Leningrad have paradoxically become the most uninformed big cities in the world: their inhabitants ask people who come in from the countryside about the news. There, for financial reasons (our population has to pay very dearly for these jamming services), the

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jamming is weaker. But according to the observations of people from various places, the jamming has been extended during the last month, has conquered new areas, has been intensified. (I recall the fate of Sergei Khanzhenkov who has now served seven years for an attempt —or rather, for only an intention—to blow up the jamming-station in Minsk. And yet if you look at it from the viewpoint of general human concern, it is impossible to understand this "criminal" as anything other than a fighter for general peace.)

The general aim of the suppression of thought in our country today could be called "Chinese-ization," an effort to realize Chinese ideals—except that these ideals existed in our country before, in the 'thirties and were then abandoned. Did many people in the West, for example, know about Mikhail Bulgakov, Platonov, Florensky in the 'thirties? Likewise in China today there are thousands of dissidents, there are underground writers and philosophers, but the world will know about them only an epoch later, in 50 or 100 years' time, and then only about those few who will have managed to preserve their works despite the grinding of inexorable millstones. And these are the ideals to which they now want us to return.

But I declare confidently that it is now impossible in our country to return to such a regime.

The first reason is this: the international information, the ideas, facts and human protests that slip through in spite of everything and have an influence. It is important to understand that the East is not at all indifferent to protests from public opinion in the West. On the contrary, it has a deadly fear of them—and them alone—but only when it is a matter of the united, mighty voice of hundreds of prominent personalities, the opinions of a whole continent. Then the authority of the "advanced structure" may waver.

But when timid, isolated protests are heard, without any faith in their success, and accompanied by the inevitable reservation that "the same thing happens in Greece, Turkey and Spain," then they evoke only the laughter of the aggressors.

When the racial composition of a basketball team becomes a bigger world event than the daily injections given to prisoners in psychiatric clinics, brain-destroying injections, then what else can you feel but contempt towards an egoistic, short-sighted and disarmed civilization?

Our prisons retreat and hide from the light of world publicity. It was planned to give Amalrik a long, long sentence as early as 1970, but they were forced to give him an "everyday" charge of three years in order to cut him off from the political camps in Mordovia and chase him off to Kolyma. And now, because of renewed world publicity, they have been forced to limit themselves to "only" three years more. Otherwise it would have been longer.

The Western world has already helped a lot through its publicity, and saved many of our persecuted. But the lesson the Western world has drawn from this is an incomplete one; it has not sensed with

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sufficient awareness that our persecuted are not only grateful for the protection but also provide a lofty example of spiritual endurance and readiness for sacrifice, at the very point of death and under the syringe of the murderer-psychiatrists.

And this is the second and most important reason why I am sure that the Chinese ideal is unattainable in our country. The unyielding General Grigorenko requires incomparably more courage than is demanded on the battlefield, to spurn daily, after four years in the hell of a prison psychiatric hospital, the temptation to buy freedom from torment at the price of his convictions, accepting injustice in the stead of justice.

Vladimir Bukovsky, who all of his young life has been ground by the turning, mincing knives of psychiatric prisons, ordinary prisons and camps, did not break down and choose the opportunity of a free existence, but laid down his life as a deliberate sacrifice for others.

This year he was brought to Moscow and it was proposed to him that he should go free but leave the country and not indulge in political activities before his departure. That's all! And he could freely have gone abroad to recover his health. By present Western standards of courage one can pay much more for freedom and for liberation from torture: some American prisoners-of-war felt themselves able to sign any documents against their own country, and thereby, of course, set greater store by their lives than by their convictions. But Bukovsky considered his convictions more precious than his life. He is a striking example for his contemporaries in the West, though, most probably, a useless one. Bukovsky's reply was the following condition: that all those about whom he had written be released from prison psychiatric hospitals. He was not satisfied at being released [merely] without having committed any personal act of base cowardice. He did not want to run away leaving others in misery. And they sent him off to a camp to serve his 12 years to the end.

A similar choice was also offered to Amalrik this spring: he was told he could go free if he would confirm the confessions of Yakir and Krasin. But he too refused and was sent to Kolyma for a second term. And for all the cases about which we still lack all the details, cases in which torture and torment are hidden from us under the guise of protecting " state secrets," we can still say—judging merely by the fact that they are not let out, that their [prison] regimes are not lightened—that without the slightest doubt, " this man continues to remain staunchly true to his convictions."

A similar choice is often offered also to people who lead a more normal life. They are not prisoners, but that does not make their choice any easier. Take [Alexander] Gorlov, for example, who surprised the burglars from the KGB at my country cottage two years ago. The only reason they didn't kill him at the time was his active resistance, which attracted people. But in return they demanded that he keep silent and threatened to ruin his professional and scientific career. And it was

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made clear that this was no empty threat, and that he would also sacrifice the well-being of his family—and still he did not succumb to the temptation to keep silent. And yet, keep silent was all he had to do.

This series of sacrificial decisions by single individuals is a beacon to our future.

There is one psychological pecularity in human beings that always strikes you: [the tendency] to shun even the slightest signs of trouble on the outer edge of your existence at times of well-being when you are free of care, to try not to know about the sufferings of others (and your own and other people's future sufferings); to yield in many situations, even important, basic, spiritual situations—as long as it prolongs your well-being.

And suddenly, reaching the last frontiers, when man is already stricken with poverty and nakedness and deprived of everything that seemingly adorned his life, he finds in himself enough strength to support himself on the final step and give up his life, but not his principles!

Because of the first quality, man has never been able to hold on to one single plateau he has attained. Thanks to the second quality, mankind has pulled itself out of all kinds of bottomless pits.

Of course, it wouldn't be a bad thing to foresee one's future downfall and the price of the coming reckoning, while one is on the plateau, and to show some endurance and courage a little before the critical hour—to sacrifice less, but a little earlier.

One cannot accept that the disastrous course of history is impossible to undo, that a soul with confidence in itself cannot influence the most powerful force in the world.

From the experience of the last generations it seems to me that it has been fully proved that only the inflexibility of the human soul, which puts itself firmly on the front line against the onslaught of violence, ready to face sacrifice and death, and declares: "not one step further" —only this inflexibility of the soul will guarantee the real defence of individual peace, of universal peace, and of all mankind.

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Revolution Administered

Daniel N. Nelson

WHEN even a scholar of the Bulgarian scene admits that "Bulgaria lies in the shadow of European politics," as Nissan Oren does, it should not surprise anyone that there exists a dearth of scholarly literature in English about communist Bulgarian politics. Thus, having read *Revolution Administered*,* one should give credit where credit is due; Oren succeeds in removing some of the enigmatic shroud from Bulgarian politics in a generally cogent and thoughtful work.

Revolution Administered is a political history and, as such, a credible book. Oren deftly narrates the melodrama of pre-communist twentieth-century Bulgarian politics in chapters one to six, sorting out the myriad of characters in a cast as prodigious as that of a Tolstoy novel. And the thorough background possessed by the author is reflected both in an earlier work on Bulgarian communism and in the extensive bibliography offered with *Revolution Administered.*

With the book's strengths, however, several gnawing deficiencies are also apparent. Not entirely because of anything Nissan Oren has or has not done, *Revolution Administered* falls into a pattern established by the "Integration and Community Building in Eastern Europe" series of Johns Hopkins Press, edited by Jan Triska. Followers of this series have no doubt become aware that its component country-specific studies are introductory and far from exhaustive. One cannot fault Oren or the other authors of the series for writing general surveys of their subject; such an endeavour was needed. But to this reader, at least, the monographs (including this final effort of the series) seem to have struggled in vain to address themselves to an outdated question. Integrative trends in Eastern Europe appears to have been, in retrospect, a poor focus indeed. Oren finds only a tangential development in communist Europe—namely, the bilateral relationship between the USSR and Bulgaria—which he sees as more closely akin to *de facto* annexation. That Oren virtually ignores the topic of "integration" is, perhaps, mildly to his credit, but it certainly speaks poorly of the overall focus of the series.

There ought to be little quarrel with Oren's treatment of pre-communist political history, *per se.* Oren does well, I think, in reducing highly complex events to some semblance of order, introducing prominent individuals (playing some favourites along the way such as Gichev) and major political groups (the Agrarians and Democrats are cast in the best light), all with greater clarity than ever before in English without sacrificing thoroughness.

PROFICIENT as he may be, however, Oren's analysis places great emphasis on two explanatory "themes" which ought to be considered critically. First, geopolitical considerations are viewed as a

* Nissan Oren, *Revolution Administered: Agrarianism and Communism in Bulgaria* (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973, 204 pp. $4.00, paper).

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prime determinant of Bulgarian events. Oren makes the same observations about Bulgaria's traditional role in Balkan politics that other scholars have previously cited—that Bulgaria is a "frustrated" small power, prevented from realizing its "revisionist" dreams, and harbouring "irredentist" longings. Oren takes these common assessments a step further, and apparently makes the assumption that geographical position is a stable and predictable factor in determining political events. Although Oren is clearly not so naïve as to believe geography is the sole determinant of Bulgaria's behaviour today, his stress on that factor indicates that he regards it as more than a conditioning agent. Indeed, one gets the impression that Oren sees Bulgaria as buffeted about in the seas of international politics, inevitably a client state unable to control its destiny. While no one would deny Bulgaria's current dependence on the USSR, Oren takes little note of circumstances which have mitigated the degree of that dependence, perhaps altering Bulgarian subservience. Zhivkov's regime may not yet constitute an independent, allied state in communist Europe, but if positions taken by Bulgaria at the European Security Conference are indicative, some change has already taken place in Soviet-Bulgarian relations.

For Bulgarian international relations, as with geopolitics, Oren offers another explanatory "theme" implicit in his appraisal of the domestic political scene, this one harkening back to David Mitrany's *Marx Against the Peasant*. He is not incorrect in pointing to the conflict between native Bulgarian agrarianism and Russian communism, played out to the bitter end during Chervenkov's collectivization of the peasantry. Yet Oren fails to explain the phenomenon he cites. The clash between a peasant populism and imported Marxism was a "symptom," as opposed to a "cause" of Bulgaria's political course in the twentieth century. Such movements clashed, of course, because of less obvious factors. The reader soon realizes that Oren neglects such formative antecedents to the political struggles he describes. In a short survey work, glossing over intricacies is to be expected. But Oren pays very slight heed to the consequences of economic development, only minimally discusses Bulgarian social transformations in this century (all of two pages to the topic of collectivization), fails to talk about educational or socialization patterns, never discusses the origins or consequences of social stratification in pre-communist or communist Bulgaria, and does not consider interest groupings explicitly or examine the possibility of entrenched bureaucratic interests in the present regime. In other words, Oren relates Bulgarian politics as superficial regime changes and elitist power struggles, giving evidence of social-economic shifts only as a backdrop to each Sofia intrigue. Given the title of his work, one would have expected Oren to give more than marginal consideration to such formative antecedents and ongoing supports of the movements he emphasizes, and to carefully explicate the concept of an "administered revolution." But Oren creates a mystery in the latter case more than he unravels one. The phrase "revolution administered" is used several times, but never explained in more than a cursory manner. If Bulgaria has undergone a "revolution" directed methodically from above, as Oren asserts, then too little attention is paid to bureaucratic-managerial politics and to social change, and too much attention is given to the

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machinations of the leading political figures. Oren's precise implications for the phrase "revolution administered" are left for the reader to ponder.

MOST vexing to this reader is that Oren's approach to Bulgarian politics, blurred by geopolitical constructs and a focus upon the agrarian-communist struggle, allows no room for the dynamics of the political system. Granted, change within Bulgaria has never been as readily observed, even in pre-communist years, as in relatively open political systems, but it certainly occurs nonetheless. Political events, seen to be formed by a constant set of inputs, take on a "sameness" that distorts reality. Events of today such as increased trade with the West, the assertion of "socialist patriotism" as an ersatz nationalist revival, rising consumer demands and growing tourism all suggest that Bulgaria, for whatever reason, is neither a mere doormat for the Soviet Union as it once was, nor as docile a political system as Oren portrays.

Because Oren's viewpoint precludes a dynamic approach to Bulgarian events, he concludes that politics was "converted into nothing more than public administration." If competition for power and the distribution of resources continues to be a gauge of political activity, however, Oren ought to be disputed. Since the abortive plot in 1965, it should be clear that Bulgarian internal politics leads a stunted but nevertheless active existence in the late 1960s and early 1970s at both the national and local level. Such activity portends a period when "uncritical idolatry" (Lendvai's phrase) of the Soviet Union subsides, and when internal demands for consumer goods reduce the absolute priority attached to heavy industry. But in *Revolution Administered*, Oren does not indicate that demands are being made from within the Bulgarian political system to which the regime of Zhivkov must accommodate itself in its economic and social policies, the Soviet Union notwithstanding.

Oren might be correct in saying that Bulgaria was an "utterly penetrated" political system and all but annexed to the USSR through the mid-1960s. Yet, because he fails to realize that even the most servile client state of the 1970s has remarkable day-to-day decision-making powers, with highly resilient native cultures and national ambitions, Oren does not see the inaccuracy of his assessment as it applies to the present and future.

Searching seventy or more years of Bulgarian history, Oren thus grasps familiar, almost "traditional," explanations such as geopolitics and the agrarian-communist dichotomy. These suffice to explain, for Oren, Bulgaria's international position through the century; the conflict between Marx and the peasant is the fundamental explanation for the course of Bulgaria's internal politics; Bulgaria is viewed today as "utterly penetrated," a quasi-province of the USSR. Oren's reliance on such thin strands indicates that he asked too few questions and has answered those he did pose far too simply.

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Memoirs of a Red Count

Alvar Alsterdal

IN Denmark there are still some 200 families of nobility. At the beginning of the sixties they had two representatives in parliament, the Folketing, one of them being " the red count " Kai Moltke. He was elected on the ticket of the new leftist *Socialistisk Folkeparti*, where he had accompanied ex-communist leader Aksel Larsen as they were both excluded from the Communist Party in 1958 having tried to adopt a line which was meant to look independent from Moscow. Since then, Moltke has been moving to the left again, sometimes constituting practically a one-man political party. Nevertheless, he is certainly a political personality to be taken seriously.

This at least is the impression his memoirs leave with the reader. In 1970 there appeared a first volume *The Ghosts of Stalin* (Stalins Gengangere) which has now been followed by *Four Years in Prison Dress* [1] dealing with Moltke's experience as a political convict during the second world war. Both volumes impress the reader with their serious ambition to get at the evil roots of Stalinism. Kai Moltke is a prolific and very knowledgeable political writer and these works will remain a major source for the still unwritten history of Scandinavian communism, much more valuable than the late Aksel Larsen's own highly selective memoirs (1970).

The most interesting part of the first volume is centred around Moltke's time in Moscow in 1932–36, where he was an official of the Profintern. Since there seems to be comparatively little written about the inner working of this not too successful organization, we might regret that Moltke tells very little about his daily work and his immediate surroundings. Part of the latter were some Finnish comrades, who were later accused and killed by Stalin because of supposed bourgeois nationalism. This got Moltke involved in the fate of the Soviet Karelian Republic and, consequently, in Stalin's whole policy of Russification and national deportation. Later, Moltke read up on the subject and became more and more worried about the whole Stalinist degeneration of communism.

What upsets him to this very day is the fact that there has been no follow-up in the Soviet Union of the renunciation of Stalinism introduced by Khrushchev in 1956. The present leaders, Moltke writes, " have adopted the worst possible solution, that is, to black out and bagatellize those actions of violence, which were not only taken against Soviet citizens but against prominent communists from other countries as well. They have chosen to whitewash the prestige of Stalin and the Soviet CP instead of trying to regain the confidence of the European Labour Movement." This, according to Moltke, is a major reason for the split of the socialist left in Europe, which is of course true; quite apart from the fact that there are other explanations, one of them

[1] Kai Moltke, *Fire år i fangedragt* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal Publishing House).

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being that the Soviet model of communism has become less and less relevant outside the Kremlin-controlled area, that is, among communists who have got a choice. Even the New Left usually takes pride in rejecting the Soviet model, though all they tell us about their own socialist society is that it is going to be different and according to the books. Moltke's memoirs are good reading for those who eventually would like to avoid the mistakes of Soviet communism by learning something about their roots.

In his second volume Moltke quotes another excluded communist, Charles Tillon: "The bad thing is not to have been a Stalinist, but to remain one after you have discovered what Stalinism is." An essential element of Stalinism, Moltke states, was the supposed infallibility of the Party leadership. This was transferred from the great Stalin to even the smallest of his vassals, like Aksel Larsen of Denmark.

23 JUNE 1941 was the beginning of the author's four years in prison dress. Like all other known communists he was arrested in the night following Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union. The new prisoners could hardly criticize the German occupants for locking up the supporters of a state they were by now at war with. But they could blame the Danish police for having long ago prepared excellent files which now became very useful to the Gestapo.

The prisoners could also blame their own leadership which had not given them the slightest warning in advance. In fact, that leadership looked as stupefied as Stalin himself. Dissidents like the tough trade union leader Richard Jensen [2] had urged the communists to prepare an illegal organization, but Aksel Larsen was, as always, obedient to Stalin. As long as they were allowed to, the communists played their part in the bogus parliamentary democracy supervised by the German occupiers. At the beginning of 1941 there were still three communists in a parliament without any right to make decisions of its own. The party paper, *Arbejderbladet*, followed the instructions of Stalin and was very polite to the Nazis, blaming only Western imperialism for the war. The Soviet-German Pact of 1939, the paper said, was all "according to the basic nature of the Soviet Union and Germany." The readers got the impression that the pact was of a lasting nature, responding to "the basic state interests of both the Soviet Union and Germany," as Foreign Minister Molotov said in August 1940.

From the prison Moltke and his comrades were transferred to the Danish camp Horserød in Jutland. His fate was not only that of being a communist but of being a communist in opposition to his leadership. Dissident comrades were isolated in prison from the hardliners, and their families were excluded from regular Party welfare assistance. When later the Germans prepared to take over the camp of Horserød, the Danish officials offered the convicts a chance of escaping in time. This of course had to be discussed by the Party leadership, which took its usual time with the result that the Gestapo came first.

During the rest of the war Moltke had to remain in the concentration camp of Stutthof, near Danzig. It was regarded as one of the minor

[2] See his colourful memoirs *En omtumlet Tilvaerelse* (A Life Astray, 1957).

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death camps, but out of an estimated 125,000 prisoners no more than 20,000 survived. Moltke seems to have made it by devoting all energy left from the hard work to possible ways of ideological and political instruction, organizing among other things a fairly regular news service.

In January 1945 he and other survivors started on the death march from the abandoned camp. Kai Moltke met the Eastern front several times, got out of the chaos, and arrived in Denmark some six months later.

At the first congress of the restored Communist Party he and other former dissidents were not allowed to speak. They did not get their membership cards until afterwards. One open question left by his memoirs, like those of other dissident communists, is how he can remain attached to the idea of communism in spite of all his sad experiences.

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